-Analysis-
BEIRUT — Since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, many parties involved in the conflict have resorted to foreign-born fighters.
The regime of Bashar al-Assad sought help from Iranians, Lebanese, Iraqis, Afghans and Russians. Syrian Kurds sought help from non-Syrian Kurds. And other rebel groups called for “jihad” to attract foreign militants. Over the past decade, militant groups including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) received fighters from North Africa, Central Asia and even the West, and the role of those fighters was essential in the Syrian civil war.
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Following the downfall of the Assad regime, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa issued a decree promoting about 49 fighters, including foreigners, to senior ranks in the Syrian army, including foreign fighters. Al-Sharaa’s decision has drawn criticism, including from the United States, which said such a move wouldn’t help improve the reputation of Syria’s de facto rulers, who are still on the U.S. terror list.
Top French and German diplomats also raised the issue of integrating foreign fighters into the Syrian military when they met with al-Sharaa on Jan. 3, Reuters reported.
A problematic move
Al-Sharaa’s move was illegal and problematic not only because they’re not Syrian nationals, but also because they’re branded terrorists by their home countries as well as many countries around the world. Hussam Jazmati, a Syrian researcher, said al-Sharaa’s decision shouldn’t have been taken “not only because it’s illegal, but also for his own benefits.”
“All the honeyed rhetoric he gives to foreigners about building a comprehensive and national military institution that excludes no one is inconsistent with a move of this kind,” Jazmati said. “This step does not serve the principles he claims to adhere to, nor his personal interests in the long run.” He said al-Sharaa should have benefited from former army officers who were not involved in atrocities against civilians in the civil war, as well as those who defected earlier in the war.
Such issues should be managed in an organized and legal manner.
After the Assad regime’s downfall, al-Sharaa has two options to tackle the issue of thousands of foreign fighters in Syria: either abandoning them, or integrating them into Syrian society, which requires a great deal of effort.
The first option could cause clashes between combating rebel groups. And the second option may not succeed, at least in the near future, due to the fundamental differences between foreigners and Syrian society, and requires a great effort.
“Such issues should be managed in an organized and legal manner,” Jazmati said. “The issue should be open for public discussion within a clear legal framework, with nationality files organized to address the situation systematically. The current way things are being managed is chaotic and unacceptable. For example, someone is appointed as a brigadier general in the army, and then we discover later that he holds Uzbek or other nationalities.”
Syria isn’t Idlib
It appears that al-Sharaa lacks a clear idea about state institutions. Running a city like Idlib — which HTS ruled for years — is totally different from running a country like Syria, Jazmati said. “Al-Jolani [Al-Sharra’s nom de guerre] is not used to respecting law and this has only gotten worse due to the overwhelming euphoria he is experiencing after the major reversal in his status.”
He explained that al-Sharaa’s status has been shifted from “an isolated person in Idlib, facing criticism from the revolutionary movement,” to the country’s de facto ruler who is “credited for liberating Syria. This transformation has increased his self-confidence excessively.”
Jazmati said al-Sharaa has sought to repeat and expand the Idlib model. “He is managing the scene through arms that implement his orders, not through real institutions that abide by the laws.”
Among those promoted are an Albanian from North Macedonia, a Tajik, and three Chinese Uighurs. The promotions also include prominent fighters such as Mukhtar al-Turki (Turkish), Abu Hussein al-Urduni (Jordanian) and Abu Mohammed al-Turkistani (Turkestan), according reports.
What are al-Sharaa’s motives?
The appointments also raised questions about al-Sharaa’s motives. Was his goal to make sure that those fighters won’t turn against him?
Rami Abdul Rahman, director of the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, said the appointments and promotions included al-Sharaa’s inner circle like Marhaf Abu Qasra, the HTS military commander who is expected to take over the Ministry of Defense in the new administration.
When asked about the reason for promoting some foreign fighters, Jazmati said that “al-Jolani relies heavily on these foreign fighters because he trusts them, and they are a powerful military force he can depend on.”
Aaron Zelin, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who authored a book on HTS, told Radio Free Europe that the appointments do not suggest that Syria’s new rulers have any agenda beyond Syria, saying it is an “effort by Jolani and HTS to try and make sure that these men follow the orders of the Syrian state, and that there is no freelancing now that the war is more or less over.”
Al-Jolani is trying to potentially indigenize them and make them Syrian.
He said that al-Sharaa has talked about giving Syrian citizenship to foreigners who have lived in the country for a certain amount of time and supported HTS in its fight against Assad’s regime. “Al-Jolani is trying to potentially indigenize them and make them Syrian…. [It’s] better for them to be integrated and following HTS’s new role than them freelancing, or at least this is how they view it.”
The recruitment allows al-Sharaa to guarantee the loyalty of these fighters on the one hand and their non-return to their countries or Europe on the other hand, especially in light of the fears in Europe and other places about the return of Jihadists.
Syria, meanwhile, is different from other countries that received foreign fighters. It is not only young men who traveled to Syria, but also young women and sometimes families.
The question of IS
Amid these announced and unannounced understandings, there is also the question of the Islamic State (ISIS) group. It’s almost impossible that IS fighters engage in any kind of understanding or negotiation with Syria’s new rulers. An article in the ISIS Naba newspaper with the headline “Free Syria and Assad’s Syria,” affirmed its position that all Syrian factions — Assad and the rebels — are its opponents.
According to the article, Bashar al-Assad’s downfall is part of “an international understanding after the truce in Lebanon, which led to removing Iran from the scene in Syria, and toppling Assad and replacing him with the opposition.” ISIS said the reasons for its militant attacks in Syria didn’t disappear after the overthrow of Assad, adding that al-Sharaa’s respect to minorities as a legitimate reason to fight what the militant group views as “infidels.”
ISIS fighters pose an increasing danger to Syria.
The new administration in Syria said earlier this month that its forces foiled a planned bombing attack by ISIS at the shrine of Sayyida Zainab in Damascus.
Siyamand Ali, media director of the Kurdish People’s Protection Unit in northeastern Syria they have about 12,000 IS members including foreign fighters held in 26 prisons, as well as tens of thousands of women and children affiliated with IS in the al-Hawl and Roj camps. Those fighters pose an increasing danger to Syria because their home countries do not want to repatriate their citizens and their families who joined IS and are now held in detentions or in camps in northeastern Syria.
