-Analysis-
BERLIN — By the end of the Cold War, the era of nuclear weapons seemed to be behind us. But since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has been repeatedly making veiled nuclear threats at the West.
Now, with Donald Trump back in the White House and casting doubt on the solidarity of the NATO alliance, the concept of “nuclear deterrence” is being discussed in Europe and Germany more seriously than at any time since the height of the Cold War.
It is not just the geopolitical developments that are cause for concern, but also the casual, even reckless way the topic of nuclear deterrence has recently been handled in Germany. Metaphors like “nuclear shield” or “nuclear security guarantee” are being tossed around as if they meant something clear and specific. This shows a troubling lack of understanding of how nuclear strategy actually works among the world’s atomic powers.
“Nuclear shield” is another euphemism
The idea of a “nuclear shield” is misleading: a euphemism, plain and simple. It suggests, whether by accident or design, that Europe could somehow be protected by an umbrella against nuclear destruction. But that is not at all how nuclear deterrence operates.
Saber-rattling only works when the sabers are actually there to be drawn.
Deterrence only works if a potential aggressor believes that any attack will trigger nuclear retaliation. Or, to put it differently: saber-rattling only works when the sabers are actually there to be drawn. Countless studies, and of course the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nearly 80 years ago, show just how catastrophic it is when the nuclear threshold is crossed.
Many politicians and commentators choose to look the other way, and focus exclusively on the theory of deterrence. They avoid facing up to the consequences of nuclear war, because the sheer horror and massive suffering is simply beyond human comprehension. In psychology, the term “psychic numbing” has been coined to describe this mental mechanism: a kind of willful apathy when it comes to imagining catastrophes of unimaginable scale like nuclear war.
One case in point: In autumn 2022, U.S. media reported intelligence reports that Russian leaders had openly discussed the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine: so-called mini-nukes, as they are euphemistically called. President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken briefed journalists about it. But in Germany, the story was barely mentioned by the media, probably because it didn’t fit the preferred narrative that Putin would never dare use nuclear weapons. The response was to dismiss the concern as typical “German Fear.”
At the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany. Gertrud Zach/U.S. Army
Deterrence is just good faith
At the end of the day, deterrence is nothing more than a fragile belief system built on assumptions about the rationality of adversaries in power. Ever since the Cold War, there have been two main fears in the German and broader European debate about U.S. nuclear strategy.
One is that an American president would be reluctant to start a nuclear war for Europe’s sake, which would make deterrence ring hollow. The other fear, still very much alive, is that the U.S. would indeed be willing to start a nuclear war on European soil, thereby destroying the very thing it claims to be protecting. Both scenarios are entirely plausible.
What is clear is that neither the United States nor Russia has what is called escalation dominance. If deterrence were to fail, both sides would try to contain a nuclear exchange to Europe. In their national interest, they would try to keep their own territory, and the homeland of the other nuclear power, out of the fight.
Only the heads of government in nuclear-armed states decide whether to use these weapons
To that end, both have long developed “flexible options” with non-strategic nuclear weapons whose yield can be adjusted. These are the so-called “tactical nuclear weapons,” another euphemism. But in most realistic scenarios, multiple nuclear detonations would occur simultaneously. In densely populated and highly vulnerable Europe, such escalation would mean widespread destruction, perhaps even wiping out large parts of the continent. NATO’s eastern members and Germany, which is the alliance’s central logistics hub, would be hit hardest.
Only the heads of government in nuclear-armed states decide whether to use these weapons. Parliaments and cabinets have no say. In NATO, the European allies have left this decision to the U.S. president for over 70 years — currently, to Donald Trump.
NATO members are entitled to consultations, but not to shared decision-making. This surrender of sovereignty has been the price of what is supposed to be a credible deterrent — a price all European NATO states, except France, have accepted since the 1960s. In truth, it is an untenable situation.
Should Germany be a nuclear power?
The idea that Germany should build its own nuclear weapons is just as unrealistic. It is not even legally possible. The Two Plus Four Treaty that enabled German reunification, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Germany is a signatory, explicitly rule it out. What remains is the option of European deterrence — cooperation with France and the United Kingdom.
French-led deterrence would raise the same dilemmas as U.S. deterrence.
But those two nuclear powers only possess about one-twentieth of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Their stockpiles were designed solely for national defense — to deter existential threats from the Soviet Union, and later Russia. If France or Britain ever actually used their submarine-based missiles on Russian cities or industrial zones, they would be inviting massive retaliation. In other words, French and British deterrence also ultimately relies on the presence of American nukes stationed in Europe. Britain depends entirely on its submarines, while France also has nuclear cruise missiles launched from Rafale fighter jets. The range and survivability of these weapons are hard to predict.
President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly invited his European partners to hold talks on expanding French nuclear deterrence, most recently in early March. But any French-led deterrent would raise the same dilemmas as extended U.S. deterrence. If push came to shove, Macron would probably also want to limit any nuclear fighting to the borderlands of Central and Eastern Europe.
Can’t count on luck
Still, Berlin should finally take him up on the offer and begin confidential talks. If French nuclear deterrence is to be taken seriously by Russia, it would need to grow: perhaps with stealthy cruise missiles launched from submarines.
That, of course, would require a major financial commitment, one that a group of willing European partners would need to share. In return, France would have to grant them a meaningful role in deciding whether to use nuclear weapons. Even a small council of heads of government, if tasked with such a decision, would be accepting an enormous risk: the possibility that deterrence could collapse, and their own country would be wiped out.
Regardless, Europe must urgently boost its conventional defense and deterrence capabilities. The more Europe can defend itself without relying on nuclear weapons, the safer it will be.
To be clear, Europe cannot be defended once nuclear war has begun. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 ended without nuclear disaster, but only by sheer luck. We cannot count on being that lucky again.
