Updated Feb. 6, 2024 at 12:00 p.m.
-Analysis-
KYIV — Ukraine’s aim to “liberate all the territories occupied by Russia” has been replaced by a new strategy.
It is still true that, along with achieving “victory in the war,” and “guaranteeing the security of Ukraine for the next 50 years,” liberating the occupied territories represent different pieces of the same puzzle.
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The past week Kyiv has been consumed with speculation of a major shake-up in the Ukrainian military leadership, including the possible replacement of Valery Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of Ukraine’s armed forces. But the bigger question is Ukraine’s longer-term war strategy.
It’s evident that in a conflict such as this, where a smaller force like Ukraine faces a larger adversary like Russia, Ukraine’s chances of victory appear more limited. Russia, aware of its resource advantage, seeks to prolong the war through diplomatic maneuvers aimed at negotiating ceasefires or truces, which don’t align with Ukraine’s objectives.
Additionally, Russia seeks to divert global attention away from Ukraine by creating conflicts in other regions such as Gaza, Yemen, and Africa. This tactic aims to drain resources that could otherwise support Ukraine’s defense efforts.
Ukraine’s war strategy should thus follow this maxim: “It is not the big that eat the small, but the fast that eat the slow.”
Ukraine’s approach must now involve a hybrid war characterized by rapid, agile responses — this is where Ukraine’s strength lies. The strategy should no longer be focused on the return of occupied territories. It’s not about land, but about the destruction the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.
Given the enormity of this task, the strategy involves multiple operations, including various forms of support (such as informational, cyber, psychological, ground, air, etc.) bundled together. In essence, the strategy comprises a series of coordinated operations aimed at achieving the overarching goal of total victory.
In the air
While air superiority remains elusive, Ukraine can gain strategic advantages in specific areas and at specific moments. Ground troops require air support, a role not suited for the F-16 fighter jet, and with limited Su-25s available, consideration should be given to acquiring heavy fighters like the Su-27 or F-15. In anticipated short-range air battles, early enemy detection will likely determine the victor.
The destruction of 660 enemy anti-aircraft systems and the continuous supply of modern, albeit limited, anti-aircraft missile systems from allies enables Ukraine to stay on par with Russia. However, the majority of this support is directed towards protecting major cities rather than ground troops.
Allies are not currently aiming to defeat the Russian Federation in the war.
Therefore, in preparation for any advances, Ukraine must not only penetrate the enemy’s air defense corridors, but also conduct extensive maneuvers to incapacitate their defense capabilities.
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Ammunition supplies
In January, Russia suffered an average loss of 23 artillery pieces per Main Strike Group (MSG) that was deployed. This level of loss is significant, equivalent to the loss of artillery pieces typically associated with two divisions.
However, despite best efforts, Ukraine also incurred major losses in artillery. Apart from equipment lost irretrievably, a significant portion failed due to technical issues.
Additionally, the shortage of ammunition, especially the old Soviet 122 mm and 152 mm rounds, hampered the effectiveness of nearly half of Ukraine’s artillery systems. Reports from the front indicate that Russia, in areas where they succeed, simply demolish Ukrainian fortifications with their artillery, seize the ruins, and, unable to hold onto them, retreat, repeating this cycle until things settle down.
Ukraine must address this issue as preparation and execution of an offensive demand extensive artillery support and require thorough preparation.
Defense strategy, nuclear risks
When devising a defense strategy, it’s important to recognize that assistance from allies is not currently aimed at defeating the Russian Federation in the war, as this carries the risk of Russia collapsing into semi-feudal principalities, and there is the very delicate question of what happens to the country’s nuclear arsenal and other weapons of mass destruction in such a scenario.
There’s no guarantee that reports on the destruction of chemical and biological weapon stockpiles provided to international organizations by Russia will be truthful, given their track record. The prospect of destabilizing the Russian Federation concerns Ukraine’s partners more than Ukraine’s military defeat and the subsequent repercussions in Eastern Europe.
While Ukraine’s disappearance from the world map would prompt adjustments in the West’s geopolitical goals, the collapse of Russia would profoundly alter the global geopolitical landscape. Therefore, it’s prudent for Ukraine to rely on its own strength and foster cooperation with Eastern European countries, which are next in line to suffer Russia’s wrath after Ukraine.
Decision-making is quicker and our troops show superior horizontal effectiveness.
In terms of military management, Ukraine holds the advantage. Our commanders and headquarters are quicker in decision-making, and our troops demonstrate superior horizontal effectiveness compared to Russia. Additionally, we have a linguistic advantage as the enemy struggles to comprehend radio conversations in Ukrainian, often relying on Polish mercenaries and other individuals from the Afro-Ukrainian diaspora in Canada to translate.
While the enemy possesses several generals capable of innovative battlefield tactics, Ukraine has a far greater number of them. However, our military defeats in Chongar, Melitopol, and Mariupol raise questions about leadership. How did the enemy manage to withdraw from the right bank of the Kherson region with such minimal losses, for example? Similar concerns arise regarding the defense of Bakhmut.
Those responsible for these failures should not remain in command, but their removal should not be publicized, in order to prevent undermining troop confidence and fostering indecision among other commanders.
Fueling Russia’s domestic discord
The support operation should entail a multifaceted approach aimed at weakening the Russian Federation. This includes targeting critical infrastructure across enemy territory, with a focus on defense facilities, transportation networks, and oil/gas production and transportation infrastructure.
Additionally, Ukraine must create points of tension within Russia by fueling ethnic conflicts, igniting religious disputes, generating social problems, and inciting riots, particularly among migrant populations. Support for separatist movements in regions like the Caucasus and national republics, along with efforts to bolster reintegration sentiments in territories such as the Kaliningrad exclave, Karelia, and the Kuril Islands, is also part of the plan.
Furthermore, comprehensive assistance is provided to Moldova in its endeavors to reclaim Transnistria. The operation also encompasses exerting a disruptive influence on Russian military deployments outside their national borders, as well as undermining Russian businesses abroad.
We’ve already witnessed a number of incidents like these: fires at the oil refinery in Tuapse, and the port in Ust-Luz, along with reported events involving the remnants of the “Wagner” group in Somalia, and unrest in regions like Bashkortostan or riots in Dagestan.
While these occurrences are advantageous to Ukraine, it’s unclear whether they’re orchestrated by Ukrainian special services. The essence of support operations lies in benefiting from events without necessarily knowing their exact origins, and ultimately, the attribution of such events is not particularly important.
Military operation
The more conventional military operation should aim to inflict maximum losses on enemy personnel and equipment while minimizing our own losses: excessive casualties could provoke a social revolution in Russia (there is already serious discontent within the country which Ukraine should exacerbate).
Avoid “at any cost” approaches that sacrifice infantrymen needlessly.
Commanders’ professional competence is assessed based on the level of losses incurred by their units, emphasizing the need to avoid “at any cost” approaches that sacrifice infantrymen needlessly. Priority targets include enemy manpower concentrations, formations, and high-tech systems, with tactics focused on softening enemy forces through strategic maneuvers and precision strikes.
These lists are not exhaustive, but this dual-pronged approach of support and military operations, is crucial for exerting pressure on Russia and achieving strategic objectives beyond simply reclaiming occupied territories. The Ukrainian Armed Forces must remain vigilant, adaptive, and resolute in executing their strategies to ensure the defense and sovereignty of Ukraine and the total defeat of the Russian Armed Forces.
