Hamas, Hezbollah, Houthis: What Happens Now To The “Axis Of Resistance”?

-Analysis-

BERLIN — The so called “Axis of Resistance” is — or was — a coalition of Iran-backed militIas and political parties that includes Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis, and relied on a decades-long friendly relationship with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Over the past year, these organizations have mostly been dismantled or severely weakened, leaving the Iranian regime more isolated than it has ever been.

But what exactly is left of these once so threatening organizations? Will they ever manage to recover from the crushing defeats they suffered this past year? If so, what will it mean for the future of the Middle East?

 Can Hamas rebuild?

Hamas triggered the Middle East war with its attack against Israel on Oct. 7, 2023. Some 1,200 Israelis were murdered by the terrorists and 250 people were taken hostage in the Gaza Strip. The attack, which came as a surprise to Israel, showed that Israel had underestimated the danger coming from its southern borders.

But still, Hamas was never able to counter Israel’s ground offensive in the Gaza Strip. The terrorists had built tunnels and underground hideouts in residential areas and clinics, and Hamas fought an asymmetrical battle, hiding behind the civilian population. Israel’s air force and army repeatedly attacked targets such as schools, hospitals and refugee camps when fighters were present. The Hamas-controlled authorities in Gaza say more than 46,000 people were killed. These figures cannot be verified, but it is certain that many innocent people, including children, died in the war.

Hamas has also lost thousands of fighters. In October 2024, its long-time leader Yahya Sinwar was tracked down and killed by an Israeli patrol in the Gaza Strip. “Hamas is not an organized, army-like force anymore,” says Kobi Michael, a security expert at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

Oct. 7 has brought Hamas enormous international popularity.

Yet the organization continues to exist and still controls Gaza to this day. Michael fears that Hamas will use the ceasefire to continue smuggling weapons through Egypt and recruiting new, much younger fighters. In addition to that, the organization still has the ability to build its own weapons. “It is unlikely the organization will reach its former strength, but the hypothesis that Hamas will recover and that there will be a new war cannot be ruled out completely,” Michael says.

Another risk for Israel is that Hamas will become more of an international threat, and that it could start threatening Israeli and Jewish institutions worldwide with attacks and assassinations. The massacre they carried out on Oct. 7 has brought Hamas enormous international popularity, says Marie-Theres Sommerfeld, a consultant at the Bundeswehr Command and Staff College, in an analysis for the German Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies.

“This could lead to the group gaining followers in other countries as well. Radicalized lone wolves — and domestic cells — might be inspired by them and imitate their modus operandi,” Sommerfeld says.

Is Hezbollah buried?

Hezbollah has also been attacking Israel since October 2023. Israel has been striking back with its air force and artillery troops. Tens of thousands of people had to flee from northern Israel and southern Lebanon because of the fighting. Until a few months ago, the terrorist militia was considered the dominant force in Lebanon, more powerful than the official military or even the country’s government.

In the fall of 2024, however, Israel intensified its attacks against Hezbollah. In a previously unprecedented intelligence operation, Israel managed to supply Hezbollah fighters and officials with explosive pagers and radios for years. Israel detonated the pagers remotely in September, killing at least 37 people. More than 3,000 were injured. Longtime Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed in an Israeli airstrike at the end of the same month. His successor Hashem Safi al-Din also died after an Israeli airstrike in the first days of October.

The end of the Syrian regime interrupted the organization’s logistical connection to Iran.

On Oct. 1, the Israeli army moved into southern Lebanon. During the fighting, which was accompanied by Israeli air strikes, large parts of the Hezbollah military infrastructure and missile arsenal were destroyed. Hezbollah finally accepted a ceasefire that provided for the withdrawal of its militias from southern Lebanon. Hezbollah was also significantly weakened by the timely fall of a neighboring ally, the Assad regime in Syria: The end of the Syrian regime interrupted the organization’s logistical connection to Iran.

Hezbollah is now considered to be severely weakened. So much so that it is also losing political control over Lebanon. For years, Hezbollah’s political arm had prevented the election of a new president in Lebanon. On Jan. 9, the Lebanese parliament elected army general Joseph Aoun as the new head of state.

At the end of November 2024, Hezbollah and Israel agreed on a 60-day ceasefire. A ceasefire should be easier to implement in Lebanon than in the Gaza Strip, says Peter Lintl, Middle East expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin.

