-Analysis-
As Iran’s aging leader Ali Khamenei moves inexorably to the end of his life, there is acute interest in who or what type of leadership will succeed him. Will Shia clerics elect a successor using the institutional procedures that put Khamenei himself into office (in June 1989), or will the Revolutionary Guard Corps, which already have a grip on numerous institutions and business sectors, grab power? Either way, ordinary Iranians and the reformist and opposition groups that would represent them, will have little say in this jostling between internal power-brokers.
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As I have written before, the Leader’s death at a time of marked domestic and foreign hostility to the Islamic Republic will be a delicate moment, but the regime has shown it has all the gall and lack of scruples needed to weather history’s squalls. Opponents should not imagine, as they understandably did in past decades, that the death of a key figure could bring this outfit crashing down.
As the regime takes stock of the dismally low voter turnout in the parliamentary elections of early March and tires of its useless efforts to win popular legitimacy, Khamenei’s successors may turn to one of several options.
They may firstly decide to end decades of institutional and electoral theater meant to give credence to the regime’s claim that it is a republic; secondly, reveal the ‘trump card’ of a nuclear bomb in a bid to force the West to deal with the regime more respectfully, as it does with Pakistan and North Korea; or thirdly, engineer an overhaul that will strip the clergy of powers in favor of Revolutionary Guards officers.
Nuclear race in the Middle East
Would these options aid the regime’s survival? Transforming the country into a closed, autocratic regime, literally run by a despot like North Korea’s Dear Leader, could harm its diplomatic and economic ties with a range of foreign partners, and likely worsen an already dismal economic situation. That could provoke yet another revolt by desperate Iranians.
The nuclear card might in turn deprive it of the support of even key allies like Russia and communist China and possibly fuel a nuclear race in the Middle East, compounding geopolitical tensions. Would the West and the Biden administration, which has so far shown itself to be excessively complaisant with this regime, tolerate that? Informally, it is said the administration could live with a nuclear Islamic Republic, if it entails a type of Cold War peace in the Middle East based on heightened fears and risks.
With the Guards, their power grab would likely benefit officers beneath the top échelons or generals closest to this Leader. That means the captains, majors and colonels who have borne the cost of Iran’s regional policies — putting in the casualties for example — deciding it was time for them to take the decisions.
Their coup de main will have been prepared beforehand, to be triggered following Khamenei’s death.
It would reveal new faces and provoke the arrests of prominent clerical or regime personalities, some of whom will be blamed and tried, for 45 years of corruption and incompetence. Certain personalities may have to be eliminated (and expect vast sums and assets to change hands, to buy pardons and passports, in this purge). The country’s new masters might loosen social controls and censorship — without effectively ceding power — to win over that mass of Iranians termed ‘silent majority.’
This revamped regime may also curb the Islamic Republic’s regional adventurism, becoming a more pragmatic type of authoritarian regime able to do business with both the East and the West. Precisely, this pragmatism may prove a more potent threat to the people’s democratic aspirations than a prolongation of clerical rule.
Searching for a coherent team
Personally, I believe the Revolutionary Guards have been thinking hard about the post-Khamenei situation, and a military, or militaristic, regime is quite plausible. The “colonels’ junta” would consolidate itself with limited liberalization moves at home, reduced foreign spats, and an alleviation of economic problems to assuage Iranians.
Perhaps its chief problem with public opinion in the longer term is the absence of a charismatic leader like the late head of the regional Quds force, Qasim Suleimani. I suspect his killing in 2020, in a strike ordered by the Trump administration, was not just designed to thwart the regime’s regional terrorism but also its political prospects.
To many, the only figure able to play this role is the son of the last Shah.
Iranian opposition groups must exploit the very few options they have here: vigorously lobbying Western states to list the Revolutionary Guards as terrorists, and promoting secular, lawful patriotism inside Iran, notably among the armed forces.
Opposition groups must also unite around a constitutional project or process of transition toward democracy, regardless of their own leftist or rightist goals, led by a prominent and broadly acceptable figure.
It is not about determining Iran’s future political shape right now, but clarifying a path and finding a figure that is known and respected inside Iran, to mobilize Iranians behind that transition. To many, including some of his harshest critics, the only figure able to play this role is the son of the last Shah, Reza Pahlavi, a man who has tirelessly, indeed excessively, stressed the absence of dynastic ambitions for himself.
Like the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran, the opposition too must make its plans and present itself to the West as a coherent and pragmatic team the West can treat as partners.
