AMMAN — Officials in Arab countries are concerned that the Syrian insurgency will spread across borders, reigniting popular uprisings demanding deep political reforms — at a time when their efforts are focused on preparing to confront incoming U.S. President Donald Trump’s unknown deal on the Israel-Hamas war with minimal damage. This is particularly the case in Jordan.
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If Syria‘s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, succeeds in implementing his promises for a “new Syria,” he may become a model in the region for a new political system similar to that of Turkey‘s president. Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power as a leader of an Islamist party and then maintained the secularism of the state according to the constitution — at least until today.
According to politicians and diplomats, Turkey has favor and influence in the new Syria because it has adopted al-Sharaa. It crafts the features of the next stage, the political identity of the country, and the form of the system after half a century of one-man rule.
Political dominos
Decision-makers in Jordan are concerned that the Syrian insurgency could lead to the spread of an extremist version of political Islam. They have in their mind the dominance of armed Takfiri factions on the northern border areas in Syria in recent years.
They are skeptical about the new regime in Syria: whether al-Sharaa’s soft approach is a tactical one until they dominate power in the country, or whether it’s a strategy that aims to rebuild the country on a comprehensive civil foundation. Jordanian officials could face difficult choices in dealing with the transnational Muslim Brotherhood group, whose ideology overlaps with Syrian jihadist factions.
Will there be a shift in the dialectical relationship between the group and the government if the Jordanian Brotherhood sought to invest in the rise of political Islam in Damascus, similar to the rise of their tone during the short-lived rule of the mother organization in Cairo between 2011 and mid-2013?
Before the transformation in Damascus, the relationship between the government and the Jordanian Brotherhood swinged back and forth, soft and harsh containment. The government has rejected regional pressure to ban the Brotherhood and to brand it as a terrorist group, according to officials.
What’s next?
Jordanians have cautiously followed the epic rise of al-Sharaa from the ranks of Salafi jihadist fighters to a statesman who speaks with a calm voice and in a pragmatic way.
“He creates a new reality in the region that may have an impact on Jordan’s youth and the generation of conservative Islamists,” said Hassan Abu Haniya, a researcher in Islamic movements. “What al-Jolani, who has directly transformed into Ahmed al-Sharaa, offers is a new, living model of a leader who has the ability to adapt and be pragmatic; a leader who can take off the face of al-Jolani and put on the face of al-Sharaa and can continue to take off the turban and put on the ‘tie’ as needed.”
The political Islam that was destroyed in Egypt is returning again, but in a completely different form.
Abu Haniya said the developments in Syria “won’t have a significant impact on Jordan,” which faces complex crises of poverty, unemployment, and difficult living conditions coupled with corruption and unprecedented restrictions on independent media. Al-Sharaa “was also able to build a narrative related to the confrontation with the Russians and Iranian militias, despite the Sunni-Shia sectarian rift that has existed for decades.”
He concludes that young people usually cling to the values and concepts of victory, achievement, strength and heroism when choosing examples of sources of inspiration; this is the case with some people clinging to figures who chose the path of resistance, such as Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.
“Second Arab Spring”
A Jordanian leftist lawmaker who preferred to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the issue said the region has entered a “second Arab Spring to reproduce the experience of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, but in a new form in Syria. We are facing a new experience in the region. The experience of political Islam that was destroyed in Egypt is returning again, but in a completely different form.”
Yet the lawmaker is skeptical – as are many observers – of “al-Sharaa’s ability to continue with his pragmatism without limits” before some extremist factions turn against him or excluded Syrians revolt against him if they feel that their state is being hijacked again.
The dangerous confrontations between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and its allies, and Assad’s remnants in the strongholds of the Alawite sect, which feels defeated and marginalized after Bashar al-Assad abandoned them. Such confrontations are likely to extend to other regions. There are weapons across the country as well as foreign intelligence agencies that are prepared and waiting to disrupt the whole transitional process.
The lawmaker expected “an inevitable clash between the supporters of Sharia law coming from the countryside, most of whom did not enter Damascus until after the overthrow of Assad, and the cities of the Levant that have managed their regions for decades and are aware of the diversity of their societies.”
He said that “anyone who knows Syria, its people and its socially conservative but open way of life knows that it will not accept another tyrannical religious regime imposed by the Turks.”
More civil war
Among secular circles, there are fears that “al-Sharaa will enter into an inevitable confrontation with Syria’s ethnic, religious and sectarian minorities, if they feel excluded.”
Al-Sharaa is still acting as if he is the next president and not the leader of a transitional phase. He imposes himself by force. He meets his visitors from Arab and foreign officials in Assad’s presidential palace. He sits on the same wooden decorated chairs that his former opponent used to sit on. He repeats to his visitors what they want to hear about a future based on coexistence, equality, rejecting terrorism and preventing the return of Iranian militias.
Jordan’s most important interest is ensuring that “terrorists” do not return to the northern border.
His first and only goal is to have international sanctions — as well as European and American economic sanctions — against him and the organization lifted so that he can improve Syria’s quality of life and financial situation. Therefore, he shows his readiness to accept the conditions of the West, which has decided to give him some time: until the end of the transitional government’s term in April.
In a counter-intuitive gesture, al-Sharaa chose all those working in his transitional government from one color, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), instead of appointing a transitional minister from each Syrian province to ensure pluralism. His recent statement that drafting a new constitution could take three years and that elections could be held after four years, worried observers.
The transitional period is very sensitive, and Syria’s future is open to all possibilities. Jordan is monitoring the situation and gradually opening up to al-Sharaa, while also protecting its interests — the most important of which is ensuring that “terrorists” do not return to the northern border.
The regional scene
Arab officials familiar with the security scene in Egypt and other countries where the Brotherhood has a strong presence, view Turkey as the group’s locomotive globally. They believe that conservative Salafist movements that follow the “Erdogan” recipe usually lean toward Takfiri thought whenever they have an opportunity to seize power.
An example of this is the behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood when they came to power in Egypt in the first free elections in 2012. Morsi, who hailed from the Brotherhood, excluded other parties, leading to the military’s seizure of power amid widespread street protests against the Brotherhood.
There is a possibility that the United Arab Emirates will lead an effort to disrupt al-Sharaa’s project by financing and mobilizing dissatisfied factions, according to an official. The UAE has experience in thwarting the Salafi movement’s attempts to reach power or remain in power like what happened in Sudan, Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, where Abu Dhabi worked against the Turkey-backed Islamists.
