The Two Sides Of European Populism — A Threat To The Whole World

-Analysis-

PARIS — The European elections, which will take place June 6-9, do not have the same geopolitical importance for the world as the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5. The U.S., despite its divisions and weaknesses, remains the world’s leading military and economic power.

But at a time of rising populism and with the war back in Europe, the European vote is no less essential. And, just like in the United States, the vote will undoubtedly translate the deep polarization of societies between reason and emotion.

“Tell me what you fear most, and I’ll tell you who you are.” To get straight to the point — at the risk of oversimplifying — in Europe today, there are two camps when it comes to fear. In one camp, are those who are most afraid of migrants and more generally of migratory phenomena, for security and identity reasons. In the second, are those who believe the war in Ukraine has radically transformed the situation on the European continent, and who put Russia at the top of the list of threats to Europe.

Is the prime danger primarily internal or external? Is it a priority to close our borders to migrants? To expel all foreigners who are already here irregularly, and who represent a threat to our security — perhaps even to our identity?

Or is the priority to rally together against an external enemy who, if victorious in Ukraine, would not stop there. And, with an ever growing appetite, would become a direct threat to European lifestyle and fundamental values, beginning with freedom?

Credibility question

The prioritization of these threats is largely — but not exclusively — a matter of geography and history. It would be tempting to say that further from Russia and closer to the Mediterranean, the more migration issues prevail. And that the Russian threat is a greater concern closer to Moscow.

This dichotomy does not take into account national specificities. In Eastern Europe, Viktor Orban‘s Hungary stands as a notable exception to the rule. Conversely, Giorgia Meloni‘s Italy, with a modernized and more “serious” far right, both on a geopolitical and economic level clearly addresses the question of the Russian threat. That is far from being the case of the National Rally (RN) party in France.

At a time when Russia — feeling time may play against it in Ukraine, with the planned arrival of U.S. weapons — is playing more than ever with the nuclear threat, a geopolitical theme should prevail. And it should lead Europeans to come up with simple answers to a simple question.

How can Europe respond in the most united and credible manner to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intimidation attempts? The more Russia threatens, and the more the U.S. hesitates, the more Europe there has to be, both qualitatively and, no doubt, quantitatively.

More Europe

Exactly 20 years ago, EU enlargement to include previously communist countries in the east and center was — despite some very real difficulties — a resounding success. Today, to grow stronger and be united in freedom, Europe must prepare for a new enlargement that would increase its membership from 27 to 35.

Whatever the difficulties, sticking points, delays, contradictions, hesitations, the EU continues to act by capillarity, through the power of attraction it has always had on all those who dream of becoming a member.

The geopolitical issues are infinitely more dramatic for Europe now than they were 20 years ago.

The fact that the EU is “mortal,” as French President Emmanuel Macron rightly put it, does not make it any less attractive. Of course, Europe should not be delusional. This new enlargement will be even more difficult than the one carried out 20 years ago.

The integration of Ukraine, which represents the key and culmination point of this process, will be complicated, even if the Ukrainian economy is not so different today — according to studies by the Institute of international economy of Vienna — from the candidate countries back in 2004.

But above all, the geopolitical issues are infinitely more dramatic for Europe now than they were back then. Faced with Russia’s ambitions, Europe’s best response can be summed up in three words: firmness, unity and enlargement.

Reason vs. emotion

The problem is that this clear and rational vision is far having unanimous support. The Russian threat remains — despite Putin‘s considerable efforts — abstract for a majority of Europeans, who have no desire to die for Ukraine.

This threat, although very real, does not have as strong an impact as tragic domestic news items. It is natural that news of someone who is perceived as a radicalized alien carrying a weapon nearby is more frightening than the entire Russian military arsenal.

Solidarity with Ukraine is generally shared by a majority of Europeans. But how do we convey the idea that the best way to avoid war is not to yield to Moscow’s blackmail? How can we explain to Europeans — at a time when the temptation to turn inward has never been greater — that a new “Big Bang” in terms of enlargement is necessary? And how do we do that quickly?

While the main threat comes from the east, it is mostly seen as coming from the south.

Europe’s two major powers, France and Germany, are simultaneously confronted with the rise of populism — although the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is far from reaching the RN’s scores in France.

While the main threat comes from the east, it is mostly seen as coming from the south. While it is above all political in nature (eastern despotism), it is mainly felt as religious (radical Islamism). I am well aware of the reality of the latter threat; the recent Belgian film “Amal: A Free Spirit” illustrates the devastating effects of Salafism in a Brussels high school.

The problem is that the fear of migration works much more clearly in favor of populist forces (the parties of emotion), than the Russian threat does for the parties of reason.

A dangerous shift in priorities.