-Analysis-
BEIRUT — As expected, Hezbollah would not accept a ceasefire deal– unless something has happened to the party that the general public is not aware of. What has been leaked from the terms of the deal — and we don’t have all of its details — appears to point to the beginning of a path that will eventually remove Hezbollah from the regional equation.
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In the best case scenario, the deal will push Hezbollah north of the Litani River, where it will find itself besieged by internal Lebanese questions, just like the other parties of our nation’s sectarian system!
What has been leaked from the terms of the settlement points to Israel having virtually complete control “on the ground.” An American general will head the committee supervising the implementation of the agreement.
There is also the important right of both parties to strike if there is any attempt by either of them to violate the terms of the agreement. This means that Israel has freedom of movement, while Hezbollah will be north of the river and bound by the terms of the agreement, and will not be able to intervene if Israel violates the terms of the agreement.
It seems that the agreement includes terms related to controlling the borders with Syria. We don’t know the mechanism of this control or other crucial elements of the ceasefire, but there are more than enough reasons to be skeptical.
After Nasrallah
The reactions thus far suggest that Tel Aviv is enthusiastic about the terms of the deal, while it remains difficult to measure Hezbollah’s response after the repeated recent blows its suffered at the hands of the Israeli forces.
The party’s leadership is now off the radar. It is likely that the margin of maneuver once enjoyed by the party’s late Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has narrowed, and the decision has been completely transferred to Tehran. If that is the case, and the agreement holds, we have before us a deal that largely circumvents Lebanon. Still, it’s too early to say.
The insistence of the “sources” from both sides of the front that the agreement is complete raises suspicion. What the Israelis are leaking refers to an almost complete defeat for Hezbollah, to go along with a written American pledge, outside the agreement, that Israel has the right to intervene militarily if it detects any breach of the agreement.
Blame and alibis
As for what the Lebanese are leaking, it is limited to continue the commitment to the 2006 Resolution 1701, and a committee to supervise its implementation headed by an American general. As for the actual agreement, it is the clauses that fall between these two boundaries.
One might think that the rush to announce the completion of the deal is the best indication that it will fail. Each party preemptively seeks to blame the other party for that eventual failure.
Israel will defend itself in front of the U.S. administration, and Hezbollah will avoid blaming the Lebanese living in dire conditions due to death and displacement.
The question of the Lebanese army
As for the Lebanese army, which will be responsible for dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of the Litani River and repelling any Israeli attempt to breach the agreement, it needs to deal with these two tasks in a completely different domestic political landscape.
Today’s political divisions in Lebanon do not facilitate this task, and the governing institutions are in complete vacuum. The army is certainly affected by this vacuum.
To say that Hezbollah has lost its leadership and suffered painful blows is not sufficient to believe that the party has handed over its affairs to the Lebanese negotiator — Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri — who was tasked by the party and not by Lebanon to negotiate.
There are many hidden corners of complications in an agreement like this, but perhaps the most crucial question is about Hezbollah’s ability to adapt to what would be a dramatic transition of its function as Iran’s strongest arm in the region to a mere Lebanese Shiite party.
This is not in itself an expression of pessimism about the future of the ceasefire, but rather the reality that we don’t have the answers. It’s also a reminder that nobody should rush to bet on the end of the war. There are still too many who have an interest in fighting, and the ceasefire is unlikely to hold unless there’s an agreement behind the deal that goes beyond Lebanon.
