–Analysis–
The Ukrainian offensive has come to a standstill, even Kyiv’s most senior generals have admitted that. For the time being, the military options for liberating more regions occupied by Russia seem to be largely exhausted. Now, voices in the West are once again calling for talks and negotiations between Kyiv and Moscow.
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For the Ukrainians, despite the strain the war has put on their society, that is not an option. They are still holding on to the hope of liberating all occupied regions.
But the Ukrainians also know that everything could change for them if the United States — Kyiv’s most important partner — scales back its aid, or if Donald Trump is elected president next year and decides he would prefer to invest his funds at home. But is Vladimir Putin even open to negotiations?
It is true that he has repeatedly claimed to be open to talks – although his conditions are unacceptable to Kyiv. He demands the recognition of Russia’s claim to occupied and annexed regions, from Crimea to Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. He also wants assurances that Ukraine will not join the EU or NATO. From Putin’s perspective, that would mean order had been restored.
In the old Soviet tradition, he is positioning himself as a voice for peace. But in reality there are a number of signs that suggest he is preparing for the war to go on for some time – and for Russia to wait until help from Kyiv’s partners runs out. Putin is no longer just waging war against the “Fascists in Ukraine” but against the West. He recently declared the war a “fight for liberation” for all those who stand against Washington’s “hegemony”.
Sky-high military spending
One clue to Putin’s true intentions lies in his state finances. For the coming year, 6% of gross domestic product (GDP) is earmarked for “defence costs”. In absolute terms that is around 0 billion. Russia hasn’t spent that much on its army since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Military spending is due to stay at this level until at least 2026.
If we also include the budget for national security and the police, which sometimes find their way into the army’s coffers, that would mean Russia is spending an unbelievable 10% of its GDP on the war.
Production of military equipment is also on the rise. According to figures from the state-owned defence conglomerate Rostec, production in some areas could rise by a factor of at least ten. But the arms manufacturer has not released concrete figures.
We can however estimate the numbers based on production figures from industries that are linked to armament production, such as the chemical or IT industries. They paint a mixed picture. In some industries, Russia is producing significantly more than in 2022, while in others the numbers are stagnating below where they were during the first year of the war.
But these industries have been given the green light from above, and money is flowing in from the state. First of all, Moscow is keen to make up for the losses it suffered in the first two years of the war – with help from western technology, which despite sanctions is still finding its way into Russia in the form of so-called grey imports.
Very little opposition to the war
On the domestic front, there is hardly any opposition left. A few soldiers’ wives recently staged a protest, calling for their husbands to be brought back from the front. But they don’t dare to criticise the war itself. Russians are facing the prospect of years in prison for harmless acts of protest. Recently, the artist Aleksandra Skochilenko from St Petersburg was sentenced to seven years in prison for replacing price stickers on products in a supermarket with anti-war messages.
Hundreds of thousands of Russians have left their country since the invasion of Ukraine.
Those who remain are struggling through waves of mobilization and the crackdown on opposition. Some are finding that financially they are doing better than before, profiting from the booming economy, as long as they work in the right industries.
The high spending on armaments is boosting growth in parts of the economy. Russia is suffering from a lack of workers, because many citizens have fled abroad. According to official figures, the unemployment rate is at a historic low of 3%. This goes hand in hand with higher earnings.
For many Russians, the war is only playing out on their TV screens. According to a survey by the independent research institute Levada, around 40% of the population are not following the war closely, or not at all. Despite waves of mobilization, high casualty rates among soldiers and Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian soil, the fighting in Ukraine has become a kind of background noise – at least for the time being.
The whole world is financing Putin’s war
In the lead-up to his planned re-election in March 2024, Putin is wary of introducing any unpopular measures. He wants to at least maintain the appearance of democracy. But if the Russian president is re-elected, he could step up the war effort and repression even further. That is what experts such as the Russian political scientist Vladimir Gelman, who teaches in Helsinki, fear. In his eyes, that could mean a new wave of mobilization and a “new round of military escalation”.
Putin’s system has adapted to the conditions, says Gelman, and could survive for many more years, or even decades, to come. “The war will last as long as Putin is in power,” writes Gelman. The window of opportunity for the Ukrainians to prepare for that will soon be closing.
According to Levada’s surveys, 76% of Russians still support Putin’s war, while at the same time 56% are in favour of holding peace talks. A paradoxical desire, which Putin can safely ignore. He is relying on recruits from the countryside, who are drawn to the front by high salaries for soldiers and financial help for those left behind.
High oil prices also mean that the whole world is financing this war for Putin.
In a decree published by the Kremlin earlier this month, Putin ordered the military to increase the number of troops to 1.32 million. That would be a rise of 170,000, the second such expansion in recent years, as in summer 2022 Putin ordered the Russian army to be increased to 1.15 million troops.
After the announcement, the Russian Ministry of Defense immediately played down fears among the population that it might mean a new wave of mobilization. “There is no mobilization planned,” the authorities insisted. Instead, they are calling for Russian citizens to join up voluntarily. Putin has plenty of funds available to draw them in.
High oil prices also mean that “the whole world is financing this war for Putin”, says exiled Russian political scientist Kirill Rogov. Economies like India and China are still buying oil from the Kremlin; in the first half of this year alone, Russia earned around 0 billion from exports. Of course Putin is spending more on the war than these exports are bringing in, but he has considerable reserves.
It will be a long time before the Kremlin runs out of roubles – perhaps longer than Ukraine can last.
