After Sinwar, Will Hamas Break From Iran — And Turn Back To Muslim Brotherhood?

-Analysis-

BEIRUT — It is easier to talk about a Hamas future after Yahya Sinwar than Hezbollah’s future after Hassan Nasrallah.

The hierarchical nature of Hezbollah — directly connected to the Wilayat al-Faqih and what the “Deputy of the Imam” sees — makes it difficult to predict who will succeed Nasrallah.

Hamas, however, has a more horizontal organization with well-known power centers. And while Sinwar had been the most prominent among them, he was not the only one. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood’s essence within Hamas gives the Palestinian group organizational flexibility that Hezbollah does not have.

Sinwar‘s election as the head of Hamas’ political bureau, following the assassination of his predecessor, Ismail Haniyeh, was not the only indication of Sinwar’s prominence. His leadership on the ground had already made him the movement’s foremost figure before he assumed the highest office.

“Abu Ibrahim,” as those close to Sinwar call him, succeeded in restructuring the group and establishing a certain level of independence for the Qassam Brigades from the movement’s broader organizational body, which intersects with Brotherhood structures extending to Jordan — and connects to the Muslim Brotherhood’s mother organization, from Egypt to Turkey.

Paradoxical leader

Sinwar’s personality contained elements that go beyond the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, he greatly admired the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, which is a rare paradox within Brotherhood ranks.

He is also one of Hamas’ prison leaders, having spent more than two decades in Israeli prisons, during which he developed a mindset that transcends the typical Brotherhood consciousness, which often confines its members to the group’s psychological and social choices.

Other power centers within the movement might reassert themselves.

One of the clearest results of Sinwar’s relative independence from the Brotherhood’s dimension in Hamas is his ability to easily forge a relationship with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard — despite the sectarian (Shia-Sunni) sensitivities this has always triggered within Brotherhood thinking.

In this context, the question about Hamas after Sinwar turns into one about the possibility of the movement returning from its Iranian exile to the embrace of the mother group.

Answering this question is not easy, but it invites reflection and speculation. The war that followed the Oct. 7 operation, in which Sinwar’s Qassam Brigades showed unexpected strength and resilience, neutralized many of Hamas’ leaders close to Iran, including Saleh al-Arouri and Mohammed Deif, and Haniyeh, to a lesser extent.

Shifting power

More importantly, a year of brutal Israeli military action has at least weakened the Qassam Brigades. That raises the possibility that other power centers within the movement — most of which are aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood more than with the military brigades and less enthusiastic about a deep relationship with Tehran — might reassert themselves.

One example of the internal divisions within Hamas regarding its relationship with external events is the split between its Brotherhood leadership’s support for the Syrian revolution and its military faction’s continued relationship with Iran, the sponsor and protector of the Syrian regime.

Notably, the Syrian regime maintained its hostility toward Hamas’ leadership but exempted leaders close to Iran, such as Saleh al-Arouri, who played a role in transferring weapons to the West Bank through Syria with direct help from the regime.