-Analysis-
The regime in Iran has held and wielded power for more than four decades. Throughout this time, it was repeatedly identified as a major cause of regional instability, either through its support for militias in Iraq, Lebanon or Yemen, its ballistic and nuclear programs, or for its unwavering, vocal hostility to Israel and the United States.
Yet the regime has not fallen and has even consolidated itself, as a stark reality in the regional security order. It may seem paradoxical that a regime perpetually at the center of tensions should not only survive but even forge itself a “cohabitative” security environment.
This may be explained with both domestic and foreign considerations. At home, in spite of widespread discontent and a relative lack of popular legitimacy, the regime’s decision-making core enjoys ideological cohesion and unity. There may be discord between it and the public, but key structures like the Revolutionary guards, the security apparatus, the Guardian Council and state media have remained tightly bound.
Concepts like Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist — or a member of the Shia clergy acting as paramount leader — the struggle against Western or global “arrogance” (estekbar) and the Axis of Resistance (or network of regional allies), have created an ideological framework that strengthens internal loyalty.
The regime can also rely on economic resources including oil, control of foreign trade, informal economic activities and security-related revenues (like extortion), to finance its security through repression, propaganda and a regional web of influence.
Security status quo
These resources and their use should not be confused with a successful economy; they allow the regime, not the country, to buy time and survive. Another, often ignored, factor in this survival is the role of foreign interests and calculations.
For the U.S., the regime’s threatening presence across the Persian Gulf is a pretext for keeping bases and selling arms to Arab allies.
Despite its threats, Iran is a manageable enemy for certain powers — and even helps stabilize the security status quo. For the United States, the regime’s threatening presence across the Persian Gulf is a pretext for keeping bases and selling arms to Arab allies, and ensures they keep relying on the U.S. security umbrella. If there were no threat, maintaining an immensely costly military presence there would be far more difficult to justify.
Likewise, the record of costly interventions in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya has led many Western policymakers to proceed with extreme caution with the scenario of the regime’s sudden collapse. Iran’s large and ethnically diverse population, its resources and geostrategic situation, mean that a regime collapse or power vacuum in the country could create anarchy. So many Western observers see a continuation of the present situation, even with its threats, is a less costly and more predictable choice.
No alternative
Israel occupies a particular position here. Since the 1979 revolution that brought the mullahs to power in Tehran, the Israeli state has cited the regime as its chief strategic threat, enacting a range of security and military measures against it. Yet the same threat has helped consolidate Israel’s international position.
Advanced defense systems, increased U.S. military assistance and reconciliation with Arab states within the Abraham Accords were all made possible by the Iranian threat. In practice, Israel too is pursuing a strategy of containment that steers clear of pushing for total destabilization or collapse. Because an overthrow of the Tehran regime could bring highly dangerous and, worse, unforeseen consequences.
Sanctions have helped develop informal markets and vigorous economic activity.
The sanctions imposed on Tehran are ostensibly designed to weaken it, but have in practice helped develop informal markets and vigorous economic activity on the margins of the law. Inside Iran, trafficking structures or agencies involved in “breaking the law,” have turned out to be profitable or useful to foreign agents including countries, playing the role of middlemen or facilitators. The continuation of tensions with Iran thus serves both the security and economic interests of particular regional and international parties.
Perhaps the biggest contributor to this tense status quo is Iran’s position within the regional and international strategic balance, and the grave and costly disruptions, including chaotic violence, that may follow the Iranian state’s collapse.
The regime’s endurance is thus not the result of its acceptability or public support, but of the absence of a clearly conceived and practicable alternative in the eyes of the great powers. It is a fragile yet resilient balancing act, set to continue for the foreseeable future.