Three Years On, Ukraine’s Most Reliable Ally Is The Russian Military Bureaucrat

-Analysis-

Contrary to popular belief, Ukraine’s main allies in its fight against Russian aggression aren’t NATO countries like the United States, Germany or the U.K. While these nations provide crucial financial and military support, another ally is playing an even more pivotal role in ensuring what was supposed to be an easy lightning victory has turned into years-long war: Russia’s own corruption and military bureaucracy.

Russian corruption prevented its military from capturing Kyiv in the promised three days, while its military bureaucracy ensures the war drags on — or at least doesn’t end in Moscow’s victory. Military and military-related writers have been writing about it for three years.

Writers within Russia’s so-called “Z” community of war hawks, the issue of bureaucracy is a constant source of anger and frustration. For example, all military equipment is meticulously tracked. Each lost tank, armored vehicle, or truck requires endless paperwork to explain its disappearance and assign blame. Repair processes face the same hurdles.

As a result, Russia’s army often relies on civilian transport for frontline logistics — vehicles bought with personal funds or donated by volunteers. Since these aren’t officially on the unit’s balance sheet, there’s no need for tedious reporting. This workaround, detailed in countless Z-texts, has created severe challenges for frontline supply chains and the evacuation of wounded soldiers.

Suffocating bureaucracy

The situation is no better when it comes to drones, a critical weapon in modern warfare. Every lost drone entails a mountain of paperwork required for formal “decommissioning.” In November 2023, the Telegram channel Two Majors described this grueling process, posting “To decommission a drone, you need:

1. An investigation

2. An excerpt from the order

3. An excerpt from the battle log

4. Pilots’ explanations

5. Proof that the weather was fine (no kidding)

6. Proof that our electronic warfare systems weren’t active at the time

7. A copy of the operator’s training certificate.”

As a result, the Russian army primarily relies on volunteer-supplied drones. But these are in short supply, as there are too many tasks and too few people willing to support the Russian military.

In May 2023, late Andrey “Murz” Morozov, a well-know military blogger, described in detail the suffocating bureaucracy in the Russian army. He highlighted a crucial paradox: The abundance of paperwork did not mean that there was order in the army. On the contrary, the army was — and remains — plagued by chaos.

“The low level of staff work, including supply services, and the improper handling of documentation are hallmarks of the modern Russian army,” wrote Morozov. “That’s why screw-ups are no surprise. No grenades for the AGL [automatic grenade launchers]? Look where the rifle ammunition and hand grenades are. THIS IS NORMAL. This is the Russian Armed Forces, that spent years teaching the ragtag Donbas militias what color to paint signs in warehouses.”

Meeting the metrics

There are more recent examples. The author of the Shelter No 8 channel wrote about specific features of the Russian military bureaucracy. For example, military vehicles need fuel, but obtaining it requires completing a “trip sheet.” This document must be signed and stamped personally by the regiment commander — not the chief of staff or the head of the automotive service, but the commander himself.

“From bullets to condoms — every report must be approved by the regiment commander personally. Even though there are countless reports from each department, and there are department chiefs as well as 2ICs [second-in-command officers],” the author writes. “So in the view of those who created this bureaucratic mess, can you imagine how much the unit commander should be overwhelmed with logistical and political paperwork? And that’s on top of operational documents.”

Efforts tend to focus not on effectively destroying targets but on creating impressive bar charts.

This may be a relatively recent example, but certainly not the most surprising one. A more intriguing story comes from FighterBomber, a prominent aviation-focused Z-channel. Commenting on reports by some Ukrainian sources about the reduced use of FAB bombs by Russian aviation, FighterBomber explained:

“There’s a nuance: the same old ‘slides’ [reporting forms for superiors]. And their impact on aviation morale. One column on the slide shows the number of bombs dropped on the enemy — that is the column the bosses focus on. They don’t care about the other columns. Because the UMPK [unified gliding and correction module] is a self-guiding munition, it’s almost impossible to screw the crew for misses (if they entered the correct coordinates and maintained the right parameters). But for that column on the slide — oh, they can screw them. And if they can, why wouldn’t they?”

In order to have visually appealing slides filled with attractive graphs of bombs dropped, the bombs are launched solely to meet the quantity set by the commanders. As a result, they’re often dropped on outdated targets — places where the enemy was not just an hour ago but perhaps the day before. Or maybe even longer — who knows?

Of course, some bombs do hit their intended targets. But in a system that emphasizes metrics, efforts tend to focus not on effectively destroying targets but on creating impressive bar charts.

Reining in bureaucracy

The war has been ongoing for three years. For three years, Z-authors have been stating that the front needs more shells, armored vehicles, or personnel.

The Russian authorities are even trying to address these issues. The defense industry is producing new tanks and armored personnel carriers, and new military aircraft are being brought into service. People are being recruited for contracts with increasingly substantial financial incentives. Formally, it seems the state is genuinely trying to assist the military and win the war — yet, with only one hand.

The bureaucrats — who are the very embodiment of this state — are hindering that victory with the other hand.

While in the first case the state’s capabilities are inherently limited — factories have maximum production capacities, and financial resources are not infinite — the second case is different. Surely, the state could rein in its own bureaucracy.

It certainly had the power to do so. But it chose not to, and it’s unlikely to change its stance. As the third year of the war draws to a close, not a single issue with military bureaucracy highlighted by Z-authors has been resolved. Nor is there any indication that it will be. In a way, that is somewhat reassuring.