-Analysis-
The West must develop a new strategy toward President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Its economy has shifted to a wartime model, and even if the war with Ukraine ends, Russian militarism will only grow stronger. When the fighting in Ukraine ceases, the West will have to transition to a strategic defense — exhausting Russia economically and technologically.
That is the key conclusion of a report, prepared for the Munich Security Conference. Titled “The New Deterrence: A Western Strategy for the Moscow-Beijing Axis,” the report was written by Dmitry Gudkov, Vladislav Inozemtsev and Dmitry Nekrasov, co-founders of the CASE analytical center, in June 2024 — before the reelection of Donald Trump as U.S. president.
While Trump’s arrival is clearly shuffling the deck, there are certain structural realities that are likely to outlast any one administration and hold true no matter what the specific terms of a negotiated truce on Ukraine.
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After nearly three years of war, both sides have suffered immense losses. The number of dead and permanently disabled may exceed 1 million. Beyond the human toll and widespread destruction, the war has come at an enormous financial cost — at least $400 billion for Ukraine and its allies. In an effort to cripple Putin’s regime economically, Western nations have imposed major sanctions. Meanwhile, Europe’s decision to cut itself off from Russian oil, gas and coal has cost the continent up to $800 billion.
Irreversible consequences
Yet even with such support, Ukraine has been unable to gain a strategic advantage, and a significant increase in aid appears unlikely. Most Western countries are unwilling to restructure their economies for a wartime footing and get drawn into a confrontation with Moscow.
If the war continues in its current form, the consequences for Ukraine could be irreversible. Millions of Ukrainians have become refugees, with the EU alone hosting more than 4.2 million.The longer the war drags on, the slimmer the chances of their return. Surveys indicate that between 35% and 65% of those who fled are considering a long-term stay in the EU and pursuing citizenship.
Yet even if U.S. President Donald Trump reaches an agreement with Putin, and Ukraine accepts the proposed terms, lasting peace is far from guaranteed. The majority of Ukrainians reject any deal that involves ceding occupied territories to Russia — and at this point, no other agreement seems realistic. Moreover, there is little confidence that Putin would honor any agreement, regardless of its terms.
Unjust “red lines”
The West will face challenges very similar to those it has dealt with before — above all, preventing an escalation that could require a radical military response and plunge the world into a nuclear conflict. This means acknowledging so-called “zones of strategic interest” and defining “red lines.”
One of the reasons why Ukraine has faced such brutal Russian aggression is the West’s lack of clear strategic commitment to its relationship with Kyiv. Although the Kremlin has always viewed Ukraine as an undeniable part of its “sphere of influence,” the West has never officially acknowledged this — nor has it actively integrate Ukraine into its own strategic orbit. Ukraine’s first real step toward the EU came only after the annexation of Crimea, and its candidate status was granted only in June 2022, after the full-scale invasion had already begun.
Ukraine itself was also not entirely unified in its pro-Western aspirations. Nearly every election revealed a country divided between more and less pro-European regions. This ambiguity fueled resentment among the Russian elite, who perceived it as a breach of“agreements” that never actually existed — neither de jure nor de facto. At the same time, it gave Putin the illusion that restoring Russian control over Ukraine would provoke no stronger reaction from the West than the events of 1956 or 1968. The lack of a clear consensus on “red lines” significantly increased the likelihood of a full-scale war.
The concept of delineating “zones of strategic interest” is inherently unjust.
The concept of delineating “zones of strategic interest” is inherently unjust. From the standpoint of international law and the principle of punishing aggression, there is only one legitimate Ukrainian border: the one established in 1991. Any other border — no matter how different from the current front line — will not be more just, nor will it be a lasting solution. Any forced commitment by Ukraine to renounce NATO membership under Russian pressure would already constitute a violation of its sovereignty.
Ultimately, whether borders and alliances remain fixed will not depend on legal frameworks set today but on how the balance of power shifts in the future. The use of terms like“strategic zones” and “red lines” serves as a pretext for ignoring the borders that contradict internationally recognized ones.
At present, the West lacks both the resolve and the willingness to commit the necessary resources for the consistent defense of Ukraine. Meanwhile, the collapse of Putin’s regime remains a question of an uncertain and potentially long-term timeline.
New containment
Once borders are defined, the next step is a “new containment” strategy — combining time-tested methods of economic weakening with the opportunities that have emerged in the new economic situation. However, modern Russia (and China) differ significantly from the Soviet Union, and this must be taken into account.
Russia’s elite feels compelled to respond to any technological challenge in the military sphere. Half a century ago, the arms race contributed to the collapse of the Soviet economic model, even if it wasn’t the primary cause. Today, Russia operates as a market economy and has so far managed to sustain rising military expenditures without immediate social collapse. But this cannot last indefinitely.
Even if a ceasefire is reached, the Kremlin will not be able to cut military spending, which in 2024 is set to reach around 8% of GDP. The bloated army, the military-industrial complex that will take years to replace lost equipment, and efforts to modernize technology — recently, Russia has been producing virtually no new types of weapons — will all demand continued high costs.
NATO countries’ average defense spending was roughly three times lower than Russia’s.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia’s defense industry is highly dependent on foreign components. This includes production equipment, which will inevitably deteriorate if access to maintenance and repairs is restricted. Additionally, in aerospace, aviation and other defense sectors, Russia has lost much of the technological foundation built in Soviet times.
While Moscow has been able to ramp up production of relatively simple weapons — such as shells, tanks, and drones — it is unlikely to compete with the West in developing next-generation fighter jets, advanced missile defense systems and other cutting-edge military technologies.
