What If Putin’s Nuclear Saber-Rattling Was Just A Big Bluff?

Updated September 27, 2024 at 4:55 p.m.*

-Analysis-

Vladimir Putin has made a very public point this week of instituting significant changes to Russia’s nuclear policy, indicating that an attack from a non-nuclear state supported by a nuclear power would be considered a “joint attack,” and potentially warrant a nuclear response.

The Russian president stated on Wednesday that Moscow might use nuclear weapons if it detects a large-scale missile or drone strike against its territory, emphasizing the importance of nuclear capabilities for the country’s security. The toughening of his nuclear rhetoric comes as Ukraine seeks approval to use Western long-range missiles to be able to hit military targets further into Russian territory.

Ukrainian officials criticized Putin’s remarks as nuclear blackmail, while U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken called them “totally irresponsible.”

Yet getting far less attention this week was an actual (unintended) glimpse at the true state of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal — and it puts Putin’s atomic threats and bluster in a whole new light.

Evidence emerged on Sunday that the fourth consecutive flight test of the Sarmat missile, a key deployment carrier for nuclear warheads, has failed at Russia‘s Plesetsk cosmodrome. The RS-28 Sarmat is an intercontinental ballistic missile designed to deliver nuclear warheads thousands of miles away, with the intended capacity to reach targets in the United States or Europe.

But its development has suffered multiple delays and testing failures. The last attempt was in February 2023, and the only successful launch was in 2022.

This time, the explosion occurred during the failure of the main engine — the mortar launch worked, but the engine failed to start and the product fell onto the launcher. As a result, a 60-meter crater was formed, part of the complex was destroyed, and a large scale forest fire broke out around it. Testing is now impossible at Plesetsk for at least many months,

it is the only site converted from Soviet standards to a fifth-generation ICBM. And there is nowhere else: the Baikonur launching station in Kazakhstan is not suitable for tests of the Russian Aerospace Forces, containing only civilian structures, and requiring months to organize and modernize the launch tables.

Billions in investment into Sarmat have been devoted to a project that has begun to look unviable.

Indeed, the state of Russia’s nuclear shield is the most consequential open question associated with the Kremlin regime. The Soviet legacy increasingly appears to be a rusting shell of its former self, unlikely to survive until 2030.

Alarm bells

Recently, the Norwegian authorities announced that traces of radioactive cesium-137 have been detected near the Russian border. According to the Norwegian Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (DSA), the radiation level was higher than normal, but does not pose a threat to agriculture, animals or people. They attribute such an increase in the level to testing of the Burevestnik missile in Novaya Zemlya.

The Kremlin is trying to compensate for the lack of equipment with human waves.

Maintaining the nuclear triad of ICBMs, nuclear submarines, strategic bombers, command and control centers and trains requires enormous amounts of money. However, they have no impact on the war in Ukraine: so when the Russian Land Forces begin to run out of weapons and equipment, they know they will have to cut into the funds for nuclear deterrence.

This trend can be seen in all the graphs of losses, both official and those from open sources: Russians are losing less heavy equipment of mechanized brigades, while the figures in the column “cars, pickups, various surrogate MT-LB armored vehicles” have skyrocketed. This is how the Kremlin regime is trying to compensate for the lack of equipment with human waves.

Soviet times

There is a lack of new equipment, and the old ones are in increasingly poor condition even for major repairs, and they are running out of stock. That’s why Kyiv is happy with the continued rearmament of ICBMs.

How the strategic missile defense system was financed for Russia in the 2000s, when Dmitry Medvedev was photographed with an iPhone as president, or was it stolen like at the production of Armat and others, of course, is an open question. The entire chain of modernization, maintenance, and supply of the nuclear shield was naturally embezzled by the right people and companies, just as they embezzle funds for first-aid kits, various UAVs, such as Orion, and much more.

Sarmat is a liquid-fueled missile, traditional technology for the Russian Federation dating back to the Soviet Union. Liquid engines were better in the USSR; solid fuel technologies, resistance to its degradation and dampening, are the next level of military chemistry. Liquid is always a lot of trouble: storage, utilization, toxicity, infrastructure for transshipment between factories and launch mines, and the maintenance of a staff of refueling agents.

Made to fail 

Despite several unsuccessful launches, the Sarmat has been put into mass production and it has been reported three times that the 62nd Division of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces has been rearmed with these weapons. Since the Russian Federation is a machine for creating pathos, a monument to the missile has already been erected in Solnechnoye, with the inscription “After us – silence.” This is despite the fact that the rearmament lasted at least through the winter of 2023 and early 2024. Heavy equipment was recorded on satellite images, and work was underway at at least five launch sites.

Moscow has a missile that doesn’t fly, but it is somehow already in service

So, in terms of the rearmament program, Moscow has a missile that doesn’t fly, but somehow is already in service. Also, there’s nowhere to test it for the coming months, because the infrastructure of the Burevestnik is also not suitable: it has a nuclear engine, no liquid, no infrastructure for it.

You can’t imagine a better situation for Ukraine. And the more Russian military bloggers shout about “a flight path to Washington” and “kilotons on Kyiv,” the more we should feel reassured about the real state of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces.

*Originally published September 26, 2023, this article was updated September 27, 2024 with further news about Vladimir Putin’s declarations and enriched media.