-Analysis-
MOSCOW — The approach of the U.S. presidential elections is once again raising questions about which candidate will be better for Russia. Once again, there is a temptation to consider Republican candidate Donald Trump as a more acceptable politician for Moscow than his Democratic Party rival, who last week officially became Vice President Kamala Harris.
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Trump says that he does not rule out a “deal” with Russia. His thinking is transactional. He advocates for the advancement of the national interests of his country, but in words that show he is ready to make an exchange: we owe you, you owe us. The fact that the Republican speaks from a position of strength does not bother many in Russia. In Moscow, we are used to this and ready for power politics.
But those who count on “deals” with the U.S. under Trump, or at least on more constructive relations, are mistaken. The Trump factor will not play a significant role in changing the structure of relations between Russia and the West. By and large, Moscow should not care who the U.S. president will be. Whoever is in the White House is unlikely to play a major role in reshaping Russian-American relations.
Unreliably populist
Trump’s victory in the 2016 elections was greeted with applause in Moscow. At that time, Russian-American relations were already seriously undermined by a history of contradictions with the Ukrainian issue at the forefront. At that time, it seemed that the situation was still reversible. A year and a half before Trump’s electoral triumph, the Minsk agreements on the conflict in Donbass came into force, and only the remnants of arms control regimes remained.
Trump threatened to “drain the swamp” – to get rid of the dominance of the deep-state bureaucrats, to solve the accumulated problems in foreign and domestic policy in one fell swoop. Trump’s core electorate also seemed close in spirit: hard workers from the American heartland, patriots of their country, strong family people — as opposed to the cosmopolitan and atomized residents of large cities, who live largely on the virtual economy and the service sector.
Russian experts in U.S. policy and diplomats were already warning against excessive hope: Trump’s populism was unlikely to reverse objective trends in the field of security. These people turned out to be right.
First term lessons
Practically Trump’s entire presidential term was marked by speculation about Russian interference in the 2016 election in favor of the winning candidate. The incumbent president managed to avoid impeachment, but the issue of interference hobbled American diplomacy on the Russian front. By passing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), Congress incorporated former President Barack Obama’s executive orders on the situation in Ukraine and in digital security into federal law.
The Trump administration applied sanctions sparingly.
This took away the president’s ability to cancel these orders, as well as remove individuals from the sanctions lists without the consent of Congress. CAATSA also gave the president the authority to use a wide range of restrictive measures. The Trump administration responded pragmatically.
Trump signed CAATSA and in 2018, with his Executive Order 13849, launched the legal mechanism for its implementation at the executive level. Executive Order 13848 demonstrated Trump’s determination to respond to election interference, and Executive Order 13883 of 2019 reflected the political will to apply sanctions in response to the “Skripal Case.”
However, the Trump administration applied sanctions sparingly, fearing to harm American investors in Russia. The radical initiatives of congressmen in the form of “draconian sanctions” and the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression) bill were thoroughly criticized by State Department lawyers.
Two presidents
At the same time, Trump has been a vocal supporter of sanctions against Russian gas pipeline projects, especially Nord Stream 2. In an attempt to squeeze the Russians out of the European gas market, he supported the Protecting European Energy Security Act in 2019 and its amendments in 2020. European suppliers, especially the Swiss “Allseas,” which leased vessels for pipe-laying, were seriously frightened by the threat of sanctions.
The Russians eventually adapted their vessels for construction, but the construction of Nord Stream 2 was delayed. In the end, Trump showed that he is ready to decisively impose sanctions where he considers it appropriate and necessary. In general, the moves towards dialogue with Russia did not produce any clear results. In addition, Trump turned out to be an active opponent of the arms control regime.
During the Trump presidency, despite scandals, the U.S. political machine continued to operate smoothly.
During his presidency, despite scandals, the U.S. political machine continued to operate smoothly, unhampered by the deep social division in American society. As American researcher Aron Wildavsky noted back in 1966, the United States conventionally has “two presidents”: one in foreign policy and one in domestic.
That is, internal social divisions do not necessarily have an impact on foreign policy, which is playing out as usual. The clash between Democrats and Republicans largely reflects internal processes; but in foreign policy, although differences exist, they are not nearly as deep, especially since there has long been an inter-party consensus toward Russia.
Biden and Ukraine
It is notable how after Trump left office, President Joe Biden’s policy toward Moscow also remained quite balanced until the end of 2021. Biden avoided the harsh application of sanctions on pipeline projects, taking a step towards the position of Germany and the EU.
In addition, he gave the green light to extend the START treaty at the last minute on the American side. In 2021, Biden signed Executive Order 14024, which later became the key legal mechanism for sanctions against Russia. But before the start of the special military operation, this instrument was used sparingly.
The situation began to change when relations between the two countries deteriorated over European security issues and the Ukrainian issue. That is, it was determined by structural factors inside the U.S. government, and not by the role of the U.S. President.
If Trump had been in Biden’s place at the end of 2021, his policy toward Russia would have been similar. After the start of the special military operation, Washington would have unleashed a “tsunami of sanctions” on Russia regardless of who occupied the Oval Office.
Little change
A possible Trump victory in the 2024 elections will change little for Russia. The politician is known as an opponent of the arms control regime. But its erosion has continued under Biden, and the final nail in the policy can be driven in equally successfully by Trump or his rival Harris.
Trump will lobby more actively to promote American energy resources on the European market, especially since the EU sanctions policy toward Russia will only encourage it. Trump’s threat to force the United States’ European allies to pay for security will not break NATO solidarity.
Trump’s rise to power is unlikely to destabilize the American political system.
Such threats could not undermine it in the first place, and even more so today, against the backdrop of the crisis in relations with Russia, they will not lead to any changes.
European NATO allies are now increasing their own military spending. Trump will not be able to untie the Ukrainian knot unless objective conditions for resolving the conflict are ripe, including, for example, the exhaustion of resources to conduct the conflict or a decisive victory for Russia.
Finally, Trump’s rise to power is unlikely to destabilize the American political system, and if internal divisions in it do worsen, they are unlikely to affect foreign policy. The bottom line is that the outcome of the November elections is of purely secondary or even tertiary importance for Russia. It is premature to consider it a significant factor in Russia’s relations with the United States and the entire collective West.
