Ukraine, A Mirror Of The French-German Divide

-Analysis-

BERLIN — “Should we prepare our children for war?” German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung asked in a headline last week. The article was about Education Minister Bettina Stark-Watzinger’s proposal to organize civil protection exercises in schools and to develop a “relaxed relationship with the Bundeswehr” thanks to regular classroom visits from the armed forces.

Ten days earlier, the German Association of Towns and Municipalities called for billions of euros to bring disused bunkers back into service and build new ones. Of the 2,000 public shelters dating back to the Cold War, only 600 remain, with a total capacity of 500,000 people.

Quite unimaginable in France, this kind of debate reflects the gulf that separates France and Germany in their perception of war in Ukraine. Geography, the weight of history, but also differences in political systems and economic power explain in part the differences on this subject between France and Germany.

In relation to Beijing, Moscow and Washington, these differences reached a climax at the end of February, when French President Emmanuel Macron publicly stated that ground troops could not be ruled out. In a video two days later, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said insisted that NATO was not and would not be a “stakeholder” in this war.

Strategic naivety

Yet Paris and Berlin started from a common base. Despite repeated warnings from the Baltic states and Poland, both countries showed a certain strategic naiveté toward Russia. They both underestimated the Russian threat. Unlike the U.S. and Great Britain, their intelligence services did not believe in an invasion.

The war in Ukraine has also revealed their respective limitations. Ambitious but with empty pockets, France has an operational army that claims to be complete, i.e. with capabilities and expertise that covers all areas of a modern conflict.

Germany remains disabled by the weight of history and guilt.

But it is a bonsai army, lacking the equipment and ammunition to sustain a high-intensity conflict. Its support to the Ukrainian war efforts falls short of Germany’s. In 2022-2023, Paris provided Kyiv with 3.8 billion euros worth of armaments, according to the government’s own calculations, compared with the 17.7 billion euros sent by Berlin.

On the other hand, Germany remains disabled by the weight of history and guilt. Its government is doing its utmost to reassure a public opinion that fears an extension of the conflict, and is taking great strides in clarifying the type of weapons supplied to Kyiv.

Germans opposed to missile deliveries

Germany’s shipment of Leopard 2 tanks was only unblocked with the parallel delivery of American Abrams tanks. And while Great Britain and France have supplied Kyiv with Storm Shadows and Scalp missiles, Scholz has been resisting pressure from his coalition partners for over a year to deliver Taurus missiles, with a much greater range (500 km).

Scholz has his country’s support in this issue. According to polls, 61% of Germans are opposed to the delivery of these missiles, nine points higher than in August 2023. Even Christian Democratic Union party voters are mainly of this opinion.

Chancellor of peace

Scholz’s refusal and clear affirmation of his difference with Macron on sending ground troops has allowed him to establish himself as the “chancellor of peace” in the eyes of the public — even though he has doubled military aid to Ukraine in 2024. This positioning is particularly important in the run up to the European elections in June, and the regional elections in East Germany in September.

Many in the Social Democratic Party remember that Gerhard Schroeder narrowly won the 2002 federal election by opposing the deployment of troops to Iraq.

The two countries are hampered by differences in their institutions.

While Scholz is walking the tightrope, Macron has taken a major U-turn. After highlighting the need “not to humiliate Russia” in June 2022, he insisted a year later that Russia must “be defeated,” before saying in February that ground troops could no longer be ruled out. A trajectory that reinforces German prejudices about French unreliability and unpredictability, even though for Paris it is the result of the deteriorating situation on the ground.

In truth, France and Germany share the conviction that supporting Ukraine over the long term is vital. But the two countries are hampered by differences in their institutions, with a French president who can play on a form of “strategic ambiguity,” and a German chancellor whose foreign policy is much more dependent on parliament.

Different interpretations

Paris and Berlin have also interpreted the war differently. France sees it as an opportunity for Europe to gain sovereignty, while Germany sees it above all as a need to invest heavily in strengthening the European side of NATO and limiting the prospect of U.S. disengagement.

This strategy is reflected in the Bundeswehr’s desire to become Europe’s leading conventional army, and in the Euro Sky Shield initiative. Based on American, German and Israeli equipment, this initiative has greatly irritated Paris.

The context, however, has changed. And these differences appear less bearable than before.

The differences between Paris and Berlin are not new. They existed in the days of Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder, and have continued with the leaders who succeeded them. While the two countries agreed on a reform of the electricity market and EU Stability Pact last year, the creation of a Capital Markets Union has stalled since 2015.

The context, however, has changed. As pressure on Ukraine intensifies, and a return to power for Donald Trump seems likely, these differences appear less bearable than before.

Last Friday, Paris and Berlin announced that the Franco-German KNDS group would be setting up in Ukraine to produce spare parts for Kyiv. The symbol is intended to be significant, but it comes a little late.

This kind of announcement would have been appreciated at the Munich Security Conference in February, where Western concerns about Ukraine’s ability to hold out were particularly palpable. An initiative by the Franco-German couple would have been timely. But it didn’t happen.