-Analysis-
DAMASCUS — For Syrians, the identity of the new Syria may appear clear enough at first glance. It is the identity of the Syria of the revolution, with its slogans and symbols of the past decade. The regime of Bashar al-Assad has fallen, and is gone forever, and that makes most Syrians very happy — even if we are trying to understand the context of what happened and the sequence of accelerating events that contributed to the fall of the regime.
Signs of clarity of this identity have appeared over the past two weeks, in the people’s haste to declare that the features of the new Syria are self-evident to all, military and civilian, conservatives and liberals.
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These aspects include the Syrian revolutionary flag (with three stars) becomes the new independence flag, the national anthem is from a poem by late Syrian diplomat and poet Omar Abu Risha. And to a lesser extent, Syrians also agree on a civil state and disagree on the centralization of rule.
Still the full identity of liberated Syria is of course necessarily open for discussion and deliberation. Syrians are eager to know what this identity will ultimately be, and declare it for all to hear. Important political aspects have been postponed until the transitional phase becomes clear, which helps explain why the flag and the anthem have been viewed as self-evident.
Reconsidering the basics
The flag and the anthem, nevertheless, appear less important compared to other obvious issues that will be part of the discussions of the next stage, including the government, freedoms and the structure of the state.
So what should each party in Syria offer to reach a unifying identity?
Those ruling the administration of Syria today are the de facto powers that existed before the fall of Assad. The people and policies of this administration, of course, are not viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the Syrian people. Yet as soon as the regime fell, the message was sent from foreign powers that it was important to allow these parties to participate in the political process and the transitional period, and perhaps even lead it.
The Sunni Islamists in Syria were always the first enemy of the regime
The transitional phase requires a high degree of consensus and great flexibility from all parties, which have also fought among themselves, in addition to their battle with the regime. They (the de facto rulers) found a Syria in which there is a lot of injustice, deep desires for revenge and retribution, demographic change, cases of killings and even accusations of genocide. To put it mildly, there is a serious lack of trust among Syrians.
There are many historical injustices in Syria, but there are two major injustices in recent years that overshadow the rest, namely those inflicted on the Muslim Brotherhood and on the Kurds. These two components suffered from the risk of complete annihilation because of their identities, not just their opposition to the regime.
The Syrian regime committed atrocities against the Muslim Brotherhood before and after the Hama massacre of 1982. The Sunni Islamists in Syria were always the first enemy of the regime that came from the Shia-linked Alawite religious minority.
The Kurds were subjected to similar ethnic cleansing and criminality by successive Syrian governments, and by opponents of the regime as well. They were attacked by Islamists. Turkey also launched a war against the Kurds.
Most importantly, these two components are the only ones that have an organized armed force on the ground: the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS. Each has its own authority and system of governance. They also have regional and international alliances.
There is no doubt that they have a major say in shaping the identity of the new Syria.
Who represents the Syrians?
These two forces do not, in themselves, represent the Syrian people in a legitimate capacity, but they express in some way a Syrian duality that may emerge in the coming years. They express two main currents in Syrian society:
- A conservative current represented by political Islam, which will push for the implementation of Sharia laws and a striking presence of religion in the identity of the state, its nationalism and Arabism;
- Another current that calls for secularism, decentralization and civility, and the protection of minorities and the pluralism of Syria, far from the single Arab identity.
This does not negate their transgressions, as well as the conflicts between them to “rule” the land and the people!
So far, HTS appears to be showing flexibility towards other parties, and carries a tolerant discourse even towards those who had ties to the fallen regime. The group has not adopted the discourse of Turkey and the armed opposition in fighting the Kurdish forces. It didn’t view this as its own battle. It is noteworthy that the “SDF” has not been labeled as a terrorist organization.
We have just witnessed agreements to peacefully hand over some areas, and mutual protection of areas of influence and civilians.
In return, the SDF sends assurances of its openness to dialogue with any new authority in Damascus. It raised the flag of independence over its institutions, and confirms that it is set to play a major part in a unified Syria.
Radical decentralization and diversity
Today, Syrians must understand the new reality of Syria and accept all types of change. The new Syria does not mean changing its flag, anthem, or ruling figures, but rather looks forward to radical changes in the form of the state and the government.
Syrians fear a centralization of power in Damascus
Syrians fear a centralization of power in Damascus that prevents them from achieving what they have dreamed of for many years, with an eye on what many have seen from close up in European societies.
In Syria, there is a Kurdish grievance alongside Arab and Assyrian grievances alike. Authoritarian marginalization was not limited to the ruling regime in Syria, but the Syrians, living in the area between Tigris and Euphrates rivers who are now Jazrawis or Island people. They have long suffered from the marginalization of the Syrian elites and the centralization of the main industrial cities at the expense of the countryside and remote cities.
The Jazrawis have also suffered from stereotyping and a condescending and racist discourse. In Syria, there are multiple identities, other than the Damascene and Aleppan identity, which was represented in the media, art, literature and the prevailing identity.
In Syria, there are also multiple languages, which may be part of its future diversity. These differences are recognized on the theoretical level, but actions and practical steps are required to rebuild trust among Syrians. This will necessarily mean that each party will make certain concessions to reach a comprehensive formula.
An identity for “all Syrians”?
Many Syrian voices do not give enough importance to the demands of ordinary Syrians and their concerns about their sub-identities. They consider the victory of the revolution sufficient reassurance that the new Syria will be for all Syrians, refusing to look at years of wars, fragmentation and lack of trust.
The regime has of course not provided any unifying identity for the Syrians. The only identity it has provided over decades has been the identity of “Assad’s Syria.”
On the other hand, the opposition has not yet provided a unifying identity. Quite the opposite, the battles of “Dawn of Freedom” and the Syrian National Army’s dependence on Turkey, even while the Syrians were moving to overthrow Assad, showed the intention of some opposition factions to end any Kurdish presence, and brought back a decade of systematic anti-Kurdish violations to the Kurds’ minds.
Some segments of Syrian society (conservatives and liberals) still insist on demonizing the self-administration project as Kurdish nationalist and anti-revolutionary continues.
The PKK question
The Kurds linked with the Democratic Union Party have adopted political decentralization in the social contract document in a reasonable manner. They have provided all the required reassurances to begin a transitional phase and raise the slogans of the revolution and its flag. But they have also been asked to part ways with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK.
The Kurds are similar to the Palestinians
It’s a demand from the political forces, and is a popular demand as well. But today, Syrians are required to understand the contexts of Kurdish society, and to understand the Kurdish issue historically, socially and politically.
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) is present in Syria because a large segment of Syrian Kurds believes in its struggles and the rights it has extracted for the Kurds of Turkey.
The Kurds are similar to the Palestinians who have gathered around the Palestinian liberation movements that believe in their historical right to the land.
While the Democratic Syrian Party understands that the tools of struggle and resistance have changed, and that armed conflict will not be its first choice, it is heading to Damascus and believes in the necessity of resolving the issue of the Kurds of Syria within the framework of the Syrian state, far from nationalism.
The Kurds of Syria cannot be asked to dissolve the Kurdish movement or simply bypass it. Describing the projects of the Syrian Kurds as “terrorism” and “separatism,” and demonizing this project only serves the Turkish project, which has tried to change its demographics, religious identity, and impose Turkification policies during the Syrian war and the Turkish occupation of Syrian territories.
These fears have not yet disappeared, and thus dialogue must be open to all possible changes in the form of the state, its name, and its symbols, whether secular-religious, the color of the flag, or the words of the anthem.
After half a century of unilateral rule, a Syrian identity must be put on the table for discussion, without pre-conditions or veto declarations.
