MOSCOW — On Monday morning, in the wake of a presidential election orchestrated to give Vladimir Putin his sacrosanct “stability,” for another six years, the head of the Kremlin is not the only one feeling in control.
The “Silovik” can breathe ever easier after the president has been re-elected for the fifth time. These are the men of the security forces: not only agents of the FSB, successor to the KGB where Putin got his start, but also of the Investigative Committee, the police, the National Guard and other organizations responsible for maintaining order. For the foreseeable future, they can continue to protect their power, economic interests and political security.
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“In a way, they’re caught in their own trap: they can’t let go of power for fear of losing everything,” explains a source close to the Kremlin. “Thus their leader, Putin, has to stay.”
This presidential election was yet another show of strength for Putin and his siloviki. But it was also an admission of their weakness: after a quarter-century in power, the president has failed to build a state support structure solid enough to continue without them.
Omnipresent since the war in Ukraine
In the eyes of the Kremlin master, a lawyer by training, it was important to respect constitutional forms, since the ballot must serve as a legal basis for justifying his policies. De facto, this latest victory is a referendum for the continuation, and even acceleration, of his “special military operation” in Ukraine. And for strengthening the power of the elite.
Under Putin, the siloviki have taken control of Russia’s political, economic and cultural landscape, the country’s lifeblood and the social basis of its power. They have become all the more omnipresent as the conflict in Ukraine has transformed the military-industrial complex, their preferred sector, into an engine of economic growth.
In exchange for their loyalty, the president gives them jobs, pay rises and plenty of other benefits. Boris Kovalchuk, a dynamic and efficient manager but not necessarily steeped in democratic culture, is said to have joined the presidential administration and has been promised a ministerial post after the presidential election.
All these loyalists are so dependent on the regime that, even if some of them have doubts, they cannot express them.
Nuclear explosion
Since the start of his “military operation”, Putin himself has never once questioned his actions. He and his elites are like hostages to their collective, uncompromising logic, with no possibility of turning back.
“Living in Putin’s Russia is like living in a gulag.”
During Putin’s early terms, his regime was described as a behind-the-scenes struggle between liberals and siloviki. However, Western sanctions have turned out to be counterproductive — marginalizing the liberals and bolstering the credibility of the siloviki.
For many liberals, the war was a shock similar to a nuclear explosion, and have been living in the fallout since. Yet, they fail to consider the long-term radioactive effects. “Living in Putin’s Russia is like living in a gulag: Even if someone dared to whisper a criticism, Putin wouldn’t listen,” warns a former member of the presidential administration. “He would dismiss them, accusing them of being influenced by the Western enemy.”
As a result, these liberals, also hostages of the system, carry less and less weight in the complex balance of power where the president has become the singular master of consensus among elites.
Compromise, consensus
To each his own in the Kremlin. And in the middle: Putin, a man of compromise and consensus. A “centrist” is said ironically in Moscow. In fact, the Kremlin has divided the circles of power, dividing them up and delegating by sector.
For example, Elvira Nabiullina, the woman who has been at the head of the Central Bank for the past ten years, is in charge of major economic decisions. This Yale-educated liberal economist had to swallow her personal convictions and remain loyal to the Kremlin.
In return, Putin is happy to play the protector, ensuring that no one interferes in decisions in a sector that does not fall within his or her remit. Nabiullina has no say in military matters. At the same time, however, the President has not allowed the siloviki to impose their views on interest rates and anti-inflation policy. If a conflict of interest arises between decision-making groups, the President decides.
As for the governors in Russia’s far-flung regions, they have simply become managers responsible for implementing the policies decided by Moscow. This technocratic vertical, with leaders less and less local and more and more parachuted in, is maintained by the Kremlin thanks to a regular rotation of personnel reduced to applying Moscow’s orders.
Of course, Putin cannot decide everything. Everywhere, as in Western countries, he has his people: national government, regional leaders, administrations… But with one major difference: fear. All of them know that every micro-decision must satisfy the chief. In the event of disagreement, there is no recourse, like in a democracy, to neutral administrative arbitration, an independent press or impartial justice. Only the judgment of the siloviki counts.
