-Analysis-
As the third year of Russia’s all-out war against Ukraine comes to an end, can we consider it a new type of war? What innovations has it brought to the pursuit of warfare? Was it just the mistakes of the Chekists secret police agents that led to the failure of the initial Russian offensive? Or was there a strategic miscalculations of the military command?
The full-scale invasion of Ukraine was preceded by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and a subsequent low-intensity conflict in eastern Ukraine. Starting in April 2021, Russia deployed nearly all its ground forces along Ukraine’s borders under the guise of military exercises. Despite obvious invasion preparations, Russian forces conducted a successful disinformation operation aimed at Ukraine’s military and political leadership.
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The then-commander of Ukraine’s Ground Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi, acknowledged that the military leadership believed the main strikes would target eastern and southern Ukraine to encircle the Joint Forces Operation group and secure a land corridor to Crimea. The reasons why Ukrainian strategists dismissed U.S. intelligence about a full-scale attack across the border remain unknown. Ukrainian forces began redeploying to reinforce the northern front just seven hours before the invasion.
Beginning in the early hours of Feb. 24, 2022, Russian units advanced simultaneously on 11 different fronts. The operation’s objective was to capture Kyiv and Kharkiv within the first three days, paralyze Ukraine’s military and political leadership, and, with the support of Ukrainian collaborators, establish a new puppet state in Ukraine.
The swift seizure of the capital would include helicopter-borne assaults targeting airports inside and around the city. Once a security perimeter around the runways was established, airborne units were to land there. Meanwhile, heavy mechanized units and punitive detachments advanced toward the capital to reinforce the assault, stabilize the situation and suppress any potential resistance.
To Kyiv and back
Russian forces were successful in the southern operational zone by advancing from Crimea into the rear of Ukrainian defenses. The subsequent siege of Mariupol and Russia’s crossing of the Dnipro River in the first days of the campaign were among the most significant and tragic setbacks for Ukraine’s Armed Forces during the war.
Nevertheless, the Kremlin’s overall strategic plan did not succeed. By the end of March 2022, Russian forces had been pushed back from Kyiv, the Zhytomyr, Chernihiv and Sumy regions.
Despite its initial defeat, however, the Russian state maintained the ability to continue military confrontation. Forces withdrawn from the northern zone were gradually redeployed to the south and east to reinforce combat formations.
Fighting like their grandfathers
From the perspective of classical military planning, Russia’s blitzkrieg plan might appear overly reckless and devoid of military logic. However, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that these actions are quite characteristic of Russia. All the key elements of the plan have been employed in previous Soviet and Russian military-police operations.
The failure of Russia’s initial plan largely stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of Ukrainian society
The gung-ho advance of marching troops, relying on the intimidation of the enemy; airborne assaults on capital city airfields; and the neutralization of an opponent’s top leadership— all these components, whether combined or used separately, can be traced back to the suppression of the Hungarian Uprising (1956), the invasion of Czechoslovakia (1968), the Afghan War (1979–1989), and the two Chechen campaigns (1994–1996 and 1999–2009).
Russia’s successes in the war with Georgia (2008) and the annexation of Crimea (2014) probably had a heady effect on its planners, strengthening their confidence in this approach.
The failure of Russia’s initial plan largely stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of Ukrainian society, and an underestimation of its capacity for resistance. Since Russia lacks any quality academic school of Ukrainian studies, Russia’s military-political leadership relied primarily on its own imperial stereotypes and the illusion of cultural proximity.
Kherson push
By April 2022, having failed to achieve their objectives, the invading forces lost their offensive momentum and effectively transitioned to defense. They were stretched across a front over 1,000 kilometers long and lacked sufficient troops to establish cohesive tactical formations. On the right bank of the Dnipro River, the attacking force — having failed to reach Odesa or the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant — found itself in a vulnerable position.
The group’s logistical lines crossed the Dnipro River and were vulnerable to Ukrainian strikes. At this stage, Russian commanders compensated for a lack of manpower by total superiority in artillery. By the summer of 2022, however, the Ukrainian forces opposing them had almost completely depleted their artillery arsenals.
The Russian command was aware of the vulnerability of its logistical lines
Lacking significant reserves, Ukraine’s leadership nonetheless began planning a counteroffensive. The shortage of forces limited the options for attack directions. A strike on the left bank toward Tokmak and Melitopol seemed the most promising. However, priority was given to liberating the right-bank part of Kherson Oblast. Simultaneously, Ukraine’s defense forces prepared the Kharkiv operation to eliminate the so-called Izium salient, a position from which Russian forces threatened to encircle Ukrainian troops in the Donbas.
In late August 2022, the operation to liberate the right bank of Kherson Oblast began, followed almost simultaneously by the Kharkiv operation in early September.
In Kherson Oblast, Ukrainian troops faced well organized defenses. The Russian command was aware of the vulnerability of its logistical lines supporting the Kherson grouping and the necessity of withdrawing from the right bank of the Dnipro River. However, they maintained their positions until November 2022. Despite the success of the Kherson operation, Russian forces still managed to withdraw from the right bank in an organized manner.
