Why Tehran May Actually Welcome Neighboring Armenia’s EU Pivot

-Analysis-

LONDON — Recently, Iran International TV reported that Iran and its northern neighbor, Armenia, had signed a major arms deal that involved the purchase of Iranian weaponry, including Shahed drones and air defense missile systems. The London-based news channel cited an unnamed military official in the Middle East.

But while the foreign ministries of both states have rejected the claims, the report has caused a stir in Armenia. Despite its good relations with Iran since the country’s independence in 1991, Armenia has not pursued military collaboration with Tehran. Rather, Armenia has sought to move closer to the West, particularly to the European Union, and has modernized its armies with Western help. Working with Iran, a state hostile to the West, would jeopardize this long-term strategy.

There were speculations that Azerbaijan — presently Armenia’s chief enemy and an irritant to Tehran — was behind the report.

After marching into the disputed Karabakh region — under the impotent watch, if not the complicity of Russian peacekeeping forces — Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev appears keen to grab more Armenian land, including enclaves occupied in September 2022.

Iran opposes any redrawing of frontiers in the Caucasus; however, its protests have only been verbal, as it can barely afford to send troops here. Iran and Azerbaijan share a large population of Azeris on both sides of the border, and while their relations are fraught, tensions have typically led to nothing more than border maneuvers as a show of force and warning.

Trouble at the border

Armenians are disappointed with the feebleness of Russia, supposedly its strategic partner, toward Azerbaijan’s aggressive conduct. This has led Yerevan to look for other strategic and defensive partners, which began with asking the EU to send observers to its border with Azerbaijan. This was important, as Baku usually justifies its aggressions by calling them preemptive action against “expected” Armenian attacks.

In 2022, the EU sent 40 civilian observers, which proved effective in halting Azeri incursions along the border. Indeed the only place where these persisted was the Verinhand district, where Russian troops are present, being sent there after the (2020) 44-day war at the request of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. Now, after Russia and Azerbaijan signed a military pact on February 22, 2022 (two days before the Russian attack on Ukraine), those troops are seen as a dangerous fifth column working inside Armenia.

Calls inside Armenia to end all collaborations with Russia are growing louder.

The EU border operation has expanded to include over 200 observers from EU member states as well as Canada and Norway. The decision to invite EU border guards, and Armenia’s decision to assure its long-term security with a Western partnership, were not entirely welcome to its neighbors Azerbaijan, Iran and especially Russia, which sees itself as Armenia’s closest partner and protector.

Moscow has responded with hostility, making threats and surreptitiously encouraging Baku in its aggressive conduct, though unable so far to block Yerevan’s decisions. It no longer has a border with Armenia and the two or 3,000 troops it has stationed there are more of symbolic than practical value.

Meanwhile, calls inside Armenia to end all collaborations with Russia are growing louder. And the Armenian government recently terminated the contracts of Russian observers working at Yerevan’s airport since the end of the Soviet Union, which led to their departure.

Benefitting from EU presence

The problem is not a military one, but one of Armenia’s overwhelming economic dependence on Russia, to the tune of 80% of its entire economy. While Yerevan is taking steps to diversify its partners, this will take time. Tehran meanwhile has offered to supply Armenia with gas should the Russians cut supplies, and it has been less hostile than Russia to Armenia’s Western realignment.

Tehran’s ambassador in Yerevan, Mehdi Sobhani, met with French ambassador Olivier Decottignies there soon after observers arrived. And Sobhani was assured the EU mission there — and peace in Armenia — could be beneficial to Iran’s economic and strategic interests.

Certainly, a weak and dismembered Armenia would not benefit Iran, which does not want to see the Caucasus and its wealth effectively carved up among Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. On numerous occasions these states have shown they’re happy to trample on Iranian state interests.

Furthermore any bid by Azerbaijan to annex Armenian lands between Nakhchivan and the rest of Azerbaijan, would deprive Iran of its border with Armenia. So despite its anti-Western posturing, Iran can benefit from EU presence in Armenia, especially economically.

Iran has realized the benefits of EU presence on its border.

Sobhani has said Iran was ready to participate in EU projects in Armenia, adding in an interview with Radio Free Europe that Tehran will respect Armenia’s foreign policy choices as long as they do not threaten Iranian interests. He stressed that his country will not stand for any change to the Iran-Armenia border.

Iran has realized, and is making it known that it understands, the benefits of EU presence on its border. Its diplomats may even have had a role in persuading Tehran to take a neutral view of this development, a change of tack that has already had palpable results like allowing Indian arms destined for Armenia to be delivered over Iranian airspace. Other benefits include the possibility of EU financing for road and rail links that would eventually connect Iran, through Armenia and Georgia, to the Black Sea and the European continent.

If Armenia were ever to join the EU, it would effectively provide a shorter route, linking Iran as a potential energy supplier with the mother of all customers. Armenia would become Iran’s bridge out of isolation.