-Analysis-
PARIS — On the electoral front, 2024 was a particularly busy year on the Asian continent, with elections held in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Taiwan, Japan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
For the latest news & views from every corner of the world, Worldcrunch Today is the only truly international newsletter. Sign up here.
In South Korea, which in principle boasts one of the most democratic regimes in the region, instability has prevailed since the December crisis between the unpopular (and impeached) President Yoon Suk-yeol and the opposition Democratic Party, the big winner of last April’s parliamentary elections.
Many Asian leaders have come to power since Donald Trump’s previous departure from the White House in 2021: Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba, Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, Indonesian President Prabawo Subianto, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary To Lam.
As none of these heads of state or government has a direct link with Trump, emissaries have been arriving in Washington one after the other since the November election to try to decipher his administration’s future strategy towards the Indo-Pacific — a vast region considered crucial by virtually everyone in the American political class, regardless of party or ideology.
Imminent sanctions
While outgoing President Joe Biden’s term has been one of alliances, it is still far too early to outline the team arriving at the end of January. At the very least, we know the names of the Secretary of State (Marco Rubio), the National Security Advisor (Mike Waltz) and the Under Secretary of Defense (Elbridge Colby). All will play a key role on the international stage, particularly with regard to the Asia-Pacific region.
The technological rivalry between Washington and Beijing is in full swing in Asia.
One of the main issues that will preoccupy Asian governments is the U.S.-China rivalry, with the almost-certain imposition of trade sanctions against China, and no doubt other countries enjoying trade surpluses with the United States. In New Delhi, the government of Narendra Modi is already preparing for this reality.
The technological rivalry between Washington and Beijing is in full swing in Asia, with major players such as Apple, Microsoft, IBM and Dell choosing to leave China, sometimes relocating to Vietnam, the Philippines or Indonesia, three high-growth countries (IMF forecast 2025: 6.1% for the first two, 5.1% for the last).
Military risks
Beyond economic issues, it’s the military risk that is of greatest concern to the region, with several hotbeds of tension: the Korean peninsula (which has every reason to worry Seoul, and Tokyo); the East China Sea (Senkaku/Diaoyu islands claimed by both Japan and China); the South China Sea (Chinese expansion over several archipelagos also claimed by Manila and Hanoi, in particular); and Taiwan, the de facto independent island claimed by China.
On Jan. 1, Lai Ching-te, who was democratically elected president of Taiwan just over a year ago, issued a statement calling for greater visibility and international involvement for Taiwan. That came in contrast to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s own New Year’s speech, in which he reaffirmed his territorial claim to the island — and his intentions to confine it to the status of a “province.”
Over the past two years, the People’s Liberation Army has stepped up its military exercises around Taiwan. In December, 90 Chinese warships were deployed in a new attempt at intimidation, while there have been numerous incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone, as economic and political threats of boycott have multiplied.
Over the past four years, the United States has repeatedly assured Taiwan of its support, but Trump has hardly seemed moved by the future of its 23 million inhabitants. On the other hand, he regularly calls on Washington’s Asian allies to “pay more” for their defense.
The “G2” concept
Another important issue is China’s support for Russian aggression in Ukraine and elsewhere. The involvement of North Korean soldiers in the Russia-Ukraine war is not good news for China, which thought it could benefit from an exclusive ideological relationship with Pyongyang.
Here again, the attitude of the new occupant of the White House — who tried in his last term to negotiate with the dictator Kim Jong-un, without success — will be decisive.
China enters the Year of the Serpent with a more fragile and less attractive economy.
How far can one negotiate with authoritarian regimes with which points of convergence are close to zero? In the deeply divided U.S. House of Representatives, there will be no shortage of debate. But from Biden to Trump, there is every reason to believe that the Quad — a military partnership between the United States, India, Japan and Australia — will be strengthened.
The central issue will be rivalry with Beijing, as some of Trump’s advisors (such as Colby) call for a concentration of diplomatic and military resources on Asia — at the expense of other continents.
For some, the “G2” (Group of Two, ie, U.S. and China) concept is back in vogue. As for Xi’s China, it enters the Year of the Serpent with a more fragile and, above all, less attractive economy.
Then there are those focused on “de-risking,” a term now used on both sides of the Atlantic that is meant to create mechanisms to protect one’s own economy without the more radical “de-coupling” that would cut trade ties completely. For the West, it is reflected in an acceleration of defensive measures against Chinese products, particularly electric vehicles. While for Beijing, it most recently was expressed by a new anti-corruption campaign launched by the Chinese Communist Party on the eve of the Lunar New Year.