Milei Rising: A Rare Chance To Remake Argentine Politics, Or Nightmare Scenario?

-Analysis-

BUENOS AIRES — Fate can be strange. Many believe that the massive financial credit from the United States played a decisive role in the October 26 elections. And yes, it mattered — but political credit mattered even more.

It seems President Javier Milei had earned enough trust to deserve another chance, something along the lines of: “I placed my hopes in you and made you president. Let’s not get into the details, but you brought down inflation, and carried out a brutal fiscal adjustment. Now you’ve landed yourself in trouble again, and Trump is giving you a hand… Well, I’m already invested, you know? So I’ll give you another shot and see what happens.”

But a victory is still a victory.

My inner optimist tells me the conditions might now be in place for a real change in Argentine politics — for Milei’s movement to become normalized, and for Kirchnerism (the political movement associated with Néstor and Cristina Kirchner) to fade as a conservative force capable of blocking reform.

My inner pessimist argues that Milei’s camp has itself become the main threat, and that the decline of Kirchnerism has only cleared the path for the most dangerous version of Milei’s politics — the Milei of arrogance.

The optimist accuses the pessimist of being blind. Turning an election victory into an excuse to take everything, to rule alone, and to impose drastic change on Argentina has been tried before — with disastrous results. On the night of October 26, Milei instead spoke of unity and moderation.

Better, then, to think about a post-Milei phase. Their voters, frightened by the specter of Kirchnerism and economic collapse, refused to give them unchecked power. Like U.S. President Donald Trump and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, they offered credit — a second chance. People tend to extend new trust to those they have already believed in and who have delivered something tangible. This time, it was also driven by the hope that Kirchnerism would finally stop serving as the guardian of decline.

“Peronism”, the social-nationalistic politics of mid 20th-century leader Juan Perón, has been losing ground for years. But perhaps now there’s an understanding that it can no longer cling to the past and must learn to share space within a more pluralistic opposition.

Still, Milei’s coalition, La Libertad Avanza (LLA), gains little from its recent growth — just enough to sustain a presidential veto and avoid impeachment. What has truly expanded is the ruling party’s bargaining power. It’s not unrealistic to think that reforms could now be fully integrated into both the executive and legislative agendas.

The opposition, for its part, may now have stronger incentives to negotiate, adopting — or at least pretending to adopt — a more constructive attitude.

Governance and cooperation

The conditions long considered necessary to lift Argentina out of its quagmire may finally exist. Don’t you see? It begins with the ruling party and the opposition finding common ground out of mutual self-interest — entering into a virtuous cycle. The government will want a “constructive” opposition, knowing it strengthens its credibility and continuity. The opposition will want the government to succeed so that it can eventually inherit a functioning country.

Of course, the struggle between government and opposition will remain fierce. No one expects the ruling party to nurture its successor like a delicate flower. But it could still be a pragmatic, even productive rivalry — one where each side benefits from the other’s stability.

That would lay the foundation for a clear, decisive winner — a leader who has already raised the banner of reform and would face fewer credibility problems if he pursued change not through authoritarian decisions but through dialogue and compromise.

Reform always relies on confrontation.

The opposition, which thrives on conflict, has been indispensable because conflict produces winners. And it will remain indispensable, since reform always relies on confrontation. But cooperation and negotiation will also be necessary. Governing by decree or force of will would be the worst possible strategy, and excuses about “urgency” or “protecting reform” would only lead to new issues.

True stature

The true political stature of the winner will be determined by his ability to balance cooperation and conflict — the framework needed to create reform.

That is why, in the end, what matters even more than having good winners is having good losers — and for that, they must feel their role is rewarded. This is a complex game, part chess and part Go, that must begin with a clear formula for governance: will it be presidential rule? A presidency-and-cabinet formula? A presidential coalition? A parliamentary one? The question is unavoidable.

“You’re dreaming,” my inner pessimist interrupts. “That post-Milei version doesn’t exist — and never will. What we’ll have is pure Milei politics.” The opposition may genuinely believe in harmony, but Milei is the one in control.

By that, I mean a political model that Milei will soon make his own: the corrosion of democratic and liberal life; the hollowing out of the Constitution; the destruction of the republican spirit until politics itself fades beside the infinity of an oligopolistic market and an anti-liberal conservatism hostile to diversity — the agenda he so despises — and the hardening of social inequality.

Harmony? Cooperation and conflict? Don’t be naïve. Milei and his distinctive style belong to Argentina’s oldest and most indestructible tradition: the conviction that the nation can be remade from top to bottom, in one sweeping act, by a providential leader.

This is my inner dialogue, but of course every reader is entitled to their own.