Sisi’s Two-Faced Stance On Gaza Reveals Just How Weak Egypt Has Become

-Analysis-

CAIRO — In the Baghdad conference hall, where the Arab summit was held earlier this month, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi delivered a speech that took many political insiders by surprise. With a decisive tone and unambiguous words, he declared: “Even if Israel succeeds in normalizing its relations with all Arab countries, a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East will remain impossible without establishing a Palestinian state according to international law.”

Sisi made a direct appeal to U.S. President Donald Trump “to exert all necessary efforts and apply effective pressure to achieve an immediate ceasefire in the Gaza Strip.”

The words were not just a repetition of standard diplomatic positions; they came amid rapidly escalating tensions between Egypt and Israel, and amid dramatically changing regional equations. Sisi’s words may seem, at first glance, consistent with Egypt’s historic stance, but they actually reflect deep contradictions in Egyptian policy in dealing with the Palestinian issue and its relations with both Israel and the Gulf countries.

The president’s speech came as Egypt continues to import record amounts of Israeli gas, reaching 981 million cubic feet per day in 2024, an increase of 18.2% over the previous year. December alone saw an unprecedented rise to 1.065 billion cubic feet per day. Moreover, the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum revealed plans to increase gas imports from Israel by an additional 17% starting January 2025, reaching 1.15 billion cubic feet per day.

This is not the only contradiction in Egyptian policy. In February 2024, the Egyptian government signed a massive $35 billion investment deal with the UAE sovereign wealth fund (ADQ) to develop the Ras Al-Hikma area along the Mediterranean coast. This deal is the largest land sale in Egypt’s history, covering an area of 171 square kilometers. While the deal was seen as a financial rescue for Egypt’s struggling economy, it raised serious concerns about selling valuable Egyptian assets to foreign investors and the implications for national sovereignty.

Here emerges the dilemma Egypt’s regime faces: the urgent need for monetary liquidity on one hand, and the price of that liquidity on the other — whether that price is giving up land, remaining silent on vital issues, or adopting contradictory positions to declared interests.

Military tensions over Sinai

In another development revealing the complexities across the region, increasing tensions have emerged between Egypt and Israel over the Egyptian military presence in the Sinai Peninsula. A senior Israeli security official accused Cairo of violating the 1979 peace agreement by “deploying military forces beyond the permitted quota, expanding port docks and  extending airport runways.”

Israel is trying to divert attention from Gaza

According to Israeli sources, Egyptian military deployment in Sinai includes 88 battalions with 42,000 soldiers, three full military divisions, 1,500 tanks and armored vehicles, projects to develop and extend a military airport runway and  enhance air defense and naval port networks. The 1978 peace agreement only allowed 50 battalions with 22,000 soldiers.

Egypt responded to these allegations through former officials and experts, declaring the Israeli concerns “unfounded,” adding that “Israel is trying to divert attention from the situation in Gaza and its internal crises.”

Said Okasha, an Israeli affairs expert at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, noted that “Israel fears that Egypt will regain its deterrent military capabilities.”

Permanent presence

This is not the first time tensions have risen over military presence in Sinai. After terrorist attacks starting in 2011, Israel agreed to additional Egyptian troops in Sinai, which defied the same agreement. To further confront the terrorist threat, Egypt and Israel set up a coordination mechanism in 2015 to approve Egyptian military activities in Sinai exceeding the peace treaty limits, called “agreed activities.” Israel’s renewed approval was based on assurances these violations were temporary and reversible.

However, the situation today is different, as noted by the Israeli National Security Studies Institute, which pointed out that “the violations include building infrastructure, which is irreversible and could be understood as establishing a permanent Egyptian army presence in Sinai with offensive capabilities against Israel.”

Israel’s government approved plans for a third pipeline linking Israel to Egypt.

Egypt’s position was different, justifying in September 2024 its increased military presence in Sinai following Israel’s control of the Philadelphi corridor — a strip of land between southern Gaza and Egypt — during the Israeli attack on Gaza starting in October 2023.

Eyes on Gaza

Returning to Egypt’s role in the Gaza crisis, President Sisi accused Israel during his speech at the Arab summit of “a systematic campaign to destroy Gaza and force its inhabitants to leave.” He said, “Israel spared no stone, no child, no elderly person… What is happening in Gaza is not just a war — it is an attempt to make the area uninhabitable and force its people to flee.”

Despite these strong statements, Egypt continued increasing its imports of Israeli gas to unprecedented levels. The Israeli company NeoMed Energy, holding a 45.3% stake in the Leviathan gas field, has already submitted plans to the Egyptian government to double shipments to more than 2 billion cubic feet per day by 2030. On December 19, 2024, the Israeli government approved plans for a third pipeline linking Israel to Egypt, aiming to double Cairo’s current imports from Tel Aviv to about 10 billion cubic meters annually.

This contradictory stance of the Egyptian regime is not new, a result of years of policies prioritizing economic stability and narrow security interests over the historic claims of a Palestinian homeland. But it is an approach proving ever more fragile amid accelerating events and the complexity of the Middle East.

Sinai as asylum

Interestingly, Israeli military experts predicted the possibility of a new war between Israel and Egypt despite the peace treaty. A 2014 research paper titled “The Next War Between Israel and Egypt: A Study of a High-Intensity War Between Two of the Strongest Armies in the Middle East” examined potential military confrontation scenarios. Another study titled “The Lost Gamble: The Third War Between Israel and Egypt, Its Causes and Lessons” explored conditions that could lead to a new confrontation.

Egyptian troop deployment in Sinai increasingly worries Israel, which demands removal of military infrastructure and considers its presence a peace treaty violation. According to Hebrew-language media, the Israeli government is applying pressure through diplomatic and security channels, including Washington, to reach a formal agreement on this issue.

Conversely, Egyptian experts see Israel’s pressures as an attempt to push Egypt to absorb Palestinian refugees in Sinai, which Cairo strongly rejects. Ahmed Fouad Anwar, professor of Hebrew studies at Alexandria University, said, “Tel Aviv seeks to pressure Egypt to absorb Palestinian refugees in Sinai.”

Middle East acceleration

Economically, Egypt is in a very difficult position. It has signed loan and aid agreements with the IMF and the European Union, alongside the Ras Al-Hikma deal with the UAE, with total commitments exceeding $50 billion. At the same time, Egypt has witnessed a sharp decline in local gas production by 20-25% over the past two years, pushing Cairo to increase reliance on Israeli gas to meet domestic needs, alongside statements sharply criticizing Tel Aviv.

Real questions are arising about Egypt’s future role in the region

Based on available information, Egypt appears to be seeking to reaffirm its historic regional role while maintaining necessary economic relations with Israel and Gulf countries. However, this difficult equation may not be sustainable, especially amid increasing tensions and accelerating events.

Sisi’s recent statements about the impossibility of peace without a Palestinian state, even if all Arab countries normalize relations with Israel, can be read as an attempt to rebalance Egyptian policy. It may be seen as a message to the Trump administration, which played a role in brokering a temporary truce in January.

Amid these contradictions and tensions, real questions arise about Egypt’s future role in the region and the limits of Cairo’s ability to balance urgent economic interests with historic commitments to the Palestinian cause. The coming months will reveal whether Egypt can manage this tightrope or whether pressures from across the region will unleash a whole new dynamic that nobody can predict.