Is Russia An Existential Threat? German Leaders Can’t Have It Both Ways

-Analysis-

BERLIN — Could it be that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul are laying it on a bit thick with their warnings about Russia?

Just a day before his trip to the Ukrainian capital Monday, Wadephul made a striking statement: declaring Russia a “direct threat to lives in Germany.” Upon arriving in Ukraine, Wadephul doubled down: “The freedom and future of Ukraine is the most important task of our foreign and security policy.”

In a recent interview with the Munich-based daily Süddeutsche Zeitung, Chancellor Merz accused Germans of harboring “the illusion that peace in Europe will be permanent, almost something that just happens on its own.”

It all sounds quite dramatic. But there are solid reasons that such remarks ring true.

Of course, neither politicians nor intelligence agencies can see inside the mind of Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. Whether he actually plans to attack Europe or Germany, even the Kremlin strongman himself may not yet have decided.

Still, there is proof that Russia does not hesitate to take dangerous actions, even on German soil. Six years ago, Putin dispatched the hitman Vadim Krasikov to Berlin to assassinate an old enemy from the Chechen wars. And just last summer, Russian agents allowed a DHL cargo plane to crash after a fire broke out on the ground caused by a package sent on behalf of the Russian GRU secret service. It could easily have been much worse.

The danger is clear on a broader scale too. Russian weapons production is ramping up. And according to Bruno Kahl, the outgoing head of the German Federal Intelligence Service, there are people in Putin’s inner circle who no longer take Article 5, NATO’s mutual defense pledge, seriously. Intelligence reports back this up.

But even without the reports, Russian think tanks and Kremlin-linked analysts have published plenty of material in recent years casting doubt on Article 5.

Support for Ukraine is just too low

Merz and Wadephul’s assessment of the risks is, therefore, quite credible. It is their conclusions of what to do that raise some eyebrows.

Take Foreign Minister Wadephul, for example. He praised the planned hike in NATO defense spending to five percent of economic output as “the right and necessary step.” Yet it is not at all clear why, given the situation, the German government has not ramped up its aid to Ukraine in similar fashion. Instead, the Merz administration is carrying on with the same cautious Ukraine policy that marked former Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s time in office.

Russia seized more territory in June than in any previous month this year.

If Merz and Wadephul really mean what they say, then they must also grasp what the war in Ukraine actually means. The war’s outcome will decide whether threats to people’s lives in Germany remain theoretical or become all too real. Practically every European intelligence agency has publicly stated that Russia is unlikely to risk an attack on NATO territory until it reaches its objectives in Ukraine.

That makes it even harder to understand why German aid to Ukraine this year will not even exceed ten billion euros. For comparison, in just the first half of 2025, Ukraine’s military spending was already eight billion euros higher than originally planned. Set against the backdrop of Germany’s recently approved, massive increases in future defense spending, these sums seem almost laughably small.

Joint ventures

There is no doubt that Ukraine will benefit from these spending increases over the medium and long term. European countries will replenish their own stockpiles and may then be able to pass on some of their supplies to Ukraine. But that will take years, not weeks or months.

That much was evident in Kyiv on Monday. Wadephul, who was joined by leaders from Germany’s defense industry, spoke of “joint ventures.” He said Ukraine’s needs are vast. Both countries, he explained, are entering a new phase of cooperation. At the same time, he admitted there were still hurdles to overcome, particularly bureaucratic ones. None of this suggests anything resembling an emergency response.

Ukraine is under immense strain. Russia seized more territory in June than in any previous month this year. Its airstrikes are growing in intensity by the week.

Unless Ukraine can produce enough of its own weapons, it will not be able to hold off the Russian army for much longer.

Ukraine needs every bit of help it can get to repel these attacks. It needs billions to continue developing drone technology and to stockpile parts in case its biggest supplier, China, decides to cut them off.

Can’t rest easy

The country also needs every cent it can get to manufacture its own Grim-2 short-range missiles as an alternative to the US ATACMS systems. Ukrainian interceptor drones have already proven effective against Russian unmanned aircraft, but only if they can be produced in large enough quantities. And Ukraine needs funding to recruit more soldiers, to make military service more appealing, and to ease the economic hardship caused by the war. Inflation is currently at around 15% and rising steadily each month.

Unless Ukraine can produce enough of its own weapons, it will not be able to hold off the Russian army for much longer. And until then, Europeans cannot afford to rest easy.

All of this should be more than enough reason to significantly increase aid to Ukraine. And anyone who calls Ukraine the “most important task of foreign policy” ought to follow those words with action. Otherwise, no one should be surprised if Russia continues to question the West’s commitment to its own alliances.