-Analysis-
KYIV — In early 2024, the Ukrainian military initiated a series of attacks on Russian oil and gas processing facilities, conducting seven drone strikes between January 18 and February 3.
These attacks by drones (also known as UAVs: “unmanned aerial vehicle”) mark a shift from the previous targeting of oil industry sites in occupied or border regions, as drones now strike locations deep inside Russian territory: in the Leningrad, Volgograd, and Yaroslavl regions. These attacks are the first of their kind since the onset of the war.
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Following the drone strikes, operations at the Novatek chemical plant in Ust-Luga, Leningrad Region, were halted for 10 days on January 21, along with the Tuapse refinery on January 25. Meanwhile, the Volgograd oil refinery, targeted by drones on February 3, temporarily ceased part of its production cycle to address damages, as Russian business daily Kommersant reported at the time. Despite this, the official line maintains that the refinery is functioning normally.
Carnegie Center expert Sergei Vakulenko cautioned that the vulnerability of refineries to small drones should not be overstated. “The standards by which Russian refineries are built and modernized grow from state standards of the Cold War, when they were designed to ensure the viability of the plants even in the conditions of aerial bombings of 1000-kilogram bombs,” Vakulenko explains.
This said, Vakulenko said there were “potential challenges” in repairing Western equipment, which Russian refineries widely adopted after 2008. He points out that obtaining parts and expertise from the West has become impossible due to sanctions. Chinese technologies, which have come to replace Western components in a number of other sectors, may pose compatibility issues in this context.
Is Russian air defense capable of protecting a refinery?
According to Israeli military expert David Sharp, protecting objects in the deep rear from drones can be achieved by either securing the country’s border or directly safeguarding the objects themselves. However, safeguarding the long border with Ukraine is nearly impossible.
Ideally, air defense should catch all drones near the border
Sharp explains that drones present a formidable challenge for Russian air defense systems because of their construction from plastic and composite materials, resulting in a weak radar signature, and their tendency to fly at low altitudes.
He believes that some of the drones penetrating deep into Russian territory are intercepted by air defense systems located in border regions, such as the Belgorod region.
“Ideally, air defense should catch all drones near the border,” he said. “But this requires many complex, long-range detection systems, including airborne ones. And it would be very tricky getting this to work cohesively.”
Sharp suggests another approach to defending against drone attacks, which involves deploying air defense systems at every potential target. He suggests that short- and medium-range installations like Pantsir may be suitable for this purpose, with multiple systems needed at each facility.
“Many air defense systems need to be deployed either to cover borders, or to cover targets,” Sharp said.
He explained that the Kremlin is faced with a dilemma of whether to move these high-cost systems from the frontlines to inside Russia, or increase their production at great expense.
Following the attacks on the Ust-Luga terminal and the Tuapse oil refinery, Sergei Vakulenko warned that an additional 18 Russian oil refineries could become targets in the near future.
Analysts from the U.S. research center Atlantic Council observe that Russia faces challenges in protecting its numerous energy facilities, which are spread across the country’s vast territory.
Is this an effective strategy for Ukraine?
David Sharp believes the development of the “long arm,” striking targets deep within enemy territory, should be a priority right now.
Defense and offense are both crucial
Military expert Kirill Mikhailov echoes Sharp’s sentiment, saying a mix of “defense and offense” is crucial. He draws parallels with World War II, highlighting how the United States and Britain spent years searching for effective ways to damage Nazi Germany through bombing. After attacks on residential buildings and factories yielded limited results, the Allies discovered Germany’s Achilles heel: installations for synthetic fuel production.
“These were huge installations that could not be hidden,” he said. “And their repair required a lot of time. By the end of the war, the Allies managed to practically deprive the Wehrmacht of fuel.”
Bloomberg recently reported that from January 25 to January 31, oil refining in Russia reached its lowest level in two months. Time spent “offline” during this period may have contributed to this decline, particularly at the Ust-Luga and Tuapse factories, which suffered drone attacks. These facilities, which collectively accounted for approximately 5% of Russian oil refining in December, experienced reduced operations. Similarly, refining volumes at the Volgograd refinery also saw a decrease.
According to Kommersant, January saw a 1.4% decrease in oil processing compared to December, and a 4% decrease compared to January 2023. This decline is attributed to both necessary repairs and the malfunctioning of several installations due to drone attacks. The reduction in refining volumes is partially attributed to Russia’s agreements with Saudi Arabia to curtail oil production.
Russia’s Ministry of Energy officially announced measures on January 31 “to compensate for the loss of volumes of motor gasoline caused by unscheduled repairs at factories.” In order to meet domestic fuel demand, authorities have reduced fuel supplies abroad, resulting in a 37% decrease in gasoline exports and a 23% decrease in diesel exports compared to January 2023. However, the extent to which unscheduled repairs are linked to drone strikes remains unclear.
Experts suggest that continued attacks on refineries could further reduce export volumes, potentially leading to fuel shortages domestically and even at the front lines. Currently, petroleum products account for a third of all oil exports, notes oil and gas expert Vakulenko.
British writer and historian Owen Matthews emphasizes that strikes on critical infrastructure pose a greater threat to Russia than prolonged conflict on the front lines. “Perhaps this is what will make the war too expensive and painful for Putin,” he writes.
