Palestinian, Shia, Kurdish — The Militants Of The Middle East Are On The Verge Of Surrender

-Analysis-

BEIRUT — The option of armed struggle has been adopted by Palestinian factions inside and outside of Palestine for six decades. Such was also the case for Lebanon’s Hezbollah against Israel and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) against Turkey. Now it all seems to be coming to an end, soon to be confined to history — as a case to be studied and lessons drawn from by those who wish to.

This end has occurred more clearly recently with the PKK’s decision to lay down its arms and abandon the military option it had pursued for four decades in confronting Turkey. The immediate aim is to consolidate the Kurdish presence in northern Syria.

A set of conditions and factors contributed to the PKK’s change in doctrine, including the high price paid by the Kurdish people, especially in Turkey where its failure to achieve clear political gains is contrasted with events in Iraq, where the Kurds established a political entity. Added to that is the change in the Syrian situation following the collapse of the Bashar al-Assad regime.

However, the decisive factor in the PKK’s move, like elsewhere, was the decline of Iran’s regional influence. This has played out over the past year with the exposure of the fragility of Tehran’s claims of strength and its ability to confront Israel. Furthermore, the “unity of the fronts” narrative has turned out to be bogus.

This reality vis-a-vis Iran shows that any armed action must be backed by a state — or several states — since it requires money, weapons, ammunition and logistical services, as well as political support. No faction or militia — Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi, or Kurdish — can secure such things on its own, regardless of its legitimacy or the justice of its cause.

It is worth noting that the PKK had received support from the Assad regime and from the Iranian regime since its inception.

Oct. 7 reverberations

From this, it can be concluded that the repercussions of the Oct. 7 “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation — which resulted in the undermining of Iran’s influence across the region — and subsequently the collapse of the state and factional military option confronting or resisting Israel, have extended to the PKK in Turkey and subsequently in Syria.

It is also clear that this step came in the same direction as other forces. For example, the Hamas movement, which used to speak of shaking the ground beneath Israel’s feet and ultimately defeating it, is now merely calling for an end to the war, expressing readiness to relinquish power in Gaza and to agree to a long-term truce with Israel after the genocidal war suffered by the Palestinians of Gaza.

The movement has even gone so far as to hand over members of its ranks to the Lebanese authorities, accused of launching rockets at Israel from Lebanon — something that could not have happened two years ago.

Hezbollah was an extension of Iran’s regional influence and an external arm to defend the now defunct Assad regime.

And this of course includes Hezbollah, which propagated the theory or illusion of the “spider’s web” spreading across the region. Instead, it is now showing notable compliance with the Lebanese state, distancing itself from the “people, army, resistance” triad, showing readiness to surrender its weapons and halt any acts of resistance against Israel, and instead leaving the country’s fate to the Lebanese state.

It is well known that Hezbollah had, in practice, ceased resistance activities from 2000 to late 2023 — for 23 years — except for the operation involving the abduction of two Israeli soldiers in 2006, which triggered a devastating Israeli war on Lebanon. After that, the Shia group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah admitted that had he known the extent of Israel’s destructive response, he would not have carried it out.

Throughout those years, Hezbollah’s role was limited to strengthening the Shia position and dominance over Lebanese power structures, as an extension of Iran’s regional influence and an external arm to defend the now defunct Assad regime.

Story of the past

Without reviewing the entire history of armed struggle, its effectiveness, transformations and outcomes, it’s enough to say right now that it has become a story of the past, with all the tragedies it entails. Among the many reasons here are four key points:

First: The exhaustion or depletion experienced over the past decades by the affected communities — Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Iraqi — and also the Kurdish communities in Turkey, Iraq and Syria, all of whom have reached dead ends.

Second: The sources, origins, or means of armed struggle are no longer available — especially after the exposure of the illusion of the “unity of fronts,” the collapse of the Syrian regime and Iran’s keenness to avoid being dragged into any military confrontation. As a result, it has become nearly impossible to employ militia proxies to serve the agendas of one regime or another.

Just and rightful causes do not grant their proponents a blank check to pursue every possible option without due consideration

Third: This also happened due to the aggression of Israel, backed by the United States and the exposure of Arab Levant states to its savage hostility. Israel now strikes any target or person it suspects may pose a threat — in Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, even in Yemen and Iran — without anyone being able to respond adequately.

Fourth: The long, bitter and painful experience has shown that just and rightful causes do not grant their proponents a blank check to pursue every possible option without due consideration — especially if the costs vastly outweigh the returns. Armed struggle is one of the possible options, but pursuing it must be subject to certain conditions, both internal and external, including the people’s ability to endure, the capacity to achieve political gains and the presence of internal and external conditions that allow the militarized form of struggle to be translated into political achievements.

Non-state weakness

Historically, the state-based military option in the conflict with Israel ended with the 1973 war and with it ended the idea — or claim — that “Palestine is the central cause of the Arab world.” This was further affirmed by Arab regimes recognizing Israel and accepting a settlement based on the Arab Peace Initiative of “land for peace” at the Beirut Summit in 2002.

Instead, the non-state military option continued with the Palestinian national movement, though it practically ended outside Palestine after the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. It then continued internally during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2004 and through rocket warfare following Hamas’s takeover of Gaza in 2007.

The non-state model of resistance also continued with Hezbollah in Lebanon, but that, too, practically stopped after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 — with the exception of the abduction of two Israeli soldiers, which, as mentioned, sparked a destructive war in 2006. It then resumed in what is called the “war of support” for Gaza after Oct. 7, 2023, which led Israel to wage a fierce war on Hezbollah that destroyed its capabilities.

The problem is that the abandonment of armed struggle by all these parties came under duress and not as a result of political conviction.

In conclusion, after all these developments, we now face the moment of the end — or collapse — of the armed struggle option in confronting Israel, with its practical impossibility across the Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian and Iranian arenas. This also includes the reality behind the PKK’s decision to lay down arms.

The problem here is that the abandonment of armed struggle by all these parties came under duress — after its near-complete infeasibility — and not as a result of political conviction about the need to seek more suitable and effective alternatives. In other words, rational and moral incentives were not the driving forces behind this decision.

This is yet another indication of the failure of the parties that adopted armed struggle, which not only brought great hardship to civilian populations, but ended up serving authoritarian purposes rather than gaining any ground in the struggle against Israel.