Photo of a Pro-Palestine and Hezbollah rally held in Tehran
Members of the Iranian paramilitary forces march during an anti-Israel rally in solidarity with the Palestinian and Lebanese people in Tehran. Sepahnews/ZUMA

-Analysis-

Problems are piling up for Iran’s regime.

Those include everything from fuel shortages and power outages, shortage of cash to pay public sector workers and the threat of tighter sanctions on a battered economy, to foreign policy setbacks including Israeli strikes on its regional mercenaries and the debacle in Syria — and soon perhaps Lebanon — as they exit Tehran’s sphere of influence. Last but not least, all this is fueling anger among Iranians, including thousands of soldiers and policemen paid to defend the state.

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Conditions are far from normal inside Iran, and the regime is nervous. This is evidenced by recent military maneuvers meant to show it is ready for possible strikes on nuclear installations. And a parade of the Revolutionary Guards in Tehran on Jan. 10 was perhaps designed to convey the message of the state’s resolve to crush protests or an uprising.

While officials are talking as if nothing is amiss, it is unlikely that even regime cronies believe it is business as usual. Even economic parasites need to feel safe as they milk what’s left of an economy in need of intensive care.

A parade can mean many things or nothing at all. Social media users recently posted pictures of a grand parade held in Iraq in 2003, weeks before the country’s Baathist leader Saddam Hussein was overthrown following a U.S.-led invasion.

Photo of a picture of the Axis of Resistance leaders during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of Major General Qasem Soleimani's death in 2020.
An Iranian veiled woman walks past a banner showing a picture of the Axis of Resistance leaders during a ceremony commemorating the anniversary of Major General Qasem Soleimani’s death in 2020. – Rouzbeh Fouladi/ZUMA

Iran’s armed forces struggle

Iran’s Gen. Hassan Hassanzadeh, who led the parade, admitted that many members of the Revolutionary Guards or militiamen had failed to turn up, forcing organizers to replace them with thousands of Afghan migrants. That, he said, “is part of a trend evidently on the rise since the events in Syria” or the overthrow of Iran’s ally, Bashar al-Assad.

The Revolutionary Guards later denied the reports and rejected that any such thing had happened or been said. Yet that wasn’t the only bit of blunt speech in recent weeks. Brig. Gen. Behruz Esbati was quoted online as saying “we lost in Syria and we lost bad,” flatly contradicting the supreme leader’s assertions that Assad’s fall was a mere setback to its regional plans.

While reports did not give the exact date of his remarks, he added, for good measure, that the Syrians had toppled “a rotten regime” and Russia had been “treacherous” in all this.

The rift between people and regime is getting deeper.

The business daily Donya-ye eqtesad reported on Jan. 14 that people weren’t just selling off stocks but also bonds and gold, as none of those, it suggested, was expected to yield much in Iran. The regional foods giant Saudi Savola group has left Iran anticipating the return of strict sanctions and “maximum pressures” when the Republican Donald Trump becomes U.S. president on Jan. 20.

In these conditions the rift between people and regime is getting deeper. Culture Minister Abbas Salehi warned on Jan. 14 that “we have a problem of social capital across the governing system, which means people’s confidence in [the regime] has dropped sharply in recent decades.”

Whom could the regime rely on in case of trouble? In addition to the police, its mainstay has been security operatives affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and a mass of ne’er-do-wells they like to call the Basij or Mobilization Force. Repeated use of Basijis — all members of the lower classes and in need of a stipend — in repressing past protests apparently corroborated the regime’s claims that this was “the people” rising to protect “its revolution.”

The Islamic Republic shared its repressive methods, designed by Guards generals like the late Qasem Suleimani or Hussein Hamadani, with Syria, even if Baathists were already experts in state terrorism. Yet not even use of chemical weapons and barrel bombs on his own people could keep Assad in power.

Photo of Armed IRGC special force military personnel
Armed IRGC special force military personnel stand together during a funeral for General Kioumars Pourhashemi, a commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. – Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto/ZUMA

Tehran is shaken

And while the Tehran regime has been weakened by Israel’s onslaught on Hamas and Hezbollah, it was positively shaken by Assad’s downfall. Just months before in June 2024, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, meeting Assad in Tehran, had praised Syria’s contributions to “the resistance,” or Iran’s confederation of regional thugs.

He had to reinterpret events after Assad’s swift fall and furtive flight to Moscow. Yet nobody in Tehran missed the fact that Syria’s army effectively chose to let the regime fall.

One of the country’s conservative papers, Jomhuri-e Islami, warned on Dec. 17 that economic hardships can undermine support for any regime and ultimately provoke its downfall. Systems can only last, it wrote, “with popular backing,” observing that economic hardships had undermined rank-and-file loyalties to Assad.

Reports have suggested greater discontent among the police.

Likewise in Iran, police and military forces are not immune to the country’s dismal conditions. They have families to feed and their wages are reportedly insufficient to meet basic needs. Reports have suggested greater discontent among the police, as they are in daily contact with the public and its frustrations.

Enemy propaganda

Barring senior officers possibly involved in cronyism and shady deals, the vast majority of Iran’s military and police personnel are in fact, ordinary folk with bread-and-butter concerns. Many soldiers and policemen reportedly have side or evening jobs as cab drivers and janitors, a phenomenon unknown before the 1979 revolution.

It is unlikely that grumblings among regime forces are not being conveyed to the highest levels. That must be why Khamenei told a crowd in Tehran on Jan. 8, “Don’t let enemy propaganda affect public opinion.”

Beyond issues of wages or working conditions, there are signs elements inside the regime and its military have simply become hostile. Who, for example, has been leaking information on tankers smuggling sanctioned Iranian oil or planes flying wads of cash abroad? Is there precedence for members of the Revolutionary Guards refusing to attend a parade?