Iran’s Retaliation Against Israel Is An Internal Struggle With Its Own Rhetoric

Updated April 13, 2024 at 11:45 p.m.*

–Analysis-

Iran places great importance on ordinary citizens’ willingness to die for their religion. Yet, following Israel’s bombing of the Iranian embassy in Syria on April 1, the regime that touts martyrdom was forced to weigh how strongly to respond. If the response is ultimately seen as modest, it will undermine a major political pillar of the Islamic Republic.

Overnight on Saturday, Iran launched some 300 drones and missiles toward Israel in an unprecedented direct attack by Tehran aimed at Israeli soil. Virtually all the rockets were intercepted and no Israelis were killed. Earlier, Iranian troops reportedly seized a commercial ship with links to Israeli billionaire Eyal Ofer. This all came amid reports that Iran wanted to avoid a response that would provoke a full-fledged war spreading through the Middle East.

A theme of the regime since it took power in 1979, this culture of martyrdom has its origins in the unjust killing of the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Husayn in the 7th century. Shia clerics tell congregations that the objective of martyrdom is to hasten the return of Husayn’s descendant, the absent Mahdi or imam of “true” believers.

Following Iraq’s 1980 invasion of Iran and during the subsequent war, the regime used this tradition in its call to defend the homeland, sending thousands of ill-trained youth (some barely in their teens) to the front (and to their deaths) when the country was short on arms and materials.

Even long after the Iraq-Iran war’s end in 1988, the regime continues to evoke this martyrdom whenever it wants Iranians to “grin and bear” the country’s dismal economic problems that are rooted in the regime’s own policies. Talk of martyrdom helps the regime maintain a “war footing” that serves its interests; it is easier to make arrests or execute prisoners if the enemy is forever at the gate.

Iran’s forward position

In recent years, the regime has revised its martyr discourse to reflect regional and generational changes. During the Syrian Civil War, which Iran began meddling in from 2011, the regime began calling would-be martyrs “Defenders of the Shrine,” referring to Shia shrines in Syria that were threatened by Salafists and Sunni fanatics.

But faith was not enough to persuade young Iranians to fight and die in another country; a national argument was needed. So Syria was presented as part of a Shia homeland — despite its atheist regime led by Iranian ally and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Internally, the Islamic Republic considered Syria to be “strategic depth” for Iran and a “forward position” against Salafists who — if not stopped — would attack Iran itself.

The spirit of martyrdom among Iran’s youth has been the regime’s lifeline.

Most of those sent to fight in Syria already had a record of suppressing protests in Iran. In interviews, the families of those killed in the Syrian war expressed pride for their loved-ones who had not only fought in Syria but also tackled “sedition” at home. Another common refrain was that of “desired martyrdom.” They are the main base of the regime’s system for survival. At all levels of the government, officials agree on one vital principle: “the spirit of martyrdom among our youth” has been the regime’s lifeline.

Strategic patience

The willingness of ordinary Iranians to die at the regime’s request is crucial to its control, making up for its weaknesses and incompetence, and for public contempt.

Syria allowed Iran to overhaul and revive its military, around the regional Quds Force and paramilitary volunteer Basij (Resistance Mobilization Force) militia force.

People see the corruption of those who tout martyrdom

Syria also gave the regime a chance to update its narrative and to build more malleable discourse around martyrdom. Once the shrines of Syria became less relevant, the regime returned its focus to its evergreen theme: Israel.

But the situation has changed; there is a pervasive sense of exhaustion among the regime and its generals. People see the corruption of those who tout martyrdom, but only for other people’s sons and brothers. Is there anyone in Iran who hasn’t seen and heard reports of generals, officials and clerics nabbing land or pocketing astronomic wages and cheeky commissions?

Who will fight to “wipe Israel off the map” when the warmongers stay behind, living the high life in Tehran or abroad? Loyalists must be noting the regime’s extreme reluctance — and not for the first time — to act on its stated fury over Israel’s bombing of its embassy in Syria on April 1. Regime leaders have deftly coined euphemisms for their vain saber-rattling: “heroic flexibility” and “strategic patience.”

Keeping the zealots happy

Have rallying cries about liberating Jerusalem simply been pretexts, allowing the regime to maintain the war footing that keeps it in place? What do loyalists think when they hear clerics telling congregations that “the enemy” is pressuring officials to act against Israel? Or about a regime analyst calling those who urge retaliation against Israel of being “superficial?”

Does the regime, in other words, embrace martyrdom or not?

The regime’s hesitancy is bound to dishearten the zealots — especially younger loyalists, who have been raised on the verbiage of martyrdom by a regime that, in fact, prefers intrigue. Will they keep fighting for leaders so averse to risks for themselves? And if they refuse, who will defend the regime? Will the regime even have time to play its final trump card: nuclear weapons?

Will the regime be able to withstand the inevitable consequence of Israel’s wrath?

Iran’s regime faces a conundrum. It must show its loyalists it is prepared to practice what it preaches by striking Israel. But will it be able to withstand the inevitable consequence of Israel’s wrath?

This is the dead end where the regime’s 45 years of hate-mongering has arrived.

*Originally published April 12, 2024, the article was updated April 13 with reports of Iran’s missile attack aimed at Israel and seizure of an Israeli-linked vessel.