How Iran Can Exploit The West’s Divide Over Ukraine

-Analysis-

LONDON — Donald Trump‘s return to the White House is pushing three crises — Ukraine, Gaza and Iran — to the top of the world ‘ agenda. After finding a solution of sorts to the hostage crisis in Gaza, world leaders have turned to Ukraine — although not as they had expected. The Trump administration’s direct contacts with Russia have shocked the West, notably Europe, and suggest a realpolitik solution, of sorts, may be found for what might have become a protracted conflict.

An initial deal could involve Russia annexing the Ukrainian territories it has occupied, the establishment of demilitarized zones and the presence of peacekeeping forces in parts of the country, Ukraine foregoing its NATO hopes and transferring considerable amounts of mineral wealth to the United States. Still, hopes for an imminent deal on the latter collapsed as a Trump meeting Friday with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House devolved into an unprecedented public clash.

Trump’s approach, and declarations by his administration on the EU and NATO, have undoubtedly degraded the U.S.-EU relationship. EU member states are even accusing his administration of meddling in their internal affairs by supporting European far right parties. How could all this affect Iran?

Despite initial hopes that Trump might engage in dialogue with Tehran, neither side is presently showing interest in any talks. The Trump administration has set the termination of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs, and ending support for proxies, as minimum conditions for any agreement with the regime, which in turn qualifies these as going beyond its red lines.There is little hope then for imminent talks to resolve decades of fraught relations between the sides.

Differing psychological views of the world and its problems is perhaps one of the biggest cultural and political obstacles to an East-West dialogue aimed at conflict resolution. Broadly speaking, the West is pragmatic and less inclined to let matters of the heart — such as national dignity, reputation or loss of face — get in the way of solving problems like sanctions, or frozen trade and business ties.

Deals and bragging rights

But these are precisely of crucial importance to the Eastern side. How will friends and allies perceive your sitting and talking to a side you previously declared to be satanic? That means that at times, even defeat is seen as much preferable to loss of face.

Trump could never accept an under-the-table deal.

The Trump administration may have upset this equation, as it has others. Western powers were previously willing to engage in furtive talks with or to make underhand payments to the Iranian regime, to avoid humiliating it in public after 40 years of anti-Western slogans.

Trump however, while eminently pragmatic and focused on material gains, is also fond of showing off. He could never accept an under-the-table deal — like those some of his Democratic predecessors reached with Tehran — bereft of publicity praising it as a victory for his administration. The propagandistic element may seem irrational, but the Iranian regime understands it. But could it ever accept a victory at its expense?

Relations with Europe

This peculiar red line has precisely been absent in the regime’s relations with the EU. There seem to be no taboos for Iranian decisionmakers when it comes to talking to the Europeans, even if these only happen in particular conditions. Results are what matters for the Europeans who might even be said to be loath to publicise any of their talks with the Iran. This makes Tehran more amenable to talking with Europe in present conditions.

Iran can make sizable concessions to the Europeans — like downgrading its uranium enrichment levels by 3 to 5% — without being seen as ditching its flagship nuclear program. That could reduce international tensions around Iran and appease opinions on it without the need to break the taboo of talking to the United States. Because talking to the United States has internal consequences for the regime as both its critics and friends will inevitably see it as a sign of weakness.

The incipient rift between the United States and Europe is thus of interest to the regime. Europe’s exclusion so far from talks on Ukraine is nothing short of a slap in the face, and Iran will be observing the evolution of EU-U.S. ties in coming months. If the United States pulls out of Ukraine, can Europe even afford to back it against Russia?

Just as the United States has suddenly changed tack, the EU could then refuse to collaborate with its policy of maximum pressures on Iran or follow its lead on the nuclear dossier — a dream come true for the mullahs in Tehran. They can only hope for a widening of the rift in the West. European independence from the United States may prove an interesting historical development for a regime that seemed just months ago to be on its last legs.

Russian rapprochement

The source of this sudden rift is of course the reinvigoration of ties between the United States and Russia. While Russia is ostensibly Tehran’s ally, it has shown itself to be entirely cynical and opportunistic. Tehran can only be suspicious of any Russian rapprochement with its biggest enemy, just as Russia would if Tehran were to move toward the West. European estrangement from Washington might thus be the only bit of good news for Tehran, which can hope to use it to alter the bigger balance of power in its favor.

Here too, if there were peace in Ukraine, it would lose one of its negotiating cards with the EU — namely a willingness to stop aiding the Russian side as it has in the past two years. It might have presented this as a “confidence-building” move with the Europeans. But if talks on Ukraine further exacerbate tensions between the EU and the United States, Tehran will certainly want to intensify its contacts the EU3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom). It did it before, during the first Trump administration, and this would win it time and push back any humiliating decisions or deals concerning its nuclear program.

From Ukraine to Gaza, Trump has shown that politics is not enough; he wants to see the money.

Whatever it achieves in material terms, playing the European card would strengthen Tehran’s hand in any talks with the Trump administration. It can make nuclear or other concessions to the EU, while saving face — and avoiding the humiliation of the minerals deal Ukraine may have to swallow. Trump could easily require similar business concessions from Tehran. From Ukraine to Gaza, he has shown that politics is not enough; he wants to see the money.

Initially, Tehran could move to defuse any bid to enact the UN trigger mechanism renewing massive sanctions over its failure to curb uranium enrichment. That might even discourage an Israeli attack — another factor tied to Trump’s approach with Iran — without making it impossible. For Iranians, this may seem an unexpected turn of events as the fates of a hated regime and its policies — not to mention of their country and their own future — have become tied to the progression of peace talks for Ukraine.