–Analysis–
PARIS — It’s an old debate that gets revived regularly, and always with a level of controversy, as if it were being discussed for the first time. To sum up: in an interview published this weekend in regional daily newspapers, French President Emmanuel Macron raised the possibility that France’s nuclear deterrent might, in his words: “contribute more to the defense of European soil.”
For the latest news & views from every corner of the world, Worldcrunch Today is the only truly international newsletter. Sign up here.
At this stage, it is only a question of “opening up the debate,” but it is also the second time Macron has raised the subject in a span of just a few days: on Thursday, in his much anticipated speech about the future of Europe, he said that France’s nuclear arsenal is “in essence, an essential element in the defense of the European continent.”
Sharing nuclear weapons
So what is all the fuss about? Let’s start with what it’s not: it’s not about sharing nuclear weapons. The decision to use nuclear weapons is, and will remain, that of the President of the French Republic. It would be unthinkable to convene a European Council before a nuclear strike, as this would be contrary to the spirit of this supreme weapon: deterrence only works if the man, or woman, who takes the decision is credible; an assembly of 27 Heads of State is not credible.
It’s all a question of definition: does an attack on Germany constitute a “vital interest” for France?
French doctrine states that nuclear deterrence serves France’s “vital interests.” So it’s all a question of definition: does an attack on Germany constitute a “vital interest” for France? The answer is probably yes. Does the same apply to Poland? Or Lithuania?
In October 2022, eight months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Macron said that a nuclear ballistic attack on Ukraine would not jeopardize France’s fundamental interests. This statement came as a surprise, because it was the opposite of the strategic ambiguity he now claims to have. Still, at least he was clear about the limits of the nation’s interests.
But what about the subject of the current debate: the entire territory of the European Union?
An old debate
Why are we having this debate today? The topic is old, it’s the context that is new. Most EU countries are protected by the American nuclear shield under NATO. Donald Trump‘s possible victory in November casts doubt on the validity of this “shield,” and worries European leaders.
Above all, how can we share what, by its very nature, cannot be shared?
So now is the time, just a few months before this decisive deadline, to put the terms of the debate on European defense on the table. All the terms: those of the anti-missile shield that 20 countries, led by Germany but without France, have launched; those of the defense industries that need to go further and faster; and finally the question of nuclear power, which is France’s specificity on the Continent.
The issue is terribly complex, because the political uncertainty in the United States could also affect France in 2027. Above all, how can we share what, by its very nature, cannot be shared? The debate is both public — and it would be preferable for it to take place outside election periods — and private between European states.
The only certainty? That you haven’t heard the last of it.