Iran, Hezbollah’s protecting power, also views a truce between the two favorably. “Iran has little to no interest in the war in Lebanon continuing,” says Lintl. “For the regime in Tehran, Hezbollah was a strategic tool, a means of deterrence against Israel. It simply doesn’t have the strength to play that paper anymore. It will take years for Hezbollah to regain its former strength.”

Syria

Since the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, Iranian units and pro-Iranian militias such as Hezbollah have also left the country. To prevent Assad’s troops’ military equipment from falling into the hands of the new rulers and their leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, Israel’s army carried out a series of targeted air strikes against Syrian army bases. At the same time, Israeli ground troops have occupied a buffer zone of around 235 square kilometers in the Golan Heights, the border region between Syria and Israel.

From Israel’s perspective, Syria remains a potential source of danger.

“The collapse of Assad in Syria has put Israel in a better strategic position. The fall of Assad weakens Iran significantly,” says Peter Lintl of the SWP. “Because Iran has now lost its land route to Lebanon, i.e. to Hezbollah. Plus, an ideological opponent of the Shiites is now in power in Damascus.”

The new Syrian rulers are demanding an end to the Israeli occupation of Syrian territories. At the same time, al-Sharaa has stated in several interviews that he wants to foster a good relationship with Israel. In an interview with British newspaper The Times, he assured that in the future there would be no attacks against Israel from Syrian soil.

From Israel’s perspective, Syria remains a potential source of danger. It is still unclear how the country will develop under the new government. Despite their moderate appearance, Islamist currents could gain the upper hand over time.

Houthis

From Yemen, the pro-Iranian Houthis have repeatedly targeted Israel with drones and cruise missiles. The Israeli Air Force has responded by striking targets in Yemen. Their jets are able to operate in Yemen because the Air Force has tanker aircrafts that can supply flying bomber planes mid-air, thus enabling longer flights.

The Houthis pose a greater threat to international shipping than to Israel. In the past year, they fired anti-ship missiles at tankers and attacked freighters with drones and boats in an attempt to hurt Israel’s international allies. In response, the United States, Great Britain and various other states attacked targets in Yemen several times and destroyed Houthis’ military facilities. But still, the Houthis are still able to disrupt commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

At Tehran HQ

Iran continues to try to project an idea of strength. After the ceasefire was announced, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, said on the social media platform X that “the patience and resistance of the Palestinians have forced the Zionist regime to retreat.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also celebrated the agreement as a success for Hamas.

Kamran Matin, who teaches international relations at the University of Sussex, believes such triumphant rhetoric is a domestic political strategy. “It is intended to give hope to the remaining social base of the Iranian regime and at the same time to conceal the regime’s obvious incompetence. The self-confident and determined Israeli state made it clear after Oct. 7 that it can inflict considerable damage on Iran and its proxy groups in the region,” Matin said.

Peter Lintl of the SWP agrees. “In retrospect, Iran is likely to view Oct. 7 much less positively. What we have seen is Israel gradually demonstrating its military dominance,” the expert said in an interview with ZEIT ONLINE. “Israel has gained the upper hand militarily and has a much higher deterrent potential than its neighbors and Iran.”

Future air strikes on Iran would be almost impossible to prevent.

The Islamic Republic has shown its vulnerability in recent months. Recent Israeli airstrikes went unanswered, causing disappointment even among supporters of the regime. In October last year, the Israeli Air Force attacked Iranian air defense facilities and a drone factory. Media close to the IRGC confirmed that such military facilities in the west of the country were hit.

According to U.S. assessments, these attacks significantly limited the Revolutionary Guard’s ability to produce missiles. In addition, important components of the Russian S-300 air defense system were so badly damaged that future air strikes on Iran would be almost impossible to prevent.

According to Matin, Iran’s cautious reaction — merely a vague announcement of “future revenge” — is probably due to the fear that serious military countermeasures would draw the U.S. into the conflict. If reports that Israel has destroyed key parts of Iran’s missile production are true, Iran still has a considerable stock of missiles but is hardly able to produce more. “Apart from a limited number of missiles, the Islamic Republic does not pose a major military threat to Israel,” says Matin.

Nevertheless, Iran can still be a threat from a long-term perspective. “Let’s remember that Iran does not recognize the State of Israel, has an active nuclear program and missile industry, and continues to support forces that oppose Israel,” says Matin. “How Iran will react to Israeli dominance is not yet clear,” Lintl also notes.

“Now that proxy militias, the regime’s life insurance, have been dismantled, the nuclear weapons program looks even more attractive for some in the country. Moderate forces, however, are in favor of reaching out to the Trump administration. Both things could happen.”