-Analysis-
The constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran — an amalgam of often contradictory prescriptions — says nothing about Iran’s paramount leader (Rahbar) having to be Iranian by birth or nationality. This missing element has inevitably fueled speculations on the mischievous intentions, and ancestry, of the regime’s founder, the late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
The Islamic Republic is not, in spite of its unassuming name, a nation-state as such, but an experimental mix of revolutionary ideas and religious populism, also known as Islamism. At its head, in keeping with Khomeini’s theory of government known as Vilayat-i faqih, sits a “ruling jurisprudent” (Vali-e faqih). It was never clear how much power the office should wield — and before the revolution, Khomeini did suggest that he would step aside once an Islamic republic were established, and let the institutions run Iran in a broadly Islamic or non-secular framework.
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It never worked out that way, even if it took Iranians decades to see that institutions like their parliament or presidency have merely formal and superficial powers.
As the Ayatollah gathered up every scrap of power in Iran, his followers began addressing him as the People’s Guide (Imam-i ummat) and then, Leader of all Muslims. This was not just to spread his aura far beyond Iran’s frontiers, but also strengthen the non-national character of the revolutionary project. Iran had become a base and springboard, a bank, a purse and an armory for the bigger goal of forging a Shia empire in the Middle East. For that, you need a powerful figurehead devoted to that cause above all else.
Khomeini’s successor as Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, was an admirer in his youth of such prominent Islamist figures as Sayyid Qutb (an Egyptian) and Nawab Safavi (an Iranian cleric of the mid-20th century). Once in power, he swiftly proceeded to downgrade all that was Iranian in favor of the internationalist vision of his cherished figures.
Priority was given to creating militias abroad devoted to the Shia leader in Tehran. Khamenei’s rule was the perfect flourishing ground for the Revolutionary guards and its Quds Force or foreign brigade. Its commanding officer, the late Qasim Suleimani, effectively became the regional coordinator of Tehran’s militias.
Among them the Lebanese Hezbollah is the biggest and most formidable, akin to a court favorite. Its leaders have worked in absolute coordination with Tehran, creating a little Islamic Republic of their own in southern Lebanon. The group’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah may be termed an outstanding pupil and emulator of Iran’s Leader.
Like a first-rate entrepreneur, over the course of 30 years, he turned a primitive gang into a terror cartel feared across the region. Inside Lebanon, little happens at the government level without Hezbollah’s say-so.
Nasrallah has had two great helpers in his endeavors: the late Suleimani, whom the United States targeted for assassination in 2020, and Imad Mughniyah, a Hezbollah operative blown up in 2008, possibly by the Israelis. In the latter years of his life Suleimani and Nasrallah became particularly close, like two brothers to Khamenei’s father figure.
Following the Khamenei model
The Islamic Republic’s propaganda machine has worked for 40 years, at public expense, to puff up and promote such individuals as epic figures. As Suleimani and Mughniyah are “no longer with us,” the focus is now on Nasrallah. As a soldier fighting Western imperialism — though he is no longer trim like a soldier — Nasrallah also enjoys the preposterous admiration of Tehran’s leftist sympathisers worldwide, some of whom like to cite him as a fitting successor to Khamenei. Like terrorism and disease, cynicism too is without borders.
One reason the regime’s constitution says nothing about the supreme leader having to be Iranian may be explained by the view among Shias that Iran is the homeland of all Shias and of their awaited messiah: the Lord of the Age (Imam-i zaman). Historically, he was the 12th generation descendant of the Prophet, who went missing one day. The 1979 revolution thus recovered an “Islamic” land for its rightful owners, namely the Prophet’s descendants and their devotees. Nasrallah brazenly said as much in 2009, denying there was any “Persian civilization” and citing the late Khomeini as “an Arab born of Arabs” (as a black-turbaned cleric claiming direct descent from the Prophet).
In the eyes of Nasrallah and his supporters, Iranians are simply Shia Muslims and must only be governed by a male descendant of the Prophet (a sayyid). He can be from Iran — or not — though his ancestry is necessarily Arabian!
Most security and military chiefs are thought to favor the succession of Khamenei’s son.
Now, Nasrallah cannot expect an easy ride to the leader’s office. Aside from an entire population’s furious opposition to the prospects of an Arab ruler in Iran, there are others in Tehran who want to be Leader. Big fish, you might say, who have been biding their time for years, and each with his backers inside the power structure. The chief contenders are the Leader’s son, Mujtaba Khamenei, and the sitting president, Ibrahim Raisi.
It appears Khamenei has a lead, in spite of his discreet profile, and his name regularly resurfaces over the past 20 years as an internal power-broker. Most security and military chiefs are thought to favor his succession, an impression that is strengthened by the frequency with which he is cited in military and related media outlets. Yet he is likely to have enemies, being suspected of involvement in cases of corruption, and little is known about his administrative skills. Somebody somewhere must have incriminating information about him, to be revealed and used against him — when it is entirely safe to do so!
But Khamenei’s father has also helped raise his “rival” Raisi, to the presidency. It is not clear if this was to aid Raisi’s progression toward the Leader’s position, or wear him down with the business of government, discredit him with his inevitable failure to eventually be discarded. It would not be the first time a big figure falls off the regime’s precipice. Has the economy already wiped out Raisi’s prospects as successor, like it has household savings and the middle class?
Being a non-Iranian makes things more difficult for Nasrallah. At least on paper… He studied theology in Qom in central Iran and has absorbed Khamenei’s ‘precepts.’ He has shown he can run a big criminal organization, and after years of mass media exposure may enjoy significant sympathy levels among regional Shias. Unlike his rivals, he can boast a smiling picture on the Leader’s website in which he stands between the Supreme leader and the late Suleimani. It is the best publicity you could hope for, among a certain crowd.
He speaks Persian competently, with an accent, is versed in war and diplomacy, and his influence extends to the Americas.
Should this be taken seriously?
Needless to say, none of the three contenders are particularly popular in Iran. The idea of a Lebanese cleric lording over the country may seem an outrage to millions of Iranians, but as the last four decades of their lives have shown, this regime is if nothing else, an outrageous deviation from all that is normal and reasonable.
Even Khamenei’s own leadership seemed a tall order initially, as he himself told the Assembly of Experts, the body of clerics that elected him in 1989. Some years back when the Guardian Council, a top electoral body, barred Ayatollah Khomeini’s grandson Hassan Khomeini from sitting in that assembly, regime louts kept shouting on the streets that Khomeini’s ‘real grandson’ was another Hassan… Nasrallah.
Is his name being cited as a ploy?
Ordinary folk will have little say in this succession so the key players here will be the Revolutionary guards, militiamen and the secret police. Will there be a fight? Again, even there Nasrallah is not in a weak position as he enjoys the loyalty of Hezbollah cadres, many of whom are based in Iran, and sectors of the Guards.
On the other hand, Nasrallah’s name is perhaps being cited as a regime ploy, to send a chill down the population’s spine. Horrified at the prospect of an Arab militant running their lives, Iranians might then accept with relief – for want of a better word – the elevation of Raisi or Khamenei. Better the devil you know.
Politics is full of unexpected turns of course. Just look at the headlines of recent days and years. Like when Soleimani, who would likely have backed Nasrallah in any power tussle, was struck out of the equation. With his removal in 2020, the administration of President Donald J. Trump also struck a blow at the Islamic regime’s regional dreams. Today you wonder whether Hezbollah has chosen a cautious response to the war in Gaza to avoid massive reprisals and the possibility of a calamitous outcome for itself and its leader, when there is in fact a bigger prize at stake?