-Analysis-
DAMASCUS — A military group affiliated with Syria’s de facto rulers, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was kidnapped recently by a military force led by a former army officer, in the coastal town of Jebleh in Latakia province. Hours after the kidnapping, HTS fighters appeared in video footage, kneeling. They were all from Idlib province, an HTS stronghold. The kidnappers said in the video that the HTS forces “came to humiliate us.”
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Social media was quickly flooded with outrage against the kidnappers, focusing on their belonging to the Alawite sect. These are among the events causing increasing concerns about what has been described as a potential new “sectarian war.” Demonstrators took to the streets at night in Latakia, calling for national unity, but the demonstrations were soon interrupted by those insulting Alawites, especially in the town of Saliba.
HTS responded, threatening sectarian demonstrators who disrupted the larger demonstration. But the possibility of a sectarian war quickly returned to dominate the scene of terror on the coast and throughout Syria. HTS deployed reinforcements to the area and liberated the kidnapped force. When they arrived the leading kidnapper blew himself up, according to HTS fighters who arrested the rest of the kidnappers.
Message of diplomacy
In this context, “the message diplomacy” emerged as a means of communication between Alawites and HTS leaders. Alawite clerics released videos and statements employing the Quran in an attempt to have HTS leaders listen to their demands, including dialogue between the two sides.
The demands also include developing a strategic plan for transitional justice for the military and security personnel, specifically those who did not commit crimes, and even did not resist HTS and lied down their arms. They also called for resolving the unemployment in the coastal areas.
HTS apparently did not respond positively to the Alawites’ demands and ignored their messages. It also appears that the HTS has not taken into account social or political aspects in dealing with the Alawites. Seeking transitional justice will impact other factions that have become the official army under the leadership of HTS.
The masked fighters
The HTS should have reconsidered the behaviour of its masked fighters and its supporters in dealing with the Alawites– before addressing the former regimes’ military personnel.
The symbolic discourse of HTS fighters and supporters has become much similar to that of the Assad regime. Now we see terrifying terms to threaten the Alawites, like: “the factions are coming” or “the HTS is coming” or “the general security (agency) is coming.”
These terms could be interpreted as a joke, but they also reflect the behavior of the HTS and its allied military factions who describe themselves as “the liberators of Syria.”
The Alawites have asked the HTS not to send “masked” fighters to their areas. Why do HTS members wear masks?! What are we supposed to be afraid of?! And why has no one apologized for insulting the Alawites areas?
In one incident during which three young men from an Alawite family were killed, people protested peacefully and called for moving foreigners out of Latakia.
Phobia of the masked
Many have become afraid of the masked fighters, especially those who speak classical Arabic. This fear could be described as “phobia of the masked” since many linked those masked men with crimes as well as the long civil war which shaped the memory of Syrians through horrific killings that were filmed and shared online.
So what about the Alawites who found themselves on the side of the regime, and who found themselves being treated as defeated people by HTS and its supporters! The Alawites feel that they have become outside the framework of the state – meaning that they don’t have any kind of legal or institutional protection.
It’s not only the Alawites who fear the foreigners in Latakia. Sunni and Christian communities in the province are also afraid from “foreign factions.”
After the killing of the three young men, the governor of Latakia met with sheikhs and dignitaries. He listened to a long message addressing HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Regime’s remnants
Arab media and social media platforms have attack some areas descriptively, mentioning Alawite areas as places of remnants, while this discourse reflects a policy of spatial stereotyping, which links certain places or communities to negative characteristics or specific political affiliations.
And to deny that these attacks are sectarian, they circulated videos describing Sunni figures as regime’s remnants. These videos included the killing of the mayor of Dumer district in Damascus, who was shot and killed in a horrific manner that included slaughtering and beating with sticks and stones by crowds of people.
These scenes were accompanied by a narrative that claims to be evidence of non-sectarianism, in an attempt to justify the violence directed against the regime remnants.
Yet what is really happening reflects the public justification for violence, where violence is accepted as a legitimate means of achieving justice outside the framework of the law. This pattern will highly likely turn into justified popular justice terrorism, where violence is used against individuals or groups under the pretext of achieving justice or revenge, as if participating in violence is a collective responsibility.
HTS fighters are portrayed as heroes of rapid intervention in crises, like Superman or Batman. But the reality reflects a large gap between this perception and HTS ability to absorb the geographical complexity as well as the economic and social challenges which require an effective state structure including restructuring of the police and internal security forces, to be addressed in a proper manner.
Who rules Syria?
In the midst of this scene, the alienation of the Syrian identity is reinforced, as Syrians, Sunnis, Alawites and Christians, lack the means to accept the reality of the terrifying Islamization.
This Islamization highlights a social contradiction in answering fundamental questions: Who rules Syrians? Where are we heading — particularly since HTS leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa has not yet addressed the Syrians? He has been satisfied with meeting with international delegations, influencers, poets, etc., and a short sermon in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.
The concern behind the question “Who rules us” comes after some factions affirmed that they adopt a strict religious legal principle that is alien to Syrian society and transcends its social and cultural composition.
At the same time, a dispute over legitimacy is looming between the competing factions. It appears that the new rulers use religious fatwas and newly-issued laws to legitimize their practices. There is also the question surrounding the legitimacy of HTS and the role of jihadists who are supposed to turn into soldiers in a regular army.
In this context, questions are raised about the absence of firm positions and measures that address these practices. Is there anyone who can send a clear message to the media, or take decisive steps to build a state that preserves the Syrian identity instead of this ideological chaos that tears apart its social fabric?
