-Analysis-
BOGOTÁ — It is commonly believed Venezuela’s socialist regime has managed to retain power with the help of friendly foreign powers, especially Cuba, Russia and Iran. They have certainly given it diplomatic and political support — and in the case of Cuba, interrogation and crowd-control tips. But none has been as decisive as China in keeping afloat the Bolivarian project pursued by the late Hugo Chávez and President Nicolás Maduro.
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Over 25 years, whenever the Bolivarian revolution in Caracas was threatened, China would give it economic backing and diplomatic and political support. It has done so once again in the July 28 presidential election. When most of the rest of the world is questioning Maduro’s claims of victory, Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday sent Maduro a message of congratulations for a third term.
Rising multipolar world order
The close ties between Beijing and Caracas began in 1999, when the recently elected Chávez proposed creating a multipolar world order, with power blocs to counter a traditional order seen as dominated by the West. He visited China in 1999 and 2001, which led to the formation of a High Level China-Venezuela Mixed Commission that raised bilateral ties to the level of a Strategic Alliance for Shared Development.
In 2004, Chávez returned to Beijing — after winning a referendum to be recalled to office — to win investments that would boost his position ahead of his next battle: the 2006 election. The agreements included the creation of what would become a Sino-Venezuelan Joint Fund (FCCV), effectively a loans-for-oil mechanism that would allow Caracas to gather funds despite international credit restrictions.
It might not be far-fetched to say China was bribing the Venezuelan electorate.
The ties became stronger with a massive inflow of Chinese credit from 2006 to 2012, increased Chinese investments in infrastructures, and more trade. A new credit fund was created in 2010, allowing China to transfer another billion to Venezuela.
The relationship looked increasingly like dependency, with China becoming the regime’s chief lender and Venezuela in constant need of liquidity to pay for its social programs. Loans of billion, given on the back of future oil production, could have been used to stimulate productivity, but were wasted instead.
Chávez used a good chunk of those funds to ensure his reelection, to a fourth mandate, in 2012. The state bought 3 million household appliances, built council housing, and purchased hundreds of buses, cars, mobile phones and laptops to sell at subsidized prices ahead of voting.
It might not be far-fetched to say China was bribing the Venezuelan electorate.
China and Maduro
When Chávez died in 2013, Maduro, his hand-picked successor, narrowly defeated the opposition’s Henrique Capriles in the April 2013 presidential election. The opposition and its allies abroad rejected the results, alleging irregularities in vote counting. Maduro thus faced turbulent months, as his international legitimacy was impaired.
In that context, China’s new President Xi Jinping, who assumed office in March 2013, received three key figures of the Bolivarian regime over four months: the speaker of the National Assembly, Diosdado Cabello, Vice-President Jorge Arreaza and Maduro himself.
Beijing then further raised bilateral ties to the level of an Integral Strategic Partnership and replenished the FCCV fund with billion. Beijing maintained its aid until Venezuela’s oil industry entered into crisis.
Even as it slowed down payments and despite Venezuela’s increasing dysfunctionality, China continued to back the regime. In 2016, it renegotiated part of its debt, giving the regime breathing space, though U.S. sanctions complicated the scenario again in 2017 and 2019.
On both sides, it was realpolitik in action and stripped of all scruples.
In 2018, Maduro was reelected, again amid charges of fraud and foul play, but China was one of 14 states that immediately recognized his victory, receiving Maduro in Beijing in September that year. When the opposition chief and head of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, declared himself the country’s acting president in 2019, Beijing ignored him and continued to recognize Maduro as president. It used its UN Security Council veto to block a proposal to recognize Guaidó as the country’s only president.
China crucially allowed Venezuela to sell its oil inside China, thwarting U.S. sanctions. During the pandemic, it sent Venezuela 100 tons of medical supplies, a million PCR testing kits, 8 million face masks and 2 million gloves, alongside vaccines and other donations.
And Maduro reciprocated this support: backing China on a range of sensitive issues such as its claim to Taiwan, the curtailing of liberties in Hong Kong or the massive repression of the Uyghurs of Xinjiang. On both sides, it was realpolitik in action and stripped of all scruples.
Reapproachment
The two states promoted their ties again in 2023, calling them a Strategic Association for All Time. Collaborations were extended beyond the oil industry to include a new private sector, following the Chinese development model.
Before the July 28 election, Maduro had promised to build power plants and other works with Chinese money, and to join BRICS, the association of emerging economies broadly dominated by China. He remains confident China’s support, even in the face of unrest, and has boasted of receiving “cutting-edge technology, combat drones and anti-drones.”
If the word is puzzling, Maduro has shown he likes new words — and outlandish insults. Just days before the vote, he threatened a “bloodbath” should his party lose — although that has been avoided, thanks to what states are suspecting has been a massive electoral lie.
China’s interests better served by a compliant and indebted leader like Maduro.
China has fueled this confidence, no doubt. It has berated the United States for its sanctions on the oil sector. And it denounced its “meddling” in Venezuelan affairs after the United States denounced the disqualification of opposition candidates, months ago.
Yet the nature of China’s ties with the socialist regime in Venezuela is simply a massive intervention to ensure its survival. Its funds have effectively determined the fate of elections and allowed Venezuela’s two presidents to dismiss Western protests.
China’s claim that it is a neutral partner engaged in straightforward business is questionable at best. Clearly its strategic interests and rivalry with the United States are better served by a compliant and indebted leader like Maduro, than by a buoyant democracy traditionally inclined toward the West.
Yet here too, following the hard dictates of business, it could one day come around to working with the opposition and a lawful country that knows the value of money.
