Once upon a time there was NATO. And maybe tomorrow, it will still be there. But it will be a different NATO, with a new mentality way — even if a magic wand could make all allies suddenly spend 5% of their GDPs on defense, as Donald Trump and his new Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth are demanding.
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This new NATO will be one that is no longer sure how much the United States cares about the defense of Europe — from the threat of Russia or from anyone who puts its security at risk. For the United States, Europe is no longer a priority. Hegseth said it in plain English on Wednesday to a room of some 50 NATO counterparts and partners.
Atlantic rift
This undermines the glue of the alliance, the “one for all, all for one” spirit, which made “European” and “Atlantic” security one and the same. Perhaps that equation, linked to the remnants of the U.S.-Soviet bipolarism that saw us strategically caught between the two Superpowers, had largely disappeared with the end of the Cold War. But the pooling of security had continued undaunted without geographical connotations, so much so that NATO’s Article 5 was applied for the first and last time after September 11 in support of the U.S. No European objected that their priorities were geographically elsewhere.
The Trump administration gave two blunt warnings.
Conversely, the U.S. did not back down in the Balkans or Libya. Hegseth’s statement, among other things, seems tame compared to the version previously provided to the press: “We’re also here today to directly and unambiguously express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.” Nonetheless, the White House’s turn away from Europe is for NATO a major reversal from its most influential member.
In the space of two days, the Trump administration has given two blunt warnings of strategic changes of direction, to Ukraine and to Europe. The first has been in the air for some time: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin will largely negotiate bilaterally for the terms to end the war and decide the fate of Kyiv.
Volodymir Zelensky perhaps expected it, though he continues to insist that Ukraine must be part of the main negotiations.. The second warning, that European security was no longer at the center of American military priorities, may be an even more significant long-term reversal.
Transatlantic tensions
In fact, Europeans prefer almost not to react and focus their comments on Ukraine, loudly demanding a place at the negotiating table, for them (collectively) and for Ukraine.
Zelensky seems almost resigned, or perhaps hoping that Ukraine’s offer a deal for the mining of its rare earth reserves will convince Trump and company. We’ll see. The complaints from the European side are obligatory, logical and fair — and made in vain. They mark the distance that the Trump administration wants to maintain towards Europe, in the context of the general disinterest in alliances, friends and partners, which Mexico and Canada have already seen for themselves. The tariff anvil will now fall on the EU, and the coming trade war dovetails nicely for Trump with the new security dimension that promises few favors.
The Europeans have been as vocal on Ukraine as they have been silent on the American commitment to NATO. At this week’s meeting of defense ministers, the discussion focused above all on Trump’s extemporaneous request to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Extemporaneous because the United States itself does not spend that much (it’s now at 3.38%) but above all because it is completely unrealistic that the majority of allies that are already struggling to hover just above 2% (Italy is at 1.5%) could come close to Trump’s goal. Five percent would require a monstrous redeployment of resources; a recent estimate by Moody’s forecasts a required reallocation of about 6% of public spending to even reach 4%.
Transatlantic uncertainty
The idea of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is to reach a target “above” 3%. But the real point is that discussing percentages allows us to evade the question that is on everyone’s mind: is there still an American commitment to the defense of Europe? Is there even enough spending to count on NATO?
We were too calm and confident.
It will be discussed. We will hear what Trump himself will say at the NATO summit in The Hague on June 24-25. But the seed of doubt sown by Hegseth already marks the end of an era of calm confidence in American intervention to defend Europe.
We were too calm and confident: if we have reached this point, much of the blame is our own. For three decades, American Presidents and cabinet ministers have asked us to do more for our defense. Politely, we have ignored them. Then Trump arrived. And now we have move in a hurry: either to keep the Americans in Europe or to do without them. With or without NATO — or at best, with a very different NATO.
