photo of soldiers and generals in front of nuclear plant
File photo of General Abdolrahim Mousavi visiting Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant in 2019 Wikimedia/Fars

-Analysis-

PARIS — Iran had a choice between two very bad options: not respond to the assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Israel’s offensive in Lebanon, and lose its credibility; or respond, and risk retaliation from Israel and perhaps also from the United States. Iran chose the second option, prolonging the brutal escalation that region has been engaged in for several weeks.

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In recent days, most analysts have noted the relative moderation of Iran’s reaction to Nasrallah’s assassination in Beirut. These analyses concluded that Iran would not respond immediately to the elimination of its main ally, so as not to give Israel a pretext to attack its nuclear program.

This vision was undoubtedly too rational: It did not take into account the shock felt by Hezbollah supporters at Iran’s passivity — some Lebanese even spoke of “betrayal.” That was humiliating for Iran’s leaders, hence the risky decision to attack Israel on Tuesday.

Israel’s response

As early as Tuesday night, the Israelis were making it clear that Iranian missiles would not go unanswered, and that plans were ready. Of course, there were no casualties, and most of the 180 ballistic missiles were intercepted by Israeli air defense, aided by the United States.

The only question is the scale of the Israeli response. Last April, after the first Iranian missile attack on Israel, the response was, as we say in military jargon, “proportionate.” Is this restraint still appropriate now that Israel is engaged in Lebanon, but also in Yemen and Syria, against Iran’s allies?

The role of the United States will be decisive in determining the appropriate response. Washington doesn’t have much influence over Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but when it comes to Iran, Israel needs American “cover” in case of escalation.

Photo of missiles shot from Iran intercepted by Israel in the night sky above Jerusalem, on Oct. 1.
Missiles shot from Iran intercepted by Israel above Jerusalem, on Oct. 1. – Chen Junqing/Xinhua/ZUMA

The nuclear issue 

Could Iran’s nuclear program be a target? That will be the key issue in discussions with the United States. For years, Netanyahu has wanted to block the progress of Iran’s nuclear program.

The Israeli secret services have assassinated Iranian scientists and carried out cyberattacks, but Israel already has plans for airstrikes to set back the Iranian program by several years.

Iran also has new “friends”: Russia and China.

Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, took the risk of these Israeli reprisals and thus of jeopardizing his nuclear program, with his green light for yesterday’s missile launches. It’s a stark choice for a regime weakened internally by social protest and economic sanctions.

But Iran also has new “friends”: Russia, to which it supplies drones against Ukraine; and China, partners in an anti-Western “front.” These friendly powers have remained discreet in the current crisis, but what will they do in the event of an attack on Iranian soil?

This is a particularly dangerous moment in the crisis, just a few days before the first anniversary of the fateful Oct. 7 Hamas attack. One year on, the risk of conflagration is greater than ever.