-Analysis-
KYIV — In his 2020 book Active Measures. The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare, disinformation historian Thomas Rid quotes the first head of the KGB‘s Department D (disinformation), Ivan Aghayants, who said that the disinformation game is an easy one.
If “freedom of the press” didn’t exist, the KGB would have to invent it. The book contains the most vivid and effective examples of so-called “active measures,” where spy agencies pour vast resources into hacking, leaking, and forging data, often with the goal of weakening the very foundation of liberal democracy.
Rid reveals for the first time some of history’s most significant operations — many nearly beyond belief.
One example comes from the 1960s, when the Russians leaked to Der Spiegel plans for West Germany’s military exercises and information that Europe’s conventional weapons were not enough to repel an attack by the USSR. This sparked an enormous scandal for Germany’s then influential Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, who demanded the arrest of the magazine’s owner and editor-in-chief, Rudolf Augstein. On Nov. 19, the cabinet’s five Free Democratic Party ministers resigned, demanding that Strauss be fired.
This put Chancellor Konrad Adenauer at risk, as he was publicly accused of backing the suppression of a critical press with state resources. Strauss had no choice but to admit that he had lied to the parliament and was forced to resign. Charged with acting against the constitution, Strauss was exonerated by the courts. Bringing down Strauss had been the goal of a KGB operation.
The leaks this week of intercepted conversations inside the German military are sending similar shockwaves through Berlin, feeding Russian President Vladimir Putin’s narrative about the West’s responsibility in the war in Ukraine.
Until the end of the USSR, the administration that carried out “active measures” was the most desirable place of work and career. All mechanisms and work technologies were developed in the German Democratic Republic. Putin even started his career there. These stories were and are the basis of his “thinking.”
How do you tackle psychological warfare?
Rid’s book adeptly recounts U.S. Senate hearings that revealed a deeply rooted and intricate issue in communication between CIA employees and senators. This conversation took place during what was cynically termed the “Wars by Peace” era. The term is a Soviet concept from the 1970s, emerging as peace movements gained traction in the U.S. and Europe. Russia pursued a policy of war by manipulating U.S. peace movements and activists.
The distinction between activists and “active measures” proved to be minimal. It was even easier to manipulate activists than journalists. The USSR actively supported all peaceful groups, as they served Moscow’s desired purpose: while Moscow developed new weaponry, the American and European public clamored for peace and disarmament.
During this period, U.S. senators asked CIA employees: “Why don’t you do anything to stop public organizations that work for Moscow?” Their answer: “Because they work within the law.”
The CIA’s director of operations understood perhaps one of the most insidious threats associated with successful disinformation campaigns: overreaction to proactive measures risked turning an open society into a more closed, authoritarian one.
There are countless stories of successful active measures in Ukraine over the past. For example, Russian agents were rocking government mistrust in the midst of a terrorist campaign against the energy industry. During the campaign, they fed to the media that “the shutdown is the work of government officials.”
How is Ukraine faring?
In January, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell recently presented a second report on the fight against disinformation, full of analysis of active campaigns and of fresh and academic advice on how to counter it. Media literacy, capacity building, or “policy change” is all very well. But what about the here and now? It is necessary to fight against Russia’s tough and effective “active measures” on three levels.
The first level is analytics. In this regard, Ukraine is actually in a good position. Numerous public organizations and several state structures effectively monitor Russia’s behavior and objectives. You can swiftly and accurately grasp the media landscape in Ukraine and discern the methods used by propagandists. With a solid understanding of the subject matter, you can quickly uncover the true objectives at play.
Addressing institutional weakness and internal conflicts can bolster the fight against misinformation.
The second aspect concerns information delivery channels — clarifying the truth behind propaganda noise to the public. Ukraine is not excelling in this area, although it’s not a catastrophe. United Marathon and Suspilne, Ukrainian media outlets, are not well-equipped to counter information leaks and elucidate the true nature of events. Fortunately, more effective channels thrive in Ukraine: bloggers, YouTube channels and public activists who adeptly manage their social media platforms.
What is lacking in Ukraine is a fundamental approach to combating the influence of misinformation. The reality is that the true impact of “active measures” hinges solely on the resilience and strength of the targeted country. Propagandists function like opportunistic infections. Combating them requires localized treatment. Any doctor will emphasize that effectively combating opportunistic infections necessitates addressing the root cause — the primary ailment. For countries, the main ailment often lies in institutional weakness and internal conflicts. By addressing these root causes, the fight against misinformation can be significantly bolstered, rendering “active measures” ineffective.
A propaganda machine losing steam?
Last winter, a large-scale information campaign against energy companies faltered because people witnessed their operations firsthand. A recent poll conducted by the Razumkov Center confirms that the majority believe the authorities successfully tackled this challenge.
Ukraine has alternative strategies to counter “active measures,” one being to await the collapse of the Russian propaganda machine as it undergoes its own degenerative process. Signs of this deterioration are emerging.
Putin appeared weak and out of touch.
Vlad Stiran, a prominent cybersecurity specialist in Ukraine, aptly commented on the effectiveness of the attack by Russian hackers on Kyivstar, a Ukrainian telecoms company. Yet the motive behind the Russian-led attack remains unclear. It consumed vast human and time resources, generating significant noise but yielding no discernible results. This typifies structures where process is prioritized over outcomes.
Similarly, Putin’s recent interview with American political commentator Tucker Carlson suffered a similar fate. Putin’s objective was to engage conservative audiences in the U.S., particularly in the MAGA movement, and persuade them that withholding aid to Ukraine is wise.
However, Putin failed to speak their language, neglecting to address LGBTQ+ and abortion issues — key triggers for this audience. Instead, he discussed Yaroslav the Wise and Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and Nord Stream 2, leaving not only MAGA activists but also Tucker Carlson perplexed. Consequently, Putin appeared weak and out of touch.