A second counteroffensive
After the defeat in Kharkiv, the Russian Federation announced a mobilization. However, the mobilization could not immediately create an advantage on the front lines. Russia urgently needed time to train the newly conscripted soldiers and replenish equipment losses. Yet the Kremlin wound up throwing into battle poorly trained personnel and recruited convicts from the Wagner Group, leading to disproportionate losses. Still, these actions gave time to prepare the mobilized reinforcements.
Some think that Ukraine unnecessarily depleted its most skilled brigades in Bakhmut
There are different points of view on Ukraine’s defensive operation in the Bakhmut area. Some think that Ukraine unnecessarily depleted its most skilled brigades in Bakhmut, leaving the 2023 southern counteroffensive to be carried out by newly formed, inexperienced brigade. Others believe that the defense of Bakhmut prevented Russian forces from swiftly capturing Chasiv Yar, then Kostiantynivka, and ultimately the entire Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
Ultimately, the reasons for its failure are largely undisputed. The timing was poorly chosen, as the enemy had already fortified the defensive sector. The plan lacked secrecy and surprise, and the offensive was conducted with insufficient forces and the defending Russian enemy had air superiority.
Driving into Russia
By autumn 2023, the front line had stabilized, with both sides engaging mainly in positional battles for more advantageous tactical positions. In early 2024, Russian forces achieved a breakthrough in the Avdiivka fortified area, and by the end of the year, Ukraine’s armed forces had yet to overcome the operational crisis in the east caused by the loss of Avdiivka.
In turn, the Ukrainian military and political leadership also sought to break the positional deadlock, authorizing an invasion operation in the Kursk region. After initial successes, Kyiv’s forced reached its capacity to control enemy territory. Without support from the next echelon, it was forced into positional defense, thus putting itself in a vulnerable position.
As the third year of the war draws to a close, the initiative on the battlefield largely belongs to Russian forces. However, both sides are showing signs of resource exhaustion. Ukraine faces a severe shortage of manpower, while Russia is compelled to replenish its arsenals with troops and supplies from North Korea.
Safe bubbles
Much has been written about how new technologies, primarily drones, have significantly transformed the battlefield, tactics, and methods of employing combat equipment. Still, they have not fundamentally altered doctrinal approaches to warfare. Success continues to require the mobilization of a significant portion of the population and the full range of national resources.
Drones are likely to displace attack helicopters and aircraft, reconnaissance aviation. Yet, despite their widespread use, artillery remains the primary means of destruction, while success or failure ultimately depends on infantry units’ ability to control territory.
Former U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel and military analyst Alex Vershinin, analyzing Ukraine’s combat experience, highlights how complex offensive operations by small infantry groups have become. What were once basic tactical maneuvers have evolved into intricate operations, where the actions of one platoon require the coordination of three types of electronic warfare (EW), support from reconnaissance and strike drones, and counterbattery radar systems.
This war brings military thinkers back to the paradigm of attritional warfare.
The tactics of the warring sides and the combat formation of the troops are leading experts to conclude that traditional strongholds and defense areas are likely to evolve into a new battlefield configuration of “safe bubbles.” These zones, located at a distance from the enemy, would be protected by tactical air defense systems and electronic capabilities. From such relatively secure positions, forces would conduct reconnaissance and engage enemy targets without direct contact.
At the strategic level, the Russian-Ukrainian war brings military thinkers back to the paradigm of attritional warfare as the primary strategy in conflicts between two major states. According to military experts, a war between states with comparable military-industrial and economic potential will inevitably transition into prolonged phases where the advantage goes to the more resilient side.
Nuclear attitudes and NATO
The development of long-range strike capabilities and advanced reconnaissance technologies will favor the use of firepower maneuver over troop maneuvers. The increased lethality of firepower, in turn, pushes troops toward defensive rather than offensive actions. The ongoing war has demonstrated that even successful offensive operations appear unreasonably costly in the long-term strategic perspective. This approach suggests avoiding large-scale offensives during the first 18–24 months of a conflict.
The experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war has exposed the shortcomings of the doctrine of a small, professional, high-tech army designed for rapid regional conflicts. Military strategists are returning to the model of a permanent professional core, replenished by a mobilization reserve during periods of increased threat.
Russia has lost its status as a military superpower.
Attitudes toward nuclear weapons are likely to undergo revision as well. Strategic nuclear weapons resemble a suicide belts filled with explosives. Unlike conventional weaponry, they are unsuitable for selective use against the enemy, and therefore cannot lead to victory in the strategic sense. Meanwhile, tactical nuclear weapons offer destructive capabilities comparable to conventional arms, but their potential tactical advantages are far outweighed by the catastrophic political and strategic consequences for their user.
Russia has lost its status as a military superpower. The war has revealed the weakness of the Russian armed forces compared to the modern militaries of NATO countries. It has become evident that NATO forces could paralyze Russia’s entire military and civilian infrastructure within days through coordinated missile strikes.
