-OpEd-
BUENOS AIRES — In the campaign debate with U.S. Vice-President Kamala Harris, the former president and Republican candidate Donald Trump warned “we’ll end up being Venezuela on steroids” if Harris were elected president in November.
He justified this by referring to the notion of “millions and millions” of Latin Americans who had entered the United States — and who presumably would keep coming. It wasn’t the first time he was being publicly dismissive of Latin America. But beyond the inaccuracy of his charges (as studies show that immigrants there commit fewer crimes than U.S. nationals), the point is that Trump’s return to the presidency is a real possibility, and the region should prepare for it.
For the latest news & views from every corner of the world, Worldcrunch Today is the only truly international newsletter. Sign up here.
The doctrine of Active Non-Alignment (ANA) emerged in this region in 2019-20, during Trump’s first administration. It was in response to the prickly situation in which the region found itself, facing simultaneous pressures from China and the United States.
What ANA provides today is a guideline or compass to prevent panic while navigating the choppy waters of our time.
Multipolar rivalries offer opportunities to smaller powers
Its first indication is that there is no need to commit early on to either side, but to first consider the national interest, where possible, and act in coordination with other regional states to offer a united front against looming threats.
We might call this a strategy of “testing the terrain” at a time of multipolar rivalries (without the “certainties” of the bipolar Cold War of past decades), which threaten to leave lesser powers in a state of acute vulnerability. It may seem as if they have no choice but grab onto the nearest superpower and follow its dictates, but it needn’t be that way.
Indeed, those rivalries should be seen as an opportunity that was absent in the years of undisputed U.S. hegemony. In the years of the Cold War — and for reasons including the relatively limited, closed and dysfunctional nature of the Soviet economy — Latin American states had little opportunity to haggle with the United States over, say, the terms of their economic ties. The situation is different today, as communist China has become the world’s number one economy in terms of purchasing power and openness, offering us numerous opportunities. It is already South America’s biggest trading partner collectively.
It needn’t be that way.
This means our countries can indeed test the ground and seek the best possible offers from either side, for specific projects or particular sectors. This, rather than picking a side, must be the sensible choice in a fluctuating environment. In tactical terms it means acting with forethought, taking seemingly contradictory measures and planning fall-back positions in case of sudden changes or “squalls.” Some may dismiss this as opportunism, but we should see it instead as the rational response to a “disrupted” world wherein boldly picking the wrong path could lead to disaster.
A practical approach
While ANA first emerged in Latin America, it is already being implemented, with variations, across the Global South. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza have driven this process. South Africa has made it a foreign policy premise, while Vietnam pursues its “bamboo diplomacy,” flexible enough to ensure it can work with China, Russia and the United States.
The competition between the great powers, in which they try to win the hearts and minds of the people, offers room for maneuver for medium and small powers to obtain better conditions for trade, investment and development financing.
It is not about ideology but practicalities.
Superpower rivalries, in which each one tries to win the hearts and minds of the people, offer room for maneuver for medium and small powers to obtain better conditions for trade, investment and financing. While the superpowers have chiefly geopolitical concerns, medium and small powers need development. For the latter, it is not about ideology but practicalities.
Ecuador provides an example. It has enormous debts and badly needs access to big markets. Failing repeatedly to clinch itself a free-trade deal with the United States, which is turning its back on such treaties, the conservative government led by President Guillermo Lasso (2021-23) had no qualms about turning to the Chinese. And they obliged, which led to a bilateral free-trade pact that came into force on May 4, 2024. There is a lesson there for whoever is paying attention. And they should — preferably before Trump’s possible return to the White House.