The West has significant room to maneuver. In 2024, NATO countries’ average defense spending was roughly three times lower than Russia’s — just 2.7% of GDP. Increasing this figure would not only enhance security but could also drive economic growth. Unlike Russia, where military expansion drains resources, Western defense investments could stimulate technological progress in both military and civilian sectors. The focus should not be on mass-producing tanks and aircraft, as in the Cold War, but on high-tech industries capable of countering cyberattacks and infrastructure sabotage — this will spur the development of civilian industries.
The standard of living factor
The West must once again prove that its economic model is superior and that its citizens live better. Traditional strategies — restricting the transfer of key technologies and competing in high-profile projects like space exploration — should be reinforced by policies that encourage the outflow of financial and human capital from Russia and other adversarial states.
The current restrictions only strengthen Russia both economically and intellectually — a mistake that must be corrected. For instance, the West’s refusal to accept “Russian money” has played a significant role in curbing corruption within Russia during the war. Previously, much of the Russian elite’s corruption was aimed at accumulating assets in “safe” Western jurisdictions and securing a comfortable life abroad. With those options closed, officials steal less budget funds.
Difficulties with legalizing residency in the West have forced many skilled professionals and businesspeople to remain in or return to Russia—where they now contribute to the Putin regime. Even during the Cold War, at least 1,200 Soviet officials, intelligence officers and military personnel defected, while the Russian elite only rallied around the Kremlin.
It is foolish to ignore the opportunity to influence those members of the elite who are open to cooperation with the West or not to try to split the elites. Without this, regime change in Russia is unlikely. Moreover, losing Westernized citizens would be fatal. Competing with the West is impossible without people who are familiar with and integrated into the Western world.
And if Putin responds by closing Russia’s borders, it would mark a major defeat for him — setting the stage for inevitable social and political upheaval.
Winning over the Global South
A key aspect of the “new containment” strategy is winning over countries in the Global South — or at the very least, preventing the spread of authoritarian practices and halting the expansion of states aligning with China and Russia.
During the Cold War, nations threatened by Soviet influence could count on Western support, even if their regimes did not fully meet democratic and human rights standards.Some countries managed to stay neutral simply by avoiding a clear allegiance. Today, however, states that have chosen the West do not always feel secure, while sanctions and the withdrawal of international aid often push many regimes that do not quite meet democratic standards into the arms of China, Russia or Iran.
Some principles will have to be compromised. Otherwise, the spheres of influence of Russia and China will continue to grow. China has already become the leading investor and trading partner in Africa, and there is growing concern over a so-called “Russian belt” cutting across the continent.
The West should consider reviving the Non-Aligned Movement.
Meanwhile, unlike in the Cold War era, Western powers are ready to scale back their presence in these regions (as we have recently seen in Chad, Niger, Burkina Faso, etc.). It is worth returning to a pragmatic approach: Countries cannot be allies of Moscow, develop economic relations with the West and “bargain” for the countries of the periphery. Relations with them should be dominated by geopolitical tasks and goals.
Even within the BRICS+ group, most members are unwilling to become vassals of China and Russia or to clash with the West at the expense of their own interests. Alongside direct confrontation with Moscow and Beijing where necessary, the West should consider reviving the Non-Aligned Movement. During the Cold War, member states refused to formally join either of the opposing blocs.
The simplistic “you’re either with us or with the terrorists” rhetoric of former U.S. President George W. Bush does not work in today’s complex containment strategy — if anything, it would push many neutral states toward revisionist powers.
Surviving Putin
Finally, the West must actively support Ukraine’s reconstruction. A higher standard of living in countries aligned with the Western coalition was a decisive factor in the Cold War’s outcome. While a gap as stark as the one between West and East Germany cannot be achieved overnight, allowing Ukraine to lag economically behind some post-Soviet states would be a gift to Putin. It would only accelerate the expansion of authoritarian influence.
Given that Ukraine is currently unable to achieve victory on the battlefield with the current levels of aid, and Western countries lack the unity and determination to organize a military defeat of the Kremlin, this strategy of containment looks preferable. It would help avoid escalation while buying time, which ultimately works against Putin’s regime. Russia’s technological lag is increasing, and the energy transition will sooner or later undermine its resource base, leading to public discontent.
The new Cold War is likely to be shorter than the previous one.
The time when Putin’s Russia was open to engagement with the West is long over. A new chapter in history has begun, marked by confrontation that is now a reality, and it can only end with the defeat of one of the parties involved. The only question is how this defeat will manifest: through warfare or through economic and social competition.
Containment implies a shift for the West toward a strategic defense against Russia, China and other forces aiming to disrupt the global order. Western nations made a significant mistake by facilitating the modernization of China and Russia without any guarantees that these countries would refrain from challenging the existing world order. Correcting this mistake will take time and may involve enduring injustices and embracing various compromises.
The new Cold War is likely to be shorter than the previous one. Unlike the USSR, which had a relatively clear mechanism for transferring power (embodied in its party structure), all levers of control in Russia are centralized around Putin, who clearly intends to remain in power for the rest of his life. This situation deprives any potential successor of the unique qualities and influence that Putin possesses.
It is unlikely that Putin’s system can replicate itself, much like most personalist dictatorships of the 20th century failed to do so. Therefore, Western nations should focus on surviving Putin’s regime with minimal losses. If this strategy is adopted — which the West can afford — the wait may not be as long as it was last time.
