-Analysis-
STOCKHOLM — The Kremlin recently hinted that Vladimir Putin may remain as Russia’s president until 2030. After the Constitution of the Russian Federation was amended in 2020, he may even extend his rule until 2036.
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However, it seems unlikely that Putin will remain in power for another decade. Too many risks have accumulated recently to count on a long gerontocratic rule for him and his entourage.
The most obvious and immediate risk factor for Putin’s rule is the Russian-Ukrainian war. If Russia loses, the legitimacy of Putin and his regime will be threatened and they will likely collapse.
The rapid annexation of Crimea without hostilities in 2014 will ultimately be seen as the apex of his rule. Conversely, a protracted and bloody loss of the peninsula would be its nadir and probable demise.
Additional risk factors for the current Russian regime are related to further external challenges, for example, in the Caucasus. Other potentially dangerous factors for Putin are economic problems and their social consequences, environmental and industrial disasters, and domestic political instability.
Losing control
The mutiny of Wagner Group founder Yevgeny Prigozhin in the summer of 2023 and the riots in Makhachkala in the fall of 2023 indicate a loss of internal control that has not been seen in previous years.
Putin’s health may also be deteriorating — although we cannot know for sure (some observers even believe that Putin is already dead).
Can the current regime survive with a new supreme leader?
One way or another, Putin will likely leave by 2036, and possibly much earlier.
The million dollar question though is: What will happen next? Can the current regime survive with a new supreme leader or a new collective leadership that continues Putin’s legacy? Or will the Putinist system collapse when its leader is gone?
This question intrigues not only political scientists, but also developers of foreign, economic and cultural policies around the world.
Should Russians and non-Russians, foreign governments and private investors, national and international organizations prepare for political succession or radical changes in the planet’s largest country by land mass?
Putinism forever?
Some analysts anticipate a smooth transition of power within Russia’s existing political elite, signaling a continuation of the current governance. While potential scenarios include adaptive changes within the system, a complete overthrow seems unlikely.
The regime could either evolve into a more centralized, neo-Stalinist rule or revert to a proto-democratic state akin to the end of Yeltsin’s presidency. However, the applicability of historical precedents in shaping these predictions raises uncertainties.
Czarist and Soviet Russia experienced multiple power transitions under authoritarian conditions, a trend also observed in other post-Soviet regimes with autocratic systems and elite succession.
However, comparing these historical transitions to the future Russian political landscape might not hold true. Previous power shifts adhered to inherited institutional constraints like dynastic principles, one-party dominance, and regional clan agreements, which offered guidelines and limitations.
The current strength of Russia’s formal restrictions and informal behavioral norms is uncertain. Questions arise regarding the true significance of Russia’s Constitution and laws against the backdrop of the corporate culture among elites, mutual respect, and political friendships.
Determining if these institutions, individually or combined, can facilitate a peaceful transition and establish stability remains challenging but pivotal for Russia’s future.
Disintegration of institutions
Over the past 24 years, the Putin administration has systematically eroded, controlled or distorted many of Russia’s official establishments. This includes national elections, private property, the Russian Orthodox Church, the Constitutional Court, mass media, and political parties.
These key structures and networks within Russia have been compromised, facing manipulation, exploitation, and infiltration. Even the prestigious institution of the presidency has faced uncertainty since Dmitry Medvedev’s term from 2008 to 2012.
The recent three changes in Russia’s leadership were competitive and not definitively determined. Mikhail Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1985, for example, followed significant disputes within the Politburo.
It remains uncertain which individuals within the Russian elite might contend for the presidency.
In 1991, Boris Yeltsin contended for the new presidency of Russia in an election that featured various alternative candidates, ranging from Vadym Bakatin to Volodymyr Zhirynovsky. Yeltsin faced potential removal from power on multiple occasions thereafter.
