This Is How Europe Becomes The Military Power That The World Needs Now

-Analysis-

BERLIN — Siding with Russia and China on UN resolutions; getting into a shouting match with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office; and now suspending all of U.S. military aid to Ukraine: In recent weeks, President Donald Trump has been busy dismantling the order that the United States has established, and benefited from, since World War II. He has managed to place his country on the same level as the world’s two most powerful authoritarian regimes, forcing the U.S. to step down as the leader among Western nations.

It remains unclear whether Trump is pursuing a strategic goal of aligning with Russia to drive a wedge between Moscow and its Chinese competitor, or simply seeking a short-term solution to focus on China as a priority. Even if such a strategy involves striking a “deal” with Russia that sacrifices Ukraine.

For the U.S. president’s actions are tantamount to nothing less than Ukraine’s capitulation. He has effectively abandoned the country. He may not even realize the damage this causes to his country’s foreign policy, as America’s credibility erodes in the eyes of a great many nations.

Yes, Europe can go it alone

The dispute over Ukraine is now giving rise to the need for “European sovereignty” which French President Emmanuel Macron has been advocating since 2017. European leaders responded swiftly and decisively to Trump’s provocation, rejecting his flipping of the aggressor/victim roles, reaffirming their commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and getting ready to shoulder the primary burden of military support.

There is some irony in British Prime Minister Keir Starmer attempting to leverage the UK’s “special relationship” with the U.S. for mediation purposes, while simultaneously taking the lead in strengthening Europe — despite not being an EU member. Could the coalition he proposes serve as a blueprint for a future European Defense Union of sorts?

We are on our own — but not without options.

One thing is clear: Europeans can no longer hide behind the U.S. In terms of security policy, Germany in particular, has often done so. Which explains Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s hesitancy in providing military support to Ukraine. Europeans have long fallen for the myth of their own weakness and the necessity to benefit from an American “security umbrella.” Those times are over. We are on our own — but not without options.

Are Europeans aware that the EU member states collectively spend 326 billion euros on defense — more than China or Russia — and that they are in a position to deploy 1.5 million soldiers? Why shouldn’t they be able to replace the 300,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe or deployed from the U.S. in case of a conflict? According to estimates by the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, the additional cost of 250 billion euros per year amounts to just 1.5% of Europe’s GDP — less than what the EU spent on the COVID crisis.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has understood the seriousness of the geopolitical situation and is already thinking about the big picture. She believes it is possible to mobilize up to 800 billion euros for the “re-armament of Europe.” The establishment of an EU defense fund in addition to national spending would show Russia how determined the bloc is. And while Trump does not want to send U.S. soldiers to Ukraine, the U.S. defense industry on the other hand is certainly interested in supplying critical military capabilities, such as air defense.

A show of European might

Meanwhile, the debate over Europe’s nuclear deterrence is already in full swing. Doubts about the American nuclear guarantee have been around since the 1950s, but now it is discussed openly, with Macron once again driving the conversation. No German leader has addressed Germany’s potential nuclear sharing with France and the UK as concretely as the likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz. The credibility of a European nuclear deterrent does not depend solely on the number of warheads available: It increases as doubts about the American nuclear guarantee grow.

History has taught Europeans that ceasefires can be exploited to resume conflicts later.

Europe has already managed to surpass the U.S. in terms of support for Ukraine. Replacing the American contribution would cost the EU less than 1% of its GDP, and Europe is catching up in military aid. U.S. systems like HIMARS or ATACMS could eventually be replaced by British Storm Shadow, French SCALP or German Taurus missiles — while Europe also boasts its own fighter jets.

There are still short-term challenges in military intelligence and air defense systems like the Patriot missile system. Yet, military support for Ukraine strengthens European security through deterrence and cannot merely be offset against contributions to NATO.

Deals do not lasting peace make

There is no historical precedent where a just and lasting peace has been achieved in wartime through short-term arrangements, or “deals,” between major powers — especially when key actors are excluded, or told what to do. That is why the White House clash marks the failure of Trump’s diplomacy in the Ukraine war. Without involving Ukraine and European partners, it will be impossible for him to get closer to a solution.

Trump abandoned Ukraine’s most critical demands (i.e., territorial integrity and NATO membership) before talks even began. By cutting off aid to Ukraine, Trump has weakened its negotiating position and strengthened Russia’s.

The U.S. government has effectively switched sides. If Russia achieves its objectives through war, it is the world’s security, and not just Europe’s, that is at risk. Trump does not seem to understand this.

In this situation, Europe has the opportunity to act differently. History has taught Europeans that ceasefires can be exploited to resume conflicts later on. The 2014 Minsk Agreements, initiated by Germany and France, demonstrated this. European diplomacy operates based on the interests and power dynamics of the parties involved, envisioning a European security order for the future. This is a key distinction from Trump’s dealmaking approach.

The struggle to set up a new European order

European diplomacy is strategic and extends beyond Washington’s aim of a short-term ceasefire. While a truce is a prerequisite for peace, it will only hold with effective security guarantees, which several key European nations are willing to provide. Doubts about their capability to enforce a ceasefire stem from their past reliance on the United States. It is not necessarily a matter of physical presence along the (long) front line, it is a matter of deterrence. NATO’s European pillar can certainly provide this. Ultimately, Europe’s strategy hinges on further strengthening Ukraine’s military — now comprised of approximately 800,000 soldiers, the largest in Europe.

Future negotiations with Russia will have to navigate between a “New Yalta”.

Russia’s proposals from December 2021 and the Ukraine-Russia negotiations in April 2022 have shown us that Russia is looking for a European order that is reminiscent of the 1945 Yalta Conference, where the victors divided Europe. In coordination with the United States, Russia aims to restore its hegemony in Eastern Europe, with NATO retreating to its 1997 borders. While this directly contradicts the interests of both Ukraine and Europe, both sides fundamentally think in terms of order.

Future negotiations with Russia will have to navigate between a “New Yalta” and Europe’s wish to combine credible deterrence with the possibility of dialogue. These compromises can only be reached through tough negotiations — not beforehand.

Ultimately, power dynamics and the military situation in Ukraine will determine the outcome. Russia is advancing slowly, suffering considerable losses while failing to achieve decisive breakthroughs. It does not even fully control the so-called annexed regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. While the Russian war economy has temporarily boosted the economy, it is expected to wind down by next year.

In this war of attrition, Russian President Vladimir Putin believes he can outlast the West — partly because he sees Europeans as weak. They simply must prove him wrong.