Can We Trust China? The Big Question For Colombia — And Others

-Analysis-

BOGOTÁ — It’s interesting and encouraging that China wants to have a greater stake in Colombia, that new avenues of cooperation are being explored and that its diplomatic corps is representative of a new generation of Chinese people, whom I met in the years I lived in Beijing. These are people with an interest in the world, some of them learning Spanish, and with a deep interest in Latin America. They represent a side of China that — after an early period of interests focused on the developed world, Asia and Africa — is starting to open up more to Latin America. 

Until relatively recently, Latin America was considered a rather distant and almost irrelevant space for China. There aren’t many historical and cultural ties beyond some scattered episodes of immigration or historical anecdotes like the Manila Galleon — and its limited trade between East Asia and Spain’s American empire. Our continent is seen as dangerous and the journey to reach any city, tremendously long.

There are also certain barriers of knowledge and prejudice. A Chinese man once told me he didn’t want to visit Latin America as he feared earthquakes, yet ironically the second deadliest earthquake of the 21st century happened in Sichuan. 

The recent interview by Colombian news website La Silla Vacía with China’s ambassador to Colombia, Zhu Jingyang, which I recommend reading, is an excellent example not only of the opportunities China’s new rapprochement offers but also of its limits.

A friendly panda

What is most striking is how Ambassador Zhu frames relations as a matter of moral competition, meaning that China is a fairer partner than the United States. While the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump is sending Venezuelan citizens to concentration camps in El Salvador, threatening to invade Panama to retake the canal, almost imposing tariffs on Mexico that would destroy its economy and threatening to block Inter-American Development Bank loans for infrastructure in Colombia, it’s hard not to see China as a friendly panda. 

The United States’ diplomatic and economic war with China is making it difficult for Colombia to take advantage of the expertise of Chinese infrastructure firms without having to resort to borrowing money from China for relevant projects. Colombia’s advantage so far in working with Chinese companies is that it has kept its negotiations responsible. While we do not know what happens behind the scenes, in principle, financing is sought through third-party loans.

In other words, Chinese infrastructure projects in Colombia are not so much in the form of investment as of contracting Chinese companies — or paying for their services — as one would with another country. 

More than one option

If the United States cuts off financing mechanisms, Colombia is in trouble, as in any ideal contract, you do not want to borrow money from your contractor to pay for their services. That was the problem for Sri Lanka and other countries cited as cautionary tales in the debate around Chinese investments in infrastructure.

Everything also depends on how financing is negotiated. If Colombia had no other options, China would have no motivation to offer more favorable terms either. In other words, it’s better to have more than one option on the table, but the Trump administration is making that difficult. 

We are not in a position to replace the United States with China as a partner.

Latin America has another great advantage in dealing with China: We are far away, have no shared borders and are not inside its sphere of influence. We would surely be astounded by the assertion or assurance that China would never do to us anything we would not want done to us if we were a country like Burma, where China backs not only the military junta but also armed rebel groups, effectively manipulating the internal conflict in a neighboring country to its own advantage.

China, on the other hand, is not interested in openly getting involved in the Colombian armed conflict, despite its direct impact on some of its companies like the Zijin mining company, whose investments in the Buriticá mine were bogged down by illegal mining by the criminal Gulf Clan. 

Zhu made it clear in his interview that he would not replace U.S. military aid, which is essential to the Colombian state’s ability to keep control over a large part of the country. This means we are not in a position to replace the United States with China as a partner, if we were to reach a situation where the choice were imposed. Hopefully that won’t happen. 

China’s interests

Now to the main problem with how Zhu frames the issue: While it’s true that infrastructure is an essential problem and a driving force of our internal conflict, Colombia’s day-to-day stability depends on military aid. Which makes me think about that involuntary — or perhaps conscious — lack of understanding in China’s view of Colombia: It does not want to commit to aid that is not framed inside business deals that are favorable to it. 

Zhu said rapprochement with China hadn’t happened due to a problem of prejudices on Colombia’s part, which is only partly true. What most influenced the lack of closer relations was China’s lack of interest in Colombia.

I witnessed for years how Colombian diplomats made enormous efforts to attract Chinese investment and involve it in important projects of national interest, like financing post-peace agreements, but China wasn’t interested. What it was really interested in was to access the oil industry and major construction contracts. That’s where the big profit was.