By the end of 1999, Putin and his newly formed Unity party encountered a significant political rival in the State Duma elections: the Fatherland party. Putin garnered support as a presidential candidate in 2000, receiving backing from all major oligarchic clans in Russia.
The transition of power encompassed both formal procedures and informal interactions, conducted through certain inherited and adopted rules, including relatively democratic elections in 1991 and 1999.
But the issue of Putin’s successor or a team of successors presents a multifaceted problem in Russia, lacking clear resolution in several aspects.
Three problems of establishing Putinism 2.0
Firstly, it is not clear what the stakes are for each player with one or another degree of political influence and economic interest. What specific impact will the selection of a new leader have on the key stakeholders involved?
Can they improve, maintain or lose their position, their wealth and their freedom? And if so, how high are the stakes? Could they even lose their lives by supporting the wrong person?
These questions are difficult to answer not only for observers, but also for the actors themselves.
Moreover, it remains uncertain which individuals within the Russian elite might contend for the presidency or be part of the new collective leadership. While some elite members are contemplating running for higher office, others might aspire but lack the necessary financial resources.
Another looming question is: Who will be permitted by entities like the FSB security services and other armed institutions and ministries of Russia to engage in the race for key positions?
Will the different factions easily reach an agreement on who can join the new regime and who will be excluded? And what might ensue if there’s a lack of consensus on this matter?
In the event of Putin’s sudden departure or demise, as per the Constitution, the role of acting president is designated to the Prime Minister of Russia, currently held by Mikhail Mishustin.
Considering Putin’s trajectory from prime minister to acting president and then president in 1999-2000, Mishustin could unexpectedly become a significant political figure. However, Mishustin lacks a background in law enforcement and isn’t widely recognized as a public figure. It’s plausible that his current position might be a result of his lack of authority and relative obscurity.
Future prime ministers under Putin may share similar characteristics.
The new head of government, on the other hand, is likely to be someone with significant popularity and power.
Who are Russia’s kingmakers?
This leads to the third question: Who will constitute the group that selects the presidential nominee for popular acceptance, typically with a predetermined outcome? Will it be the Security Council or a more expansive or limited group of individuals? Who will determine the parameters of this group of “kingmakers”?
Even if a recognized group of selectors is established: What occurs if these selectors fail to agree on the preferred new president or the composition of the collective leadership? What if entire clans, ministries, or departments advocate for different candidates?
Both Russians and non-Russians should anticipate an ambiguous power transition.
Can influential members of the selection committee adopt opposing ideological stances?Typically, the recommended approach in such a scenario would involve letting the people decide. However, in Russia, popular voting hasn’t been democratic for more than two decades.
Putin’s “elections” aim for public validation of a predetermined leader, not a fair contest among independent political parties.
The outcome of Russia’s presidential elections is preordained before the actual voting takes place. Sudden national elections with an uncertain outcome contradict the established behavioral patterns of thousands of civil servants, party officials, low enforcement agents and media personnel over two decades.
Organizing legitimate elections might be unfeasible for national, regional, and local bureaucrats without prior training or external support.
A triple uncertainty
The process of transitioning leadership in Russia presents a triple uncertainty: first, the significant stakes for elite representatives; second, the vast range of potential presidential candidates; and third, the identification of the selection committee.
None of these issues currently has an institutionally defined solution. No authoritative resolution exists from the Party Central Committee, regional clan assemblies, dynastic principles, or any other accepted procedure.
This uncertainty doesn’t inherently imply chaotic power transfer or civil strife, but it heightens the likelihood of a disorderly interim phase rather than a smooth transition into “Putinism 2.0.”
Political prognostication is challenging, yet the institutional deficiency in Russia poses potential dangers for all participants involved. Both Russians and non-Russians should anticipate an ambiguous power transition.
The forthcoming political regime in Russia will necessarily differ from the current one. But whether it leans more towards totalitarianism or towards greater democracy than the existing Putinist system remains hard to tell.
