-Analysis-
BEIRUT — The growing influence of newly installed Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa — formerly known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani — can no longer be ignored. His weight is not only being felt inside Syria, but across the region.
Yet is no longer enough to simply decide whether the achievements of the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader in overthrowing the Bashar al-Assad regime can excuse his transgressions in the past as an Islamist radical. Sharaa has become a complex model that embodies the transformation of Syria since the beginning of the revolution in 2011.
Sharaa was associated with al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of the resistance against U.S. invasion. He was detained for five years in American and Iraqi prisons. He then established Jabhat al-Nusra as a branch of al-Qaeda in Syria, before rebranding it HTS to gain local support and international legitimacy.
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He has always been one of the most controversial figures of the Syrian revolution, if not the most controversial of all. During the revolution, his main focus was on fighting the Assad regime and the pro-Iranian militias. Sharaa adopted a sectarian discourse under the banner of “Defending the Sunnis.” He then shifted to a more nationalist discourse following the downfall of Assad, which can be summarized as “the unity of the Syrian people stands above all considerations.”
However, there are unanswered questions about his true intentions, and whether this shift is the result of a genuine conviction or the pragmatism of someone seeking power.
Pragmatic signals
Sharaa surprised all those who feared he and his allies would commit war crimes after the downfall of Assad, as the Nusra Front and other extremist groups did between 2012 and 2016. The shift of HTS from armed combat to the political process under Sharaa’s leadership helped limit acts of revenge on the one hand, and preventing the outbreak of sectarian strife on the other hand.
It must be stated that there have indeed been some “crimes of vengeance” and abuse and theft in certain areas, sometimes at the hands of members of HTS, especially in Homs, coastal areas and Kurdish areas. Still, such reports have been surprisingly limited.
After the fall of the Assad regime, Sharaa declared that “we must think with the mentality of building the state and its institutions,” and that “the mentality of revenge and retaliation should not be present because it is destructive.”
He also stressed that those involved in torturing and killing detainees in the prisons of the Assad regime will not be pardoned, and will be prosecuted. He vowed to achieve justice so that all Syrians can enjoy security and stability.
Unanswered questions
But despite all these changes, the question arises: Has Sharaa truly reconciled with himself the acts of violations of Nusra Front and HTS, especially in Aleppo and Idlib? These violations include the forced imposition of Islamic Sharia law, kidnapping and torturing civilians, including some anti-Assad activists, in HTC-run prisons.
Sharaa has not apologized for these practices, nor has he ordered the release of prisoners of conscience from Idlib’s prisons. The transitional government appointed by Sharaa also began issuing controversial decisions and circulars outside its actual powers, such as its positions on Syrian women and their participation in public life, leading to the decision to amend school curricula that was characterized by “Islamization.” This came after Sharaa’s previous denials of his intention to turn Syria into a copy of Afghanistan.
Sharaa has not made a complete break with his past.
Thus to be clear: Sharaa has not made a complete break with his past, nor has he shown a willingness for self-criticism. But what is more dangerous is that he has not clearly declared a break with “Assadist culture,” despite all the reassurances and the language of tolerance he used so far.
The culture of tyranny still constitutes a fundamental component of the Syrian social structure, after 54 years of systematic repression, restriction of political freedoms, and the use of excessive force against opponents. There are parts of Syrian society that want collective revenge against the remnants of Assad, using the same bloody methods that the former regime practiced against others.
The only party that stands as a real obstacle to this revenge so far is the transitional administration led by Sharaa. Will he provide that guarantee and protections? What is certain is simply Sharaa’s shift from a “hardline Islamist” to a “less hardline Islamist.” And while he has yet to become a moderate, he has proven that he is flexible, and has the ability to adapt and deal with the requirements of reality before him.
A social phenomenon
When Sharaa exchanged his Salafi-jihadist hat to appear in a Western suit and tie, he did not do so as a chameleon changing its skin color. The change in his demeanor is not the result of a purely personal effort, nor is it a cinematic trick to seize power. Rather, it is the result of major cultural and societal changes within the Syrian opposition over the 14 years of the revolution, as we saw the decline of the leftist, liberal and moderate Islamic opposition movements; and the rise of extremist Islamic factions.
The mentality of revenge and retaliation should not be present because it is destructive.
Therefore, the transformations in Sharaa’s personality cannot be placed within the framework of an “individual phenomenon,” despite all his personal experiences and the contradictions since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 until today, after the fall of the Assad regime.
Ideas and ideologies have been mixed to produce a cultural offspring whose identity is still hidden, having still not reached the stage of maturity or arrived at final conclusions to develop a clear plan of action.
This can be seen intuitively in Sharaa’s media interviews. He avoids providing definitive answers on a number of controversial issues, especially cultural ones, as if he is walking a tightrope and is still stuck between two different worlds and time periods.
Sharaa has not mentioned democracy in any of his interviews or speeches, despite his emphasis on some aspects of democratic governance. He has not provided a clear position on human rights, political and partisan pluralism based on freedom of thought rather than sectarian or ethnic affiliation, and freedom of the press.
In addition, the appointments of his close allies in sensitive security positions indicated his intention to build “loyalty networks.”
Towering challenges
Sharaa is in an unenviable position, as his ambitions face many challenges, both internal and external.
Internally, the first challenge is the extent to which he is accepted by large segments of Syrian society, which still view him as a descendant of fundamentalist Islam. There are also the challenges related to governance and administration including unifying the county, restoring the economy, returning millions of refugees and improving the living conditions of Syrians.
The external challenges are no less dangerous. Foreign powers — the United States, Russia, Turkey and Iran — contribute to destabilizing security and obstructing political efforts to reunify the country.
He is characterized by an unexpected flexibility, and appears to approach solving problems realistically.
Also, there are the Israeli forces that have invaded areas of Syria’s Quneitra province and took over Mount Hermon. At the same time, Turkey, which controls Syrian territories, is also amassing its forces on the northern border, threatening to invade areas controlled by the pro-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces.
There is a bitter reality and a price that the Sharaa regime must pay in order to be able to bring the new Syria to safety, without submitting to humiliating and oppressive conditions on the one hand, or falling into the trap of war with any of those combating forces on the other hand.
Ultimately, Sharaa is engaged in a multi-front struggle, with the risk that the gap between his political ambitions and the critical reality widens with each passing day. Yet he is characterized by an unexpected flexibility, and appears to approach solving problems realistically, looking to build consensus in the face of inevitable sectarian quotas.
Strategically, he has proven to have a unique ability to exploit circumstances and define goals accurately. But the appointment of his close allies in sensitive positions indicate troubling attempts to create his own network of loyalists. That makes it difficult, for both those inside and outside Syria, to have complete confidence in him as an “indispensable leader.”
