Palestinian families visit the graves of their relatives at a cemetery on the first day of Eid al-Adha holy holiday, in Gaza city, on June 6, 2025. Eid al-Adha marks the yearly Muslim pilgrimage to visit Mecca, the most sacred place in Islam. Credit: Omar Ashtawy/APA Images via ZUMA

-OpEd-

BEIRUT — Hezbollah has been defeated in Lebanon, the Syrian regime has fallen in Damascus and the fighting continues in Gaza. There is an Israeli interest in keeping the picture incomplete. In Lebanon, we are searching for solutions to Hezbollah’s weapons and in Syria, the transitional authority has made significant strides in the post-Bashar al-Assad phase.

As for what comes after Hamas, from Israel’s perspective, it is not yet developed — because the plan involves transferring the population. To where and with whose help? Answers to those questions have not yet matured.

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Is declaring defeat more catastrophic than continuing the fighting in Gaza? There is no meaning to continuing the fight unless the cost of defeat is greater than the price the people of Gaza have been paying for nearly 18 months.

Let us then think a little further: because we are discussing the people of Gaza and not debating the Hamas movement, let us suppose that the fighting will be followed by victory — what share of this “victory” will the people of Gaza have? Nothing!

An aimless fight

All top Hamas leaders have been killed, along with tens of thousands of fighters. And even if the war ends today without an “official defeat” — which is unlikely — a real defeat has already occurred. Therefore, what Hamas continues to fight for is no longer worth these sacrifices. If we add to that the fact that, after the war, the movement will be exposed amid the waning of Iranian influence in the region, then wisdom dictates that the search for an alternative to fighting should begin.

Perhaps someone as “defeatist” as I am should bear the consequences of what he says —even though the arrows of treason are nothing compared to the pain endured daily by these people, wandering aimlessly, fleeing from chasing planes, or searching for a food parcel to feed their starving children after famine overtook them.

No one has an interest in victory or defeat — except the people of Gaza.

The reality is that Israel does not want its “victory” to be complete, just as Hamas does not want its defeat to be definitive. No one has an interest in victory or defeat — except the people of Gaza and they have neither power nor recourse. Declaring defeat would mean the end of the fighting, which would lead us to what comes after: that is, looking into the future of those who remain alive in Gaza.

Israel is not prepared to engage in that issue. Its plan for Gaza does not include the people remaining there and so far, the conditions for deportation and its destination have not matured. This is the real story behind the continued fighting.

No way out on either side

As for Hamas, declaring defeat means the end of its project in Gaza — and also the beginning of the end for the Muslim Brotherhood’s project in more than one place in this miserable Levant. Moreover, “victory” is the essence of the relationship between Islamists and their audience. That relationship cannot stand without it. A call for Hamas to leave Gaza is a call for a kind of retirement — but not early retirement, for it has taken us into infernal options we were never prepared for.

An explosion following an Israeli air strike on Al Bureije refugee camp in southern Gaza on June 3, 2024. Photo: Ritzau via ZUMA

The fighting in Gaza, after 18 months since the Oct. 7 Hamas attack, after nearly 54,000 dead and more than double that number wounded and the near-total destruction of cities and camps, raises questions about the purpose of its continuation in light of these costs. Israel does not want a complete defeat for Hamas — because that would mean halting the fighting and seeking a Palestinian partner.

Hamas, on the other hand, favors continuing the desperate fighting as long as it delays the end of its influence in Gaza, while waiting for the regional scene to settle into a resolution that secures a role for it.

But the more important point is that the fighting in Gaza is no longer part of the equation of defeating Iran’s Axis of Resistance.

The price of defeat

To disrupt Israel’s project, Hamas must preempt the Israeli mission by announcing its agreement to exit Gaza. Nearly a quarter of the population has been killed or injured. Defeat is no longer a heavier price than what the people of Gaza have already paid, as long as declaring it hinders the Israeli mission — or at least makes it harder.

Perhaps an withdrawl announcement would be preceded by negotiations over prisoners and over the necessity of a Palestinian force to replace Hamas. What matters is to obstruct the transfer — or the displacement and removal of people from the cities. That goal is more important than continuing desperate fighting, which remains necessary for Israel.

Let us imagine the scene once again: Hamas announces its agreement to leave Gaza. Qatar and Turkey take on negotiations over prisoner exchanges, while negotiations with Egypt lead to a Palestinian force — one in which Hamas holds no sway — taking its place in Gaza.

It is certain that Israel would not be pleased with this option, but rejecting it would be a scandal that is hard to explain. The mission of demographic change would no longer be easy if the war has ended.

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