Assad’s End Is A Massive Blow To Putin — And It’s Not Just About Optics

-Analysis-

BERLIN — In the end, it was the shift in rhetoric that exposed Russia’s defeat most starkly. Last weekend, Russia’s state news agency Tass was still referring to the “terrorists” orchestrating an offensive in Syria, supposedly under the control of foreign powers. By Sunday morning, with Bashar al-Assad’s regime teetering on the brink, Tass reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry was in contact with “all groups.”

The regime had effectively collapsed.

By Sunday evening, the transformation was complete. Tass dropped the term “terrorists” and instead spoke of the “Syrian opposition” ensuring the “security of Russian missions and military facilities.” By then, the flag of the Syrian rebels was already flying over the Syrian embassy in Moscow, while the ousted dictator Assad was fleeing to Russia, seeking refuge with his family.

Vladimir Putin had no choice but to face the new reality on the ground in Syria, and scramble to salvage the situation. The two most significant Russian bases in Syria — the port of Tartus and the military airfield at Khmeimim — remained intact, thanks to behind-the-scenes negotiations with the new rulers.

Any dramatic optics of a chaotic retreat by the 7,000 Russian troops stationed there were avoided — and Assad’s exile in Moscow offered Putin a sliver of dignity, portraying himself as a steadfast ally even in defeat.

Yet these surface-level elements cannot mask the fact that Russia has emerged as the biggest loser in Syria’s upheaval. When Putin intervened in the Syrian civil war in 2015, his goal was clear: to reassert Russia’s standing as a global power. His message was bold — Russia could project power far beyond its borders, just like the United States.

For a while, contrary to many Western predictions, it worked. But that era has now come to a jarring halt.

Bad timing

This defeat comes at a very bad time for Putin. Russia had just largely renovated the facade of its strength. In the Ukraine war, the initiative had been firmly in Russia’s hands. In Russia’s neighborhood, pro-Russian forces that advocate a relationship with Russia are gaining support. European and German intelligence services even consider it possible that Russia could be strong enough to attack NATO in a few years. But this stumble in Syria undermines the narrative of Russian strength.

In Kyiv, Russia’s failure to act decisively in Syria is seen as a sign of weakness. For Ukraine, it bolsters arguments against rushing into peace negotiations with Putin, where he aims to dictate terms. The incoming U.S. President, Donald Trump, and the EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, also interpret Assad’s fall as a clear dent in Putin’s armor. While peace talks between Russia and Ukraine remain in limbo, this could weaken Moscow’s position at the negotiating table.

Syria had become a vital hub for Russia’s military operations in Africa

Beyond optics, Assad’s ousting carries immediate diplomatic and military consequences for Russia. Losing sway over Syria diminishes Russia’s leverage with neighboring states and reduces the incentive for these countries to consider Moscow’s interests.

Moreover, Syria had become a vital hub for Russia’s military operations in Africa. With the so-called Russian “Afrika Korps” stepping into the void left by the now-defunct Wagner Group, Russia is in the process of pushing back Western and especially French influence. In Burkina Faso, Sudan, Mali and most recently Niger, Russian soldiers are supporting anti-Western putschists.

A key country in this regard is Libya, where Russia is allied with General Khalifa Haftar. Bases in Syria were essential for funneling troops and equipment to these countries, and that logistical pipeline now hangs in the balance.

Unpleasant negotiations

Russia’s inability to prevent Assad’s downfall is intrinsically linked to the ongoing war in Ukraine. With over 600,000 Russian troops deployed along the Ukrainian frontlines and daily casualty rates in the hundreds, the strain on Russia’s military resources is immense. Last summer, the Ministry of Defense doubled its recruitment bonuses to 4,000 euros to attract volunteers. Much of Russia’s air force had already been pulled out of Syria, leaving only a skeleton crew of Su-34 bombers at the Khmeimim airbase.

But it is also clear that Russia was never strong enough to support the Assad regime with its own forces alone. In fact, even during the hot phase of the fighting in Syria between 2015 and 2017, it was Hezbollah and the Iranian militias that did most of the military work on the ground. Russia mainly used its air force against anti-Assad opposition units.

At no time was Russia’s Syria campaign comparable to the Americans’ Afghanistan mission. At its peak, the U.S. had more than 100,000 soldiers stationed in the country. Russia got by with only one-tenth of the number of soldiers. Even before the Ukraine war, Russia would probably have had little chance to counter such an attack on Assad, carried out in such a short time.

For years, Putin ignored Syria’s worsening domestic and economic crises. His focus remained on using Syria to bolster Russia’s global clout, with no clear plan for a long-term exit strategy. While Moscow expanded its influence in Africa, Syria’s problems festered.

Demoralized armies

Russia’s plan for Syria was to re-establish Assad as the legitimate ruler among neighboring states. This was also because Russia viewed the Syrian civil war, as well as the overthrow of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, as having been orchestrated from outside.

From Putin’s perspective, all that was missing before the regime could be finally stabilized was a deal between Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The economic misery, the repression of the civilian population and the dire state of the Syrian army were never factored in to Russia’s perception. And yet, they turned out to be the decisive factors when Assad’s demoralized and poorly paid army ran away without a fight.

All of these mistakes could now thwart Russia’s ambitions to become a great power.

All of these mistakes could now thwart Russia’s ambitions to become a great power. Russia hopes to be able to keep its military bases in Syria after all. Now, Russia faces the possibility of losing its military foothold in Syria altogether. From the perspective of the new Syrian rulers, there’s little reason to grant concessions to a power that only days ago branded them as terrorists. Moscow’s diplomats are in for tough negotiations, where they will likely have to plead rather than dictate.

If talks fail, Russia may have to evacuate its troops and assets — a logistical nightmare requiring dozens, if not hundreds, of flights. Valuable technology, including air defense systems, will need to be salvaged. Meanwhile, Russia’s military logistics for Africa will have to be reworked, potentially relying on ports and bases in Libya. But Libya is much further from Russia than Syria, making it a far less convenient replacement.

Putin’s ambitions of global power are in danger of being rewound several years, or more.