–Analysis-
PARIS — The war in Ukraine will soon be entering its third year. To understand where we are now, a comparison with World War I may be useful. What was happening at the end of the summer of 1916, after two years of war?
On the Western front, the hero of the Battle of the Marne, General Joseph Joffre — victim of his failures to break through the enemy front — had been replaced by General Robert Nivelle, whose 1917 Chemin des Dames offensive would prove even more tragically futile. By late summer 1916, the front had essentially stabilized. We were waiting for an external factor to tip the balance one way or the other. In April 1917, the United States entered the war.
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Today, with the frontline barely moving — even if the Ukrainians are suffering — it is not America’s entry, but its exit, which, by ending its support to Kyiv, could deeply alter the course of the war.
Trump is in some way Putin’s wild card, as Wilson was for the Allies. The Russian revolution in the fall of 1917, and its consequences, the end of hostilities on the Eastern Front, were not enough for the central empires to balance the entry of the United States in the war.
The analogies between 1916 and 2024 are numerous. Isn’t General Valerii Zaluzhny — whom President Volodymyr Zelensky has just dismissed after his counter-offensive failed — the Ukrainian Joffre?
An American betrayal of Europe?
The crux of the matter lies elsewhere. Could Europe take the place of the United States — to maintain a form of balance between Kyiv and Moscow — if Republicans, victorious behind Donald Trump, withdrew from the game, forcing Ukraine to accept negotiation on Russia’s terms ?
Or are the United States, like a fading beacon in a spreading night, still irreplaceable today? For many historians, the U.S. inward-looking attitude in the aftermath of the First World War was one of the main causes of the Second World War. If the U.S. had remained faithful to the principles of Wilson, they would not have allowed the uncontrollable rise of fascism in Europe.
In 1920, the United States had retreated after the victorious end of hostilities. In 2025, it would do so with war still raging in Eastern Europe. What was merely a resignation yesterday, would by necessity become a betrayal tomorrow.
Historical analogies are useful and contain important lessons. But they cannot be taken too far.
David and Goliath on equal footing
If we are to make a balanced assessment of what is happening in Eastern Europe — just over two hours by plane from Paris — we need to avoid two pitfalls: the first is resignation, if not defeatism, and the second irenicism, the unconditional support of peace and conciliation. Let’s not deny it. Ukraine’s situation is difficult.
The Ukrainian David continues to almost match the Russian Goliath.
A return to historical comparisons is useful, if not vital. At the end of the summer of 1916, the stabilization of positions on the Western front reflected the inability of two more or less equal powers to prevail over the other. The opening of a new front to the south, in the Dardanelles, would be a failure.
In 2024, war is not global as it was in 1916 — even if there is a de facto “second front” in the Middle East, with the war in Gaza. A conflict that diverts the world’s attention from Ukraine, and thus objectively benefits Russia. The Global South is not aligning itself with Russia — contrary to what is too often said — but distancing itself from the Western world and its selective emotions, its double standards.
In 2024, unlike in 1916, the two forces involved are not “boxing” in the same category as Germany and its allies against France and its allies. And yet, after two years of war, the Ukrainian David continues to almost match the Russian Goliath. It even managed to humiliate Moscow’s naval forces in the Black Sea, at a time when Kyiv was almost non-existent in this military field.
Ukraine, looking West
No resignation, then. We’re in 1916: nothing is decided yet. The Ukrainian fatigue is very real, but in no way reminiscent of the mutinies of 1917.
For France, losing the war then meant giving up Alsace and Lorraine.
For Ukraine, losing the war today would mean giving up independence and democracy. It would mean accepting to return to the East, at at time when everything points towards the West, through the European Union and NATO. How can you accept to return to the status of Belarus when you are getting closer and closer to Poland‘s? The Ukrainians’ motivation remains strong. To resign ourselves to their defeat would be to show how little we value the defense of our values. The late Robert Badinter, former foreign minister of France, once said: “Just because they are no longer consensual, it doesn’t mean they are no longer universal.”
Losing would also mean being blind to the intentions — and even more so to the profound nature — of Putin’s Russia. Navalny’s death is a case in point. Every step backward on our part only strengthens Putin’s appetite, and confirms in his eyes the superiority of his “pure, hard and virile” civilization.
With or without the U.S.
Nothing could be more revealing in this respect than the recent statements by the governor of Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. For him, what is happening in the world is not “Voltaire’s fault”, but “Kant’s fault”.
You can’t make people dream with impunity.
With his demand for moral clarity and his universalist internationalism, Immanuel Kant propagated false and dangerous ideas in the world, which are the direct cause of the current chaos, said Anton Alikhanov.
You can’t make people dream with impunity. Hope — like education — is the beginning of ease, which is not good for everyone.
It’s one thing to resign yourself to Ukraine’s defeat. Doing everything to prevent it is quite another. Will we be able to supply Kyiv in good time with the ammunition and weapons it needs to spare the lives of its soldiers and avoid losing the war? This must be our top priority (with or without the United States).
