Updated April 29, 2025 at 6:45 p.m.*
-Analysis-
KYIV — Russia recently launched an assault near Pokrovsk, in eastern Ukraine, with a flock of more than 90 motorcycles. The attack failed, resulting in heavy losses, but Russia is expected to continue experimenting with two- and four-wheeled improvisations.
This isn’t Mad Max, with a roaring horde of bikers hurtling towards the horizon. Instead, it’s a wide front with scattered clusters of three, five, seven riders, laden with gear, attempting to flank, gather in the rough country terrain or gain a foothold in villages.
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Despite promises this week of a 72-hour ceasefire beginning May 8, nobody in the Ukrainian military leadership is counting on Vladimir Putin actually seeking to end the war anytime soon.
Instead, as the dense greenery of summer approaches, Russian troops are desperately searching for the key to breach Ukrainian defenses. They are relying on drone operators, long-range self propelled artillery, kill zones filled with cluster munitions, remote mining, drone strikes, and conventional artillery fire — each component meant to enhance the lethality of the others.
Ukrainian forces, particularly the battle-hardened warriors of the 14th Brigade of the National Guard — known as “Chervona Kalyna” — successfully repelled a major mechanized assault by Russian forces on the Pokrovsk front.
The enemy committed significant resources to the attack — this time, mostly armored combat vehicles and motorcycles, as well as nearly two full companies of infantry.
Mixed imports
The motorcycles used in this operation came from a mix of sources — imported from China, seized from impound lots, and confiscated across Russia. There’s a prevailing belief that this reflects Moscow’s equipment shortages.
But that’s not the full picture. In recent months, there have been no large-scale armored clashes. Daily losses remain relatively consistent: no more than a dozen tanks, no more than 20 infantry fighting vehicles per day.
This far exceeds Russia’s current capacity to restore or manufacture new vehicles.
These are significant numbers — far exceeding Russia’s current capacity to restore or manufacture new vehicles. Yet, this still doesn’t cripple its capacity to carry out mechanized offensives.
There have only been a few major attempts to break through the line, including a recent assault along the Piatykhatky–Shcherbaky–Mala Tokmachka axis near Orikhiv, where Russia’s 58th Army lost 29 armored vehicles — APCs, IFVs, and tanks — in just four hours of fighting.
Despite this, some of the Russian forces managed to push through to Mala Tokmachka — many even drove straight in. So, that kind of incursion is dangerous. Had the Russians shown a bit more initiative, Ukrainian forces would’ve been forced into brutal street fighting over the village.
Lessons of Stalingrad
It’s a tactical lesson that dates back to World War II’s Battle of Stalingrad: in street fighting, it’s not infantry training or motivation that decides the outcome — it’s mass, manpower, and the speed of reserve deployment.
What’s important is that Russia is accumulating equipment, forming rapid-response fire teams made up of experienced drone pilots and recon-strike crews — and now, it’s preparing motorcycle units.
They’re gearing up for the summer campaign, when the foliage will offer cover, allowing them to conceal electronic warfare systems and boost the survivability of their air defense units on the frontlines.
Two-wheel advantage
Motorcyclists have carved out their own niche. Not always like in that viral video where the first motorcycle is deliberately sacrificed in barbed wire so the others can use it as a ramp.
Their role varies: logistics, quick crossings of danger zones, or even as a distraction tactic to draw the attention and fire of Ukrainian drones, buying time for the assault force in IFVs.
In any case, this isn’t just about equipment shortages.
A single IFV typically carries 10–15 soldiers. If hit by an FPV drone, that entire unit is taken out — some killed, others wounded. There are drivers who’ve survived five or six drone strikes simply because the warhead failed to detonate, or the shaped charge missed. But the assault, for them, certainly ends there.
While drone crews scramble to respond, there’s a window of opportunity to speed through dangerous zones
To target the same number of troops on motorcycles would require six separate drones. In reality, even more are needed — given the impact of electronic warfare, weather, and human error. A drone flight does not guarantee a successful strike.
The time spent in the kill box varies. The average speed of armored vehicles on uneven terrain, where minefields are a constant threat and new mines can be deployed mid operation, rarely exceeds 30–35 km/h.
Motorcycles, on the other hand, are faster. And while drone crews scramble to respond or track scattered riders, there’s a window of opportunity to speed through dangerous zones.
For the enemy, it’s far more advantageous to fight in built-up areas or infiltrate trench lines and fortified positions. In such environments, drones are less effective at deploying munitions, it’s harder to distinguish friend from foe, and there’s a reduced risk of artillery strikes.
Phony ceasefire talks
These positions also provide opportunities to breach Ukrainian defenses and target drone pilots directly. In many sectors, frontline drone pilots are now in direct contact zones — or just behind the front in tactical rear zones — launching drones from dugouts to minimize time-to-target and strike deeper into enemy formations as they reach the assault lines.
Exchanging the lives of even experienced motorcyclists for those of our drone pilots — that’s a trade the Kremlin sees as acceptable.
Countering motorcycles might seem straightforward, but it isn’t. It requires the synergy of multiple tools: cluster munitions, mines, FPV drones, and heavy infantry weaponry.
Minefield boundaries must be adjusted remotely, and broader anti-personnel mining should be implemented — especially with guided systems.
Suppressive fire from 60 to 120 mm is vital.
Protecting drone operators in trenches with overhead cover and netting — ensuring that most of the strongpoints remain underground, apart from the antennas.
The tried-and-tested methods still work — barbed wire backed by stakes, pits, and trenches.
But limits will appear: in some places there won’t be enough ammunition, in others, not enough personnel or no access for heavy equipment. There are freshly deployed units lacking experienced engineers or sappers.
As soon as the mud dries and the Russians feel ready, they will strike.
So outcomes will vary. The motorcyclists’ assault won’t be repelled in every direction. The most important point: they are preparing for the summer campaign.
All this talk of a ceasefire will remain just talk — a truce doesn’t require sending a hundred motorcyclists to their deaths or sacrificing a battalion in four hours of fighting on a terrain that’s incredibly difficult and inconvenient for offensive action.
As soon as the mud dries and the Russians feel ready, they will strike — aiming to shift the front line into a more maneuver-based phase. If that fails, then by autumn, acceptance may begin to set in.
But for now, Russia is in a hurry. Economic pressure is increasing: the defense industry is draining manpower, oil and gas prices are falling, and they’re realizing Europe is beginning to spin up its own industrial machine. Moscow also realizes by now that they’ve failed to knock out Ukraine’s factories and energy infrastructure.
*Originally published April 27, 2025, this article was updated April 29, 2025 with news of Putin’s offer of a May 8 temporary ceasefire.
