Elena Lasconi, leader of the center right Save Romania Union (USR), votes in Bucharest, Romania, Nov. 24, 2024. She arrived second and will be the frontrunner to ultranationalist Calin Georgescu in the second term.​
Elena Lasconi, leader of pro-Europe anti-corruption party Save Romania Union (USR), votes in Bucharest on Nov. 24, 2024. She arrived second and will be the frontrunner to ultranationalist Calin Georgescu in the second term. Zhang Gaiping/Xinhua via ZUMA Press

Updated Nov. 27, 2024 at 12:00 p.m.

The below article was published after the moderate Romanian governing coalition managed to limit the far-right parties AUR and SOS last June, during the European elections. But things have turned out very different this time around with the first round of presidential elections last week, in a stunning turn of events, far-right nationalist Calin Georgescu secured 23% of votes and arrived first, surpassing pre-election favorites Elena Lasconi and Prime Minister Marcel Ciolacu and securing direct access to the Second Term, where he will face Lasconi. Right before election day, polls had placed him at just 5%.

-Analysis-

Romania‘s governing coalition survived last June’s double election day when the country voted for both European and local candidates. The much-feared breakthrough of the AUR far-right party didn’t materialize, with the eurosceptic and ultraconservative party ultimately getting 14.93% of the votes: not enough to topple the current government coalition which includes the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL).

Yet behind the apparent stability of the government coalition led by President Klaus Iohannis, the elections have nevertheless revealed surprising support for the far right from two unlikely demographics: young people and the global diaspora of Romanians living abroad.

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The diaspora voters are crucial, with at least four million Romanians living and working abroad, out of a domestic population of 19 million. The ex-pats have proven to be much more well-disposed towards far-right parties than those who voted at home.

Romanians working abroad had already played a central role in supporting AUR in the 2020 elections, with the far-right party being the first choice for Romanians in Italy and Cyprus, and arriving second in France, Germany and Spain. This has not always been the case: until a few years ago, the diaspora typically voted for the PNL liberals.

So why do a growing number of Romanians who live abroad vote for AUR, and SOS, another far-right populist party?

“True” Romanian values

The short answer is that the far right often seems to be the only one that targets its discourse towards the “unskilled labor” diaspora, which is a large portion of those who leave the country. Those who emigrated to escape poverty, and now face prejudice and difficult working conditions, have become the new backbone of far-right parties.

They are truck drivers, bricklayers, child and elderly care workers, or the famous căpșunari, the seasonal workers who come from Romania to Western Europe to pick strawberries and other crops.

They say the political establishment was to blame for forcing them to emigrate.

AUR and SOS adopted topics and arguments that greatly resonated in this segment of the diaspora, proposing, first and foremost, a strongly anti-establishment agenda: they repeated that the political establishment was to blame for forcing them to emigrate.

AUR members also talked about ways to bring this diaspora home, a very effective argument for those who did not want to abandon their country but were forced to leave because of poverty.

“We must no longer talk about homeland and diaspora: the Romanian nation is one,” the nationalist party leaders repeat. This is the way ultra-nationalist rhetoric, paradoxically, can even seem inclusive.

This is accompanied by an emphasis on ‘true’ Romanian values, against the progressive and decadent ideologies of the Western world. It is an argument that reassures a certain type of diaspora, often with a low level of education, religious, and deeply traditional.

Photo of a AUR protest in Bucharest with Romanian flags and anti-government and anti-Western slogans.
AUR protest in Bucharest, Romania. – George Simion/Facebook

Neglected and marginalized

The segment of the diaspora that votes for AUR has long felt neglected, forgotten and marginalized. Romanians abroad contributed largely to the state coffers, with their high wages mitigating the social and economic cost of unemployment in the country.

Thousands of Romanian children grew up seeing their parents no more than twice a year.

However, the massive wave of emigration that hit Romania from the 1990s onwards had complex consequences on a social and emotional level: thousands of Romanian children grew up seeing their parents no more than twice a year and, in many cases, the elderly were left behind.

And since they were no longer part of their family’s everyday life, those who left were increasingly perceived as ‘foreigners’, often being accused, upon their return, of “having changed”, of showing Western habits and attitudes, of having become materialistic and greedy.

COVID acted as a catalyst for social tensions that were already operating under the radar. With the outbreak of the pandemic, many diaspora Romanians lost their jobs and moved back to their home country, precisely because they were employed in the most precarious sectors. At home, they were sometimes accused of “having brought the virus” with them. Worried about the thousands of returns, the Romanian government closed the borders and left many diaspora citizens unable to come back. “We are Romanians too”, and “We want to go home”, they repeated: their own country was treating them like unwanted pathogenic microbes.

Young and disillusioned

AUR, founded in December 2019, just a few months before the outbreak of the pandemic, and SOS, born as a direct product of the growing intolerance towards the anti-COVID measures, have strategically chosen to become their political champions: the diaspora is a huge electoral basin, with personal and professional frustrations fit to be channeled into an “anti-establishment” party.

These parties seem to be gaining ground with younger generations, too. A few months ago, a study by the IRES think tank on the voting intentions of young people (18-35 years) in Romania reported a bleak picture. Following a trend common to other European countries, including Germany, Sweden, Austria and Denmark, young voters show widespread sympathy towards anti-establishment parties.

75% would support a “strong leader who does not waste time with elections”.

The answers related to their trust in politics are the most discouraging: only 4% of them seem to trust political parties, only 9% trust the parliament and the government, and only 11% claim to trust the president. Meanwhile, 75% would support a “strong leader who does not waste time with elections and discussions in parliament”, confirming their worrying frustration and intolerance for the democratic system. Among the young, AUR is the most popular party at 23% support, followed by PNL and USR, both at 20%.

Overall, these trends show a picture of deep disappointment and disillusionment with the political establishment, notably shared by diaspora voters and younger generations. Both of these categories feel like traditional parties have failed them and perceive them as distant and uninterested, a feeling that far-right parties AUR and SOS have managed to capitalize on.

*Originally published Oct. 02, 2024, this article was updated Nov. 27, 2024 with news of the first round of presidential elections, and enriched multimedia content.