-Analysis-
KYIV — To win the war in Ukraine, Russia will need to control the reactions of its opponents (Ukraine and the West) and force them to act in accordance with their expectations. In Russian military doctrine, this is called reflexive control.
For the latest news & views from every corner of the world, Worldcrunch Today is the only truly international newsletter. Sign up here.
If Russia cannot quickly destroy Ukraine by military means, then it must force the West to end its aid and Ukrainian society to give up its fight. Once the country is defeated, Russia will erase Ukrainians from history. The conceptual ground for this has been formed for hundreds of years.
How is Russian culture a weapon in a semantic war? The West is hesitating to cut ties with Russia due to a history of cooperation and Russia’s “great culture” (humanism, Dostoevsky, etc.), while the Kremlin is waging an aggressive war and genocide in a neighboring country. And the consequences imposed by the West do not follow the concept of escalation management, only increasing the chances of a Russian victory.
Russian culture narrative
Meanwhile, some in the West are ignoring the Kremlin’s outright threats and behaving in a way that will allow them to resume “business as usual” over time. As long as Russia’s aggression against the West is not in motion, its information and semantic wars remain at the forefront; the Kremlin is attacking the West on its own territory just as it attacks Ukraine.
The West cannot imagine a world map without Russia.
This is a long-term story. While Russia’s information war was shaken at a certain point due to military failures and increased spending to regain the upper hand, the Kremlin had a major advantage over Ukraine in the semantic war.
Ukraine has only been waging its campaign at the state level for two years, while Russia has formed its experience and influence over centuries.
The narrative of the “great Russian culture” is one of the most striking examples. Russia and the West have fought each other, formed alliances, shared spheres of influence, traded and exchanged cultures for centuries. That cannot be erased from minds in two years. Moreover, Russians have extensive experience in waging wars of aggression, suppressing national movements, non-linear aggression against other countries and bribing foreign elites for political influence, etc.
A formidable opponent
It is not surprising that The New York Times hired a whole cohort of Russians or those who have long worked in Russia to cover the war in Ukraine. The newspaper seems to ignore the existence of Ukrainians, who could do the job much more professionally.
Another example of Russia’s great advantage in the semantic war came at the Oscars ceremony in March. The shortened international TV broadcast did not include the presentation of the Academy Award to the Ukrainian team for the documentary 20 days in Mariupol.
The West cannot imagine a world map without Russia — and Ukraine must make sure the West cannot imagine one without it either.
Ukraine is dealing with a formidable opponent. For some in the West, Ukraine, while worthy of sympathy and compassion, is a mere rebellious province. Ukrainians must recognize this unpleasant fact and fight against it. For decades to come — depending on the outcome of the war — Ukrainians will have to eradicate this influence on thinking. Yet there is no chance of winning the semantic war if Ukraine loses the military conflict.
Ukrainians have no friends in Russia, as confirmed by the behavior of Russian opposition, which openly expects or even demands certain actions from Ukraine. And they are outraged that Ukrainian society refuses to live up to these expectations. Many in the West do not understand either.
One example is the reaction to reports that Ukrainian First Lady Olena Zelenska declined a White House invitation in March where she would sit next to Yulia Navalnaya, the widow of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. The West doesn’t want to and probably can’t understand that the essence and a goal of Ukraine’s resistance is the right to choose who we interact with.
Ukrainian resistance
The peak of this semantic war, on the eve of its Feb. 24, 2022 invasion, was convincing the world that Ukraine would be unable to stop the Russian army. And it was largely successful.
Due to doubts in the West over Ukraine’s capabilities, aid was based on the assumption that the war would be short; it prioritized compact portable weapons for short-term guerrilla warfare. When Ukrainians’ massive resistance caused that plan to fail, the West had to adjust.
Russia’s impatience and use of force triggered a reaction in Ukrainian society.
The West’s narratives (“There is no point in helping a country that will fail”, or “Western weapons will not change anything for Ukraine”) have gradually transformed, and can now be summarized as “Russia cannot be defeated” and “Ukraine cannot win.” This was supported in a recent statement, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who said that Ukraine will not stand on its own feet “without Western help.”
These narratives have an impact. Look at Germany’s refusal to send Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine.
We will never know whether Russia’s semantic war alone — without the open armed conflict — could have broken passive Ukrainian resistance in the long run. Russia has always skillfully played on the contradictions among Ukraine’s political elites, strengthening collaborators and adding fuel to the fire of any significant social crisis.
Yet Russia’s impatience and use of force triggered a reaction in Ukrainian society, which was going through a gradual and painful process of forming its identity and self-awareness.
Russia’s advantages
For 30 years, Ukraine has not only been losing weapons and the military-industrial complex (squandering what is so needed today), but also forming little resistance in Russia’s semantic war.
It is not certain that during this time, Ukraine would have succeeded in doing what Russia has done for hundreds of years, appropriating our heritage and incorporating it into its state-building myth. Yet Ukraine did not make the maximum possible effort.
Ukraine did make some progress in the semantic war when the Russian army‘s narrative of complete invincibility was shaken. But the Kremlin quickly recovered, as it did on the military battlefield, where it adapted and doubled or tripled its efforts. Russia boosted its spending and continues its pressure.
The Russians are also regaining territory in the semantic war. When guns and missiles start talking, everything seems to fade into the background for Ukrainians — but only for Ukrainians.
Information battlefields have unfolded against Ukraine’s Western allies, against whom the Russians have long been working systematically. And the Kremlin has launched a new information offensive. A striking example is the campaign against mobilization.
Russia has an advantage in all resources including in information warfare. That is as well-known as the goal of the war: the invasion is nothing more than the consistent implementation of the Russian political program to destroy Ukrainian statehood and identity.
As for Ukraine, its goals in the war are to preserve statehood, protect its identity and reclaim its integral place in the world, in the hearts and minds of people, politicians, influential figures of culture and science.
Ukraine’s future
The world should not imagine itself without Ukraine on the map. It should recognize Ukraine as a unique and independent country. And Ukrainians must be clear who they are.
The winner of the semantic war depends directly on the outcome of the military war. But the semantic war is now affecting forces on the frontline. One example of this the U.S. Congress’s stalling on aid to Ukraine.
Ukraine should aim to be more detailed, and to use more symbols and interpretations. They may seem vague but are easier to materialize in the collective mind, such as reclaiming state borders. Crimea is one such symbol; as long as the peninsula remains a Russian military base, Ukraine is vulnerable to any future development.
The semantic war requires considerable efforts from both Ukraine and the West.
Simple wording works well for voters in other cases, when it comes to playing on emotions. But before going to the people, it is worth defining terms, including the complex ones. In the case of Crimea, for example, it would be worthwhile for Ukrainians to define the de-occupation of the entire constitutional territory and “reclaiming the borders.”
This is not about regaining control of fields and territories with the banks of rivers, lakes and seas. It is not an issue of physical geography, but of meaning. It is about the restoration of the violated constitutional order on the territory prescribed in Ukraine’s Constitution. Until this is done, Ukraine will be seen as a country with disabilities by everyone — including Ukrainians.
The semantic war requires considerable efforts from both Ukraine and the West. It implies a serious struggle in the shaping of thought and opinions about Ukraine in the world. But before that, Ukraine must not fail in such efforts at home. Its enemy, Russia, is actively pursuing this.
