Updated Jan. 17, 2024 at 11:50 a.m.
-OpEd-
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, questions have arisen regarding the prevailing narratives shaping Russia’s politics and people. There are four primary concepts shaping the perceptions of many Russian citizens, even within the liberal-minded segments of society.
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These ideological frames influence how Russians interpret current events and historical trajectories, often without conscious consideration.
Myth of determinism
The prevalent myth of determinism asserts that events progress along a predetermined trajectory, establishing an unbroken link between various historical points. According to this narrative, the past three decades of Russian history are often interpreted as evidence showcasing the failure of the nation’s democratic aspirations. It posits the present as the culmination of historical striving, constructing explanations and narratives solely based on this focal point.
However, it’s crucial to challenge and reevaluate this notion, particularly when examining the recent decade of Russian history. Contrary to the linear narrative depicting an inexorable march towards autocracy, this period witnessed the simultaneous emergence of two contrasting social phenomena.
Both are rooted in the country’s economic prosperity driven by surging oil and gas revenues.
On one hand, this period saw the rapid growth of one segment of Russian society. Heightened income levels brought about by the energy boom spurred the development of modernized urban centers, innovative economic practices, and novel social and civic behaviors. This burgeoning segment fostered a push toward modernization, digitalization, and progressive political demands, visibly expressed during the protests of 2011-12 and 2019-21.
On the other hand, the economic prosperity also led to the formation of a contrasting segment within Russian society. A significant cluster emerged, characterized by a redistributive economy and associated clientelistic networks. This faction embraced a mindset rooted in resource nationalism, emphasizing hostility toward the West and adopting a power-centric approach toward neighboring countries. This segment exhibited a stronger inclination toward nationalist, paternalistic ideologies.
Therefore, the past decade in Russia wasn’t a unidirectional progression toward authoritarianism, as often depicted by deterministic frameworks. Rather, it represented a period of simultaneous growth and divergence, wherein the nation experienced parallel trajectories stemming from the same economic roots. This complex duality defined the social fabric, giving rise to conflicting societal forces that ultimately shaped contemporary Russia.
Myth of imperialism
The concept of Russian imperialism remains a complex one. On one hand, there’s a deeply ingrained cultural inclination toward a superpower identity, reflecting an understanding that the country transcends mere national sovereignty or statehood — a perspective deeply rooted in Russian political tradition. On the other hand, over the past three decades, there has been an intriguing paradox where Russian national consciousness has shown little appetite for territorial expansion. Instead, it seemed more inclined toward introspection and internal consolidation.
Even during the collapse of the USSR three decades ago, a remarkable phenomenon emerged: Russians displayed neither the desire nor the capability to defend their empire. The influential slogans advocating territorial restraint, such as “Stop feeding Central Asia” and “Stop feeding the Caucasus,” highlighted the emphasis on sorting out internal issues rather than seeking expansion abroad.
This discourse essentially curbed classical imperialism and any expansionist tendencies for a considerable period. Up until December 2021, opinion polls indicated that only slightly more than 20% of the population favored annexing new territories to Russia. Furthermore, this sentiment wasn’t about conquest but rather annexation of regions seeking voluntary inclusion within Russia, such as Belarus, the so-called LPR and DPR. Approximately 20% to 25% of respondents considered such territorial expansions, while the majority expressed reservations.
As the Russian opposition contemplates engaging with society, it’s crucial to recognize this societal inclination toward territorial self-restraint over the past three decades. This stance stems from a drive to rationalize internal socio-political affairs and address domestic issues — a perspective held by the median voter.
However, this outlook faces growing pressure from propaganda emphasizing the benefits of expansion.
A semantic and informational struggle emerges, presenting a choice between compensating for the desire for superpower status through expansion and abstaining from expansion to focus on internal matters. These contrasting political ideas will continue to shape the forthcoming political landscape.
While Putinism perceives Russia as an empire destined to expand its paternalistic and forceful influence, the reality is different. Despite a Russian desire for great power status, often deemed as a “great power syndrome,” it doesn’t necessarily imply the aggressive expansionism attributed to it by Putin.
Erros of the 1990s
The third myth revolves around the popular belief among Russian liberals that the failures of the 1990s reforms led directly to the emergence of Putin’s rule, essentially trapping the country on a path it could not deviate from. This deterministic view often attributes today’s predicament to the actions and ideas of the first post-Soviet governments.
This concept seems flawed and detrimental to Russian liberal thought, tradition and opposition. The argument contends that the 1990s marked a failure in constructing a stable democracy or a fair market economy within a mere decade. However, expecting Russia to achieve these goals in such a short timespan lacks historical precedent or examples to support such rapid transformations.
Comparing Russia’s initial republican years to the emergence of young European republics post-World War I or other former Soviet republics after the collapse of the USSR reveals similar patterns: weak states, unstable economies, and a tumultuous political landscape. This context suggests that expecting a swift and seamless transition was unrealistic given historical analogies.
The belief that the first generation of reformers made inherently wrong decisions disregards the normative challenges faced during the nascent stage of forming a new nation without prior experience. This perspective on the “wrong ’90s” is harmful as it distances the current generation of politicians from their predecessors, undermining the stability and tradition necessary for sustainable party politics. A stable democracy requires enduring party organizations detached from individuals, built on the continuity and tradition of the core electorate’s values.
Russian politicians’ trend of distancing themselves from past reformers and blaming them disrupts the formation of a solid liberal tradition and perpetuates a cycle of discrediting past leaders. This approach disengages the electorate and undermines the foundations of party politics in Russia.
The depiction of the “dashing ’90s” as a time of chaos and futility serves as a justification for the legitimacy of Putinism. In reality, the era was a period of active institution-building and establishing Russia’s republican institutions and market economy, despite their inherent flaws. The task of enhancing these institutions falls on subsequent eras and generations of politicians rather than discrediting the founding efforts altogether.
The post-Putin myth
The fourth myth is the widespread belief that everything will significantly change upon Putin’s demise. Many hold the idea that Russia’s situation will markedly improve after Putin’s departure. However, this might not necessarily be the case. Instead, his departure could be a convenient way for the regime to unburden itself from accumulated mistakes while preserving the essence of “Putinism without Putin,” as political scientist Nikita Savin puts it.
The period preceding Putin’s departure presents an optimal window for the opposition to confront a weakening regime that has amassed errors linked to the dictator’s persona. While discussions often focus on potential “Putin doubles” resembling the current leader, the concept extends beyond mere resemblance. Personalist regimes, despite their apparent weakness in succession mechanisms, demonstrate that personalism is an institution that can be replicated within the right institutional context.
Hence, a reorientation in the approach to this issue is necessary.
Contrary to popular belief, the period before Putin’s exit is an opportune time for the Russian opposition. This phase involves dealing with a declining personalist regime and the fatigue and errors associated with the ruler, especially amid an unpopular war. It is crucial for the opposition to present a compelling alternative during this period, rather than passively waiting for the dictator’s passing, which is often idealized as a bright day ushering in a perfect future for Russia without going through transitional stages.
In many ways, the post-Putin era has already begun with the ongoing struggle for his succession. Upon Putin’s departure, there will be intense competition to fill the void he leaves behind. Therefore, fostering an anti-Putinism sentiment within the national consciousness is essential. This sentiment should have a key position in competition for his succession.
