-Analysis-
CAIRO — After 9/11, U.S. decision makers changed their approach toward extremist groups. In a shift, they supported more moderate groups as an alternative to jihadist groups that are hostile to the West and seek to establish “a radical Islamic empire that spans from Spain to Indonesia,” as U.S. President George W. Bush said at the time.
While Bush was discussing with his aides and advisors the preparations for his global “crusade” campaign against “terrorism,” U.S. research centers began studying and reviewing what had happened. These centers put forward many concepts and estimates for dealing with what they called the “Islamic threat.” One that Washington had helped create but that soon turned against the United States and the West, and struck the U.S. on its soil.
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In her 2003 book Civil Democratic Islam, American researcher Cheryl Benard concluded that to confront the “Islamic threat,” U.S. decision makers must “transform Islam itself into a tool that helps achieve American political and economic goals.”
Benard, the wife of Zalmay Khalilzad, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and Iraq, made several recommendations to achieve this goal. Most notably, she suggested that the U.S. support “moderate fundamentalists for temporary tactical considerations,” and later work to “create partners from reformist Islamists,” to ensure that they remain within the orbit of U.S. policies.
American attempts to subjugate “Islamists” did not begin after September 2001. Washington has not stopped supporting “Islamists” since the Cold War; it has entrusted them with the task of preserving its interests and implementing its agenda. To achieve its goals, the U.S. has depended on regressive regimes in the Middle East, on arming and financing jihadist groups, or supporting fundamentalist groups that are able to challenge regimes opposing Western policies.
The Islam that Washington likes
The United States always has its own vision to deal with “Islamists;” each stage has its own group and each goal has its own group. When the goal was to besiege Soviet influence and exhaust the regimes that rejected American orientations, there were groups in mosques and universities, calling for fighting “atheism and communism.”
When it was necessary to take up arms to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan, Washington called for the mujahideen from every corner, and they came to the “land of jihad” in droves to confront the “red occupation.” When the arrows of the “mujahideen” rebounded back to the U.S. heart, it decided to return to the “more moderate” version of Islamists.
In June 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama delivered his famous speech at Cairo University in Egypt, which was attended by leaders of the-ruling National Party and leaders of the then-banned Muslim Brotherhood. In this speech, Obama called for confronting “violent extremism in all of its forms.” He also said that “Islam is not part of the problem in combating violent extremism — it is an important part of promoting peace.”
Washington strategists came up with a “hybrid” recipe.
When Obama spoke about Islam, he was not speaking about the civilizational Islam that constitutes the cultural identity of the peoples of that region, who have for centuries resisted attempts of Westernization and Turkification, and revolted against colonialism in all its forms.
Rather, Obama was referring to the Islam that accepts to revolve in the American orbit, achieves the interests of the United States, and guarantees the security and stability of Israel.
Just as the mix of “fundamentalist mujahideen” — who turned against the “distant enemy” that had to be fought because it was “the cause of Muslims’ misfortunes” — failed, the American plan to support the arrival of “moderates” to seats of power through exploiting revolutions and ballot boxes, also failed.
Here, Washington strategists came up with a “hybrid” recipe that calls for “domesticating or taming armed terrorist groups.”
The Taliban example
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently called on Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which overthrew the Assad regime in Syria, to refrain from adopting hardline policies to avoid global isolation like the Taliban.
“If you don’t want that isolation, then there are certain things that you have to do in moving the country forward… to deal with and protect minorities, to deal with some of the security challenges, whether It’s chemical weapons, whether it’s groups like ISIS,” Blinken said in an event organized by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York.
Blinken said that “the Taliban presented a more moderate face during their takeover of Afghanistan — or at least tried to — but their true nature later became evident.”
The U.S. has not forgotten that it has been stung twice in Afghanistan.
Just 24 hours after Blinken’s speech, HST leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, said in a BBC interview that he did not want to turn Syria into a copy of Afghanistan, “the two countries are very different and have different traditions.”
The U.S. has not forgotten that it has been stung twice in Afghanistan, so its chief diplomat wanted to draw the attention of HTC to the repercussions of the Afghan experience.
Supporting HTC depends not only on reassuring statements in which they confirm that they have abandoned their previous ideas and intend to build a new state for all races and sects, but also on adhering to the path that Washington and its allies in the region are orchestrating.
The U.S. is not concerned about the future of Syria in which a regime — the worst version among Arab authoritarian regimes — has been overthrown, and replaced by militias who grew out of ISIS and al-Qaeda. The U.S. is only concerned about its interests in the region, which include ending the influence of the Russian-Iranian axis, and preserving Israel’s security.
Is it a tactic?
The new Syrian administration pledged to implement the conditions of its sponsors. It cut off the supply route to the Lebanon’s Hezbollah resistance, closed the training camps of the Palestinian resistance groups, turned a blind eye to Israel’s occupation of Syrian territory, and the destruction of the Syrian army’s capabilities.
The new rulers also called on the U.S. to “facilitate the establishment of better relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv,” according to what the governor of Damascus, Maher Marwan, Sharaa’s brother-in-law, told NPR last month.
Things do not usually go as one wishes with these groups. On the one hand, the interests of the sponsors will clash whenever they start dividing the spoils. This has already begun in northern Syria: U.S.-backed factions clashed with Turkey-backed groups.
Has al-Sharaa changed his principles as he changed his appearance?
On the other hand, no one can assert that the HTC and its partners have already abandoned their principles and doctrine that were formed with fire and blood.
In mid-2015, al-Sharaa — then known as Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, the leader of al-Qaeda affiliate al-Nusra Front, which later rebranded itself as HTC — met with a group of journalists in Idlib province, his stronghold. He was asked, “Are you prepared to change your political and jihadist discourse, or are they constants that do not change?”
He replied, “We have political constants that are linked to Sharia and do not change or alter. We are fighting to enforce God’s law on Earth, and there is no change in this matter. However, there are tactical issues that change according to the battle, reality, and incidents. As for the constants, they do not change.”
It is still too early to know how Syria will be governed. But doubts remain surrounding al-Jolani’s assurances and pledges. Could these pledges be part of the “tactical” issues imposed by reality? Or has he changed his principles as he changed his appearance and transformed from the leader of an armed group into a statesman?
