-Analysis-
BEIRUT — Before its last war with Israel, Hezbollah had a very specific place in the Shiite consciousness: as a kind of recognizable bully, akin to the neighborhood toughs in Egypt’s working-class quarters or the “Akid” in the old alleyways of Syrian television series.
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In the last war, it became apparent — despite feigned stubbornness — what state the party was in, and consequently, the nature of the borrowed image oscillating between the “tough” or the “Akid.”
Hezbollah emerged from the war exhausted, with much of its strength dissipated. The image of the protector that it had entrenched in Shiite consciousness was shattered by the war. And its place have come calls for the Lebanese army to step in as an alternative guardian.
Yet there is psychological resistance to such a shift — first reinforced by Hezbollah’s singularly powerful ability to mobilize popular movements; and second by the complacency of the Lebanese political establishment in promoting the Lebanese military, especially in the past two decades, as demonstrated well by former Lebanese Presidents Michel Aoun and Emile Lahoud.
Yet this resistance can also be explained by Lebanon’s geography — and its demographics. From the eastern border with Syria to the southern border with Israel, and to the surroundings of Rafik Hariri International Airport adjacent to Beirut’s southern suburbs, a new “protective” reality is supposed to be established — one where only the Lebanese army is in charge.
Yet we have already begun to witness pushback expanding against the Lebanese army, the President of the Republic, and the government. And yes, those voicing resistance to the army are clearly within the orbit of Hezbollah.
Fading grip
Yet the current intended outcome, at worst, appears to be an attempt by the former “protector” to share the role of the current “protector.” The framework of this partnership is meant to be focused on defensive strategy as an ultimate attempt to reclaim the fading “toughness.”
From the Shiite clan wars with military operations that stretch into Syria to the scenes of daily chaos in Beirut, and before that, the marches of southerners returning to their liberated villages — there is an expression of the hardship Shiites are being forced to endure, sometimes caused by their enemy and, at other times, by their own internal “tough” brothers.
The war with Israel was the strongest blow to date for this fractured Shiite consciousness.
Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian war added to this Shiite hardship, a burden whose consequences were fully and finally revealed with the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the transfer of power to Hezbollah’s adversaries.
The recent security tensions in eastern Lebanon were an inevitable result of this participation, which Hezbollah was drawn into, with the support of a significant segment of the Shiite population in Lebanon that remains steeped in transhistorical sectarian ideologies and connected to that same image of “toughness” and protection.
Fractured power
The recent war with Israel proved to be the strongest blow to date for this fractured Shiite consciousness, torn between two opposing realities: a rhetoric that endlessly claims exclusive protection and a reality where everything signals the collapse of such rhetoric.
This reinstates Hezbollah’s role as a protector.
This fracture has paralyzed the consciousness, manifesting in recurrent scenes of absurdity in Beirut and in southern Lebanon — where the human experiences reflect subtle attempts to shift the idea of protection from one rooted in Hezbollah’s sectarianism to one of national responsibility borne by the Lebanese army.
In the south, particularly, where Hezbollah is engaged in a veiled confrontation with the Lebanese army, and where the latter’s role as a legitimate Lebanese, Arab, and international alternative is at stake, the ongoing security tensions suggest the presence of a common thread. This thread is meant to wear out the Lebanese army, creating scattered pockets of tension that divert its focus in the south. This, in turn, revives the notion of a defensive strategy and reinstates Hezbollah’s role as a protector — despite Lebanese, Arab, and international consensus that its role has ended.